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This dissertation examines the impact of the Black church on electoral politics 
through an analysis of the role it played during the 2004 presidential election. By 
examining this particular election, I illustrate both the complexity and political mport 
of the Black church and how neither can be taken for granted by presidential 
candidates or major political parties seeking to win elections. Paying particul  
attention to the strategies the Bush campaign and Republican Party used to target a 
certain segment of the Black church, I focus on faith-based initiatives and same-sex 
marriage as two specific issues that connected Black churches to the 2004 presidential 
election in critical ways. I collected data from historical and politica exts as well as 
newspapers and published reports. My interviews with a cross-section of clergy, party 
operatives and political activists also provided critical information. This dissertation 
will examine the significance of the role faith-based initiatives and values centered 
wedge politics played in impacting Black pastors and churches during the countdown 
  
to the general election of 2004. The Bush campaign targeted and successfully reached 
evangelical Black pastors and congregations across the nation by appealing to their 
conservative moral values. This is significant for two reasons. First, because in 
expressing their support for President Bush, these Black churches represented a clear 
departure from the perception that all Black churches support Democratic candidates. 
They also complicated the notion that African Americans, often thought of as a racial 
monolith, are politically predictable. Second, because it signaled a shift in Republican 
presidential campaign outreach strategy from the previous four presidential elections. 
This study will interrogate whether that strategic shift was grounded in a desire to 
broaden and diversify the base of the Republican Party. The Bush campaign 
capitalized on existing relationships with Black churches and pastors, which were 
cultivated as the administration courted their support during Bush’s first term with 
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“As far as I am concerned, I see the hand of God on President Bush.”1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In 2004 President George W. Bush was reelected by another close margin. He 
beat his opponent, Senator John F. Kerry, by 3,337,303 votes, which equaled 2% of 
the popular vote.2 Although Kerry conceded the day after the election, controversy 
surrounded the results, which were quite close in Ohio, a key battleground state that 
gave Bush the margin of victory. As much discussion as there was in the mainstream 
press about the election results, in the days, weeks and months following the election 
there was also quite a bit of talk about the African American community and how it
responded to each candidate.   
The Democratic nominee, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kerry, had been 
plagued for months by reports that he was not connecting with African American 
voters. He was also criticized for not diversifying his senior campaign staff until close 
to the general election. Meanwhile, on the other side of the aisle, reports were 
circulating that George W. Bush was making inroads with African Americans, 
Christians in particular, who like him, opposed same-sex marriage. Consequently, it 
was argued that values in general and same-sex marriage in particular es ted in 
critical African American votes for Bush. This public narrative continued in spite of 
the exit polling which indicated that Bush only received 2% more of their votes in 
                                                
1 Kirkpatrick, “Black Pastors Backing Bush Are Rarities, but Not Alone,” New York Times, October 5, 
2004. 
2 Kevin J. McMahon, David M. Rankin, Donald W. Beachler, and John Kenneth White, Winning the 




2004 than he did in the 2000 election.3 Although this nationwide margin was small, it 
obscured a significant increase of seven or more percentage points in African 
American votes for Bush in key states including Ohio and Pennsylvania.4 When 
broken down by state, these numbers indicate that the Bush reelection campaign and 
the Republican Party were able to appeal to the often over looked conservative moral 
values of some African American Christians.  
In the following study, I will argue that the Bush campaign capitalized on 
their existing relationships with Black churches and pastors, which were cultivated as 
the administration courted their support during Bush’s first term with promises of 
faith-based initiative funding. I will also provide evidence that the Bush campaign 
used same-sex marriage, the most controversial domestic policy issue debated during 
the campaign, to gain African American votes. In short, this dissertation will 
interrogate the significance of the role faith-based initiatives and values centered 
wedge politics played in impacting Black pastors and churches during the countdown 
to the general election of 2004. 
The Bush campaign targeted and successfully reached some Black pastors and 
congregations across the nation by appealing to their conservative values. This i  
significant for two reasons. First, because in expressing their support for President 
Bush, these Black churches represented a clear departure from the perception that all 
Black churches support Democratic candidates. They complicated the notion tha all 
African Americans, often thought of as a racial monolith, are politically predictable. 
                                                
3 Larry J. Sabato, Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential 
Election (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006), 105. 
4 Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, “The Deck and the Sea: The African American Vote in the 
Presidential Elections of 2000 and 2004,” in The Expanding Boundaries of Black Politics, ed. Georgia 




To understand this dynamic this study will illuminate the complexity of the Black 
church along denominational and class lines. Second, because it signaled a shift in 
Republican presidential campaign outreach strategy from the previous four 
presidential elections. This study will interrogate whether that strtegic shift was 
grounded in an authentic desire to broaden and diversify the base of the party or if it 
was motivated by ambition to win the 2004 election.  
At present, no comprehensive literature connects an examination of the 
“Black church,” its relationship to faith-based initiatives, response to the same- ex 
marriage debate within the context of the 2004 election, and the Bush reelection 
campaign’s outreach and strategy. Considering the interplay of these phenomena is 
critical to offering a complex rather than simplistic assessment of the Black church’s 
role in the election.  To that end, this study builds on the work of Fredrick C. Harris, 
who interrogates the multifaceted relationship between Black religion and activism in 
Something Within: Religion in African American Political Activism. His exhaustive 
examination of how Black religion impacted Black political involvement in the 20th 
Century in Something Within provided a solid foundation for my analysis of the 
significant role Black churches played in the 2004 election. Harris’ central argument 
is that “religion's affects on Black activism varies not only because of religion's 
multidimensionality, but also because of the nature and context of political action.”5  
This intersectional theory supports my assertion that a combination of the 
Bush campaign’s targeting strategy and the complexities of the Black church, resulted 
in a slight but important shift in Black presidential political activism in 2004 that had 
                                                
5 Fredrick C. Harris, Something Within: Religion in African American Political Activism (New York: 




significant implications for both parties. In Something Within, Harris considers “how 
religion…mobilizes African Americans into the political process.”6 This study 
focuses more narrowly on how a specific segment of the Black church mobilized its 
members to support a particular presidential candidate. Consequently, this project 
seeks to break new ground in analysis of an election that has been the source of much 
spirited speculation and debate. Within those political, religious and cultural debates, 
the role of the Black church has received sparse attention and research presented in 
the following pages will contribute to filling that scholarly void. This project will
draw from literature in four main areas.  
First, I will look at the history of the Black church as a complex and dynamic 
entity, which contradicts its typical characterization as a monolithic “institution.”  
Theologian C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya’s The Black Church in the 
African American Experience, includes an exhaustive look at the history of the 
different denominations within the Black church. Lincoln and Mamiya’s work will 
help me address the fact that the “Black church” is actually comprised of a diverse 
collection of denominations and congregations that cover a wide range of theologies, 
levels of social activism and socio economic status. Lincoln and Mamiya devote an 
entire chapter to politics, and include an insightful section that discusses the 
“ambiguity of the Black church toward politics,” arguing that it is due to its “strong 
evangelical tradition.”7 They maintain that this born-again evangelical tradition has a 
strong influence among Black Christians, and is correlated with political 
                                                
6 Ibid, p. 8. 
7 C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, The Black Church in the African American Experience 




conservatism among whites.  Their argument underscores my assertion that George 
W. Bush’s Christian values struck a chord with a number Black Christians.  
More recent studies of the Black church and Black religion including R. Drew 
Smith’s New Day Begun: African American Churches and Civic Culture in Post-Civil 
Rights America and Black Church Studies: An Introduction a d The African 
American Religious Experience in America were also extremely useful. For example, 
members of the Black Religious Scholars Group (BRSG), which collectively 
authored Black Church Studies, offer a detailed look at the Black church tradition in 
the context of an interdisciplinary “field of study that describes and analyzes the 
legacy, traditions, and social witness of the Black church in North America.”8 They 
include explanations of, and historical context for, Black church theory, theology, 
history, methodology and hermeneutics. While the format of the study is geared 
towards Black Church Studies instructors and students, its concise explanation of a 
myriad of concerns relevant to this project, including Black theologies, and African 
American “Christian social ethics” helped me further illuminate the complexities of 
the Black church.    
Anthony B. Pinn’s, The African American Religious Experience in America, 
was useful because Pinn included information about African American Christians 
who exist within historically white protestant denominations including the Lutheran, 
Presbyterian and Episcopal churches as well as the Roman Catholic Church. He also 
posited the “Black church” and Black Christians within the broader religious 
experience of African Americans which is certainly not limited to Christianity. This 
                                                
8 Stacey Floyd-Thomas, Juan Floyd-Thomas, Carol B. Duncan, Stephen G. Ray, Jr., and Nancy Lynne 




background was helpful in ensuring that I did not trade one generalization, that all 
Black Christians think and vote alike, for another, that all African Americans are 
Christian and belong to historically Black denominations and congregations. 
Although A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election 
focused primarily on white Christians and their impact on the election, a few chapters 
including Scott Keeter’s “Evangelicals and Moral Values” and Eric L. McDaniel’s 
“The Black Church: Maintaining Old Coalitions” provided useful quantitative data 
about Christian African American voters. It is worth noting that A Matter of Faith 
was one of few religion based studies of the 2004 election that either included figur s
about Black voters or differentiated between Black church denominations.  
Next, I will look at literature focused on the 2004 presidential election. Along 
with an examination of the Bush campaign’s targeting strategy, this literatur also 
includes a comparison of how both campaigns handled African American outreach. 
Four studies were particularly useful in identifying the strengths and weakness of 
both campaigns and candidates. Election 2004: How Bush Won and What You Can 
Expect in the Future, was written by Evan Thomas who assembled the reports, 
observations and reflections of Newsweek reporters who traveled with both 
campaigns and were able to “blend into the background.”9 This insider account of the 
2004 campaign season provides balanced assessments of everything from how both 
candidates handled “the road” to the momentum each campaign gained and lost. 
Thomas’ central argument, that the Bush campaign was “better organized” and their 
candidate had the advantage of being a “natural campaigner” is not unique, as it was 
                                                
9 Evan Thomas, Election 2004: How Bush Won and What You Can Expect in the Future (New York: 




echoed by other mainstream journalists and political science scholars, including Larry 
Sabato and Ronald W. Walters.10 However, Election 2004’s intimate tone and honest 
analysis helps fill in details that other more polling centered analyses neglected. 
Four researchers, Kevin J. McMahon, David M. Ranken, Ronald W. Beachler 
and John Kenneth White, provide a concise and informative look at the campaign in 
Winning the White House, 2004: Region by Region, Vote by Vote. With over forty 
figures and tables, Winning the White House, 2004 proved extremely valuable to this 
study, especially chapters and tables included in the “Issues” section. The charts on 
same-sex marriage and evangelical voters captured rarely reported information that 
informed my analysis of the Bush campaign’s targeting strategy. Unfortunately, the 
study contained little analysis or polling data broken down by race and no 
information about African American Christians or evangelicals broken down by 
denomination.  
Applebee’s America: How Successful Political, Business, and Religious 
Leaders Connect with the New American Community by Douglas B. Sosnik, Matthew 
J. Dowd and Ron Fournier like Election 2004, is far from a scholarly treatment of the 
2004 presidential election. However, one of its authors, Matthew J. Dowd, was the 
technical mastermind behind the MicroTargeting method, which the Bush reelection 
campaign used with such great precision. He writes about their strategy with 
surprising candor. As a result, Applebee’s America is not only filled with anecdotes 
and observations about the campaign but also slices through political science jargon 
and presents sensible arguments about why Bush was reelected with simple but 
informed theories. For example, early in Applebee’s America the authors assert that 
                                                




the President was reelected because he conveyed a sense of authenticity to voters and 
spoke to their “Gut Values,” an ability he shared with President Bill Clinton. They
explain that the campaign used the unpopular War in Iraq to forge the President’s 
strongest connection to voters who “opposed the war but voted for Bush because they 
thought he had the Gut Values to keep them safe”.11 Such insider observations 
confirmed what many journalists and scholars speculated from the sidelines during 
and after the election. The authors’ analyses in Applebee’s America complimented 
other more scholarly analyses of political strategy during the 2004 presidential 
campaign including Jo Renee Formicola’s The Politics of Values: Games Political 
Strategists Play which provided a sound strategic context for this chapter.  
Finally, Ronald W. Walters’ Freedom is Not Enough: Black Voters, Black 
Candidates and American Presidential Politics, greatly informed this study because it 
is the only contemporary comprehensive treatment of the role of African Americans 
in presidential politics, and because it provides an excellent historical review of late 
20th Century Black political participation. Walters argues for the continued 
development and growth of what Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr. has called the “third rail” of 
politics: independent Black political mobilization and strategy. He opens and closes
the study by stressing the primacy of strengthening the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
which he argues was compromised by the 2000 election. His astute and candid 
critique of contemporary Black leadership was also invaluable. Echoing much of 
Walter’s scholarship on Black political activism and leadership, several articles from 
                                                
11 Doug B. Sosnik, Matthew J. Dowd, and Ron Fournier Applebee’s America: How Successful 
Political, Business, and Religious Leaders Connect With the New American Community. (New York: 




The Expanding Boundaries of Black Politics provided additional perspectives that 
complicated my discussion of African American voters and the 2004 election. 
The literature on faith-based initiatives, although limited in number, is quite 
comprehensive. Literature on the topic which proved useful to this project include Jo 
Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segers and Paul Weber’s Faith Based-Initiatives and the 
Bush Administration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, which gives a fairly unbiased 
look at faith-based initiatives as the hallmark domestic policy of the first Bu h 
administration. The “good” in the title describes the best attributes of faith-b sed 
initiatives, including what influenced Bush to conceive the idea as well as the good 
intentions of those who helped him bring it to fruition. The “bad” refers to the portion 
of the study dedicated to discussing major issues at the center of the onslaught of 
criticism the Bush administration encountered as it attempted to institutionalize faith-
based initiatives.  This chapter was especially informative because it provided details 
about the “constitutional and legal challenges that plague faith-based initiatives” 
making it difficult to translate the concept into legislation.12 The failure of faith-based 
initiative legislation along with the political battles that hampered the President’s 
premier domestic priority from its inception, are the focus of the “ugly” chapter of the 
text.   
Studies including Bob Wineburg’s Faith-Based Inefficiency: The Follies of 
Bush’s Initiatives and Of Little Faith: The Politics of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based 
Initiatives by Amy E. Black, Douglas L. Koopman & David K. Ryden take a more 
critical stance and suggests that the 2000 Bush campaign and subsequent 
                                                
12 Jo Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segers and Paul Weber, Faith-Based Initiatives and the Bush 





administration threw their weight behind faith-based initiatives because of th ir 
aggressive plan to increase the President’s base of support in the 2004 election. In 
Faith-Based Inefficiency Wineburg, a Social Work scholar at the University of North 
Carolina, Greensboro, criticizes the Bush administration for launching a national 
versus locally centered initiative that was “ideologically driven and poorly 
executed.”13 He argues effectively that the administration should have sought more 
input from local leaders who had a better sense of what was needed and which 
churches and organizations were best equipped to address those needs. Faith-Based 
Inefficiency also contains a chapter cryptically titled “Blacks and Jews” that included 
valuable information about President Ronald Reagan’s limited outreach to Black 
churches which Wineburg claims foreshadowed Bush’s campaign strategy.  
In Of Little Faith, Black, Koopman and Ryden contend that the Bush 
administration’s zealous public support of faith-based initiatives was purely political. 
According to Black, Koopman and Ryden, “their overt support for intense and vocal 
religion would be consistent with the views of the Republican Party’s white 
Protestant base, yet its emphasis on aiding the poor would help with moderate whites, 
Catholics, and racial minorities who would be the prime beneficiaries of faith-b sed 
funds.”14 This indictment was reiterated by a White House insider in Tempting Faith: 
An Inside Story of Political Seduction. David Kuo, who worked in the White House 
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) as a Special Assistant to 
                                                
13 Bob Wineburg, Faith-Based Inefficiency: The Follies of Bush’s Initiat ves (Westport: Praeger, 
2007), 117. 
14 Amy E. Black, Douglas L. Koopman, and David K. Ryden Of Little Faith: The Politics of George 




George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003, provided a scathing account of how faith-based 
initiatives were touted versus what they actually achieved and how.  
According to Kuo, even as it became clear that faith-based initiatives would 
not be fully funded, the administration supported and encouraged the White House 
OFBCI to host conferences in key states including Pennsylvania and Georgia (where 
Republicans were trying to unseat a Democratic governor and senator) that would 
provide churches with information on how to apply for federal grants. In much the 
same way that Applebee’s America provided intimate insight into the Bush reelection 
campaign targeting strategy, Tempting Faith documented the disconnect between the 
President’s rhetoric and his administration’s lack of commitment to giving his faith-
based initiative “teeth” through sound implementation and new federal funding. Kuo 
concludes his account by arguing that the Bush administration’s deceit simply 
reiterated the limitations of political leaders who are seduced by power. Although his 
concluding argument is weak, the observations made along the way in Tempting 
Faith helped substantiate my assertions about the White House’s narrow political 
priorities during President Bush’s first term.  
Paul Kengor’s God and George W. Bush: A Spiritual Life and Stephen 
Mansfield’s The Faith of George W. Bush help provide the personal history and 
background necessary to understand Bush’s religious convictions, which became a 
crucial component of the Bush campaign’s outreach effort to African American 
churches. While these authors are transparent about their respect for and support of 




like this one offered by Mansfield about what differentiates Bush from other overtly 
religious presidents: 
What distinguishes the presidency of George W. Bush thus  
far is not just the openness with which he has discussed his personal 
conversion and spiritual life, nor simply the intensity of his public 
statements about faith. Rather, he is set apart both by the fact that he 
seems to genuinely believe privately what he says publicly about 
religion—when Americans are more used to religious insincerity from 
their leaders—and by the fact that he seeks to integrate faith with 
public policy at the most practical level.15 
 
Mansfield’s assertion that Bush’s faith has influenced his public policy is supported 
by the fervor with which he rallied behind faith-based initiatives during the 2000 
presidential campaign and his first administration. However, those who have reflected 
on the first four years of his presidency including Wineburg and Kuo, argue that too 
often regarding faith-based initiatives, his actions contradicted his faith.  
Several studies have been published on the issue of same-sex marriage over 
the last decade. George Chauncey’s Why Marriage?: The History Shaping Today’s 
Debate Over Gay Equality, David Moats’ Civil Wars: A Battle For Same-sex 
marriage and The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, edited by Craig A. Rimmerman 
and Clyde Wilcox are examples of solid examinations of the topic. Chauncey anchors 
his discussion of same-sex marriage within the historical context of how heterosexual 
Americans’ attitudes towards gay people have shifted, recalling the widespread and 
intense discrimination that gay men and women faced just a few decades ago. He 
argues that today’s discrimination has taken on a different, more organized form, 
evident in the current political campaigns against gay rights.  
                                                




Civil Wars: A Battle for Same-sex marriage provides a balanced look at the 
issue by chronicling the battle over same-sex marriage in Vermont, which culminated 
in the state becoming the first to grant gay and lesbian couples the right to join in civil 
unions.  Moats includes stories and anecdotes from Vermont citizens who gave public 
testimony in front of the state legislature which was tasked with the responsibility of 
changing the law after the Vermont Supreme Court decision stating that gays had a 
right to marry.   
The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage is one of few studies published on same-
sex marriage that focuses on the politics of the issue. A collection of chapters wri ten
by political science scholars and gay rights activists, the project does not have a 
“single theoretical framework.”16 However, some of its chapters including “Same-Sex 
Marriage in the 2004 Election” by DeWayne L. Lucas were informative. What sets 
Lucas’ chapter apart from others in the study and from many other scholarly and 
newspaper articles, was his focus on how the Republican Party “framed the election 
as a defense of the institution of marriage.”17 According to Lucas, the Democratic 
Party never defined their stance on the issue and spent much of the election season on 
the defensive, fearing definitive support for same-sex marriage would alienate centrist 
Democrats. His argument underscores my assertion that the Kerry campaign and 
Democratic Party, while their fundraising was competitive, failed to successfully 
differentiate themselves from the Republican Party on a number of key issues during 
the 2004 election. Although none of these studies address the Black church’s 
response to same-sex marriage in significant detail, they are worth mentioning 
                                                
16 Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), xii. 




because they provided a solid historical context in which to discuss how same-sex 
marriage became such a significant issue during the 2004 presidential campaign and 
election.        
This project also pulled from a plethora of mainstream and alternative news 
sources that covered the election and provided post election commentary. Articles 
from mainstream periodicals including the N w York Times, Washington Post, Boston 
Globe and Philadelphia Inquirer helped capture the progression of the Bush and 
Kerry presidential campaigns and their African American outreach strategies.  Such 
articles documented the response to their tactics by various political pundits and 
observers before and after the election.  
 
Intersections: Race, Class, Culture and Sexual Orientation 
 
Although this project focuses on African Americans and Black churches 
within the context of the 2004 presidential election, it also recognizes the extent to 
which race, culture, class and sexual orientation informed much of what transpired. 
The interplay of these phenomena informed many of the questions that drove my 
research and interviews. For example, was the seemingly unlikely pairing of the 
Republican Party, a historically conservative and exclusive institution run by white 
men, and Black churches, whose congregations are historically filled with Afrcan 
American Democratic members, an indication that certain religious philosophies 
transcend race and social class? Or was this an opportunity for the Bush campaign to 
use the controversial issue of same-sex marriage to mask its other conservative 




Americans?  Furthermore, was this “coalition” of Bush and the Republican Party with 
certain Black pastors more or less genuine than the questionable relationship between 
the Democratic Party and Black churches?  
There is a certain culture of “exchange” that takes place between Black 
churches and political campaigns during election cycles. It is a phenomenon, well 
known in political circles, that involves direct payments to ministers by campaigns in 
exchange for endorsements and general support. There are some, like Chicago 
Tribune columnist Clarence Page, who suggest that faith-based initiatives are merely 
a new form of this “patronage.” Another example of how this project will investigate 
culture is through an analysis of the difference between George W. Bush and John 
Kerry’s “style” of faith, which became evident during media coverage of the 
candidates. Jodi Wilgoren and Bill Keller of the N w York Times observed that one 
candidate was much more comfortable discussing his faith than the other: 
 
Senator John Kerry’s visible discomfort with discussing religion is in 
stark contrast to President Bush’s spiritual rebirth into more 
confessional tradition of evangelical Christianity; is more at ease in the 
realm of secular facts; despite frequent invocations of term ‘values,’ he 
has not yet connected his agenda to deeper moral convictions, but with 
polls showing Bush in the lead among Catholics and Protestants, Kerry 
says he will discuss his faith at the “appropriate moment.”18 
 
This project will explore whether the difference in their style of faith impacted the 
public’s perception of their views on sexual orientation and homosexuality in general 
and same-sex marriage in particular. Besides the obvious differences in their views, 
another distinction involved the style of how each candidate “wore” their religious 
faith and how that translated into their language and messaging about the issue. 
                                                




Some suggest that style has become just as important in presidential elections 
as substance. For example, many pundits argue that style was at the core of Bill 
Clinton’s appeal within the African American community, which by his second term 
celebrated him as the “first Black president.” In spite of support for a myriad of 
conservative domestic policies including mandatory sentencing and welfare rform, 
President Clinton was viewed by African Americans across socio-economic classes as 
what American Studies scholar Sheri Parks calls, “Brother Bill,” someone “we could 
have taken home.” In short, they could relate to him.19 Although neither Bush nor 
Kerry achieved Clinton’s level of appeal with African Americans, I willargue that 
Bush’s brand of evangelical Christianity was easier for some African Americans to 
relate to than Kerry’s more private approach to his religious faith. Perhaps those 
African American pastors and congregants who supported Bush, did so because they 
could relate to his unapologetic style of Christian beliefs, manifested in his stance on 
same-sex marriage. I will argue that this was not lost on the Bush campaign, who 
fashioned an outreach strategy which included mailings to Black pastors in 
battleground states extolling the Christian values and principles of George W. Bush. 
 
Ethnographic Interviews  
 
Because this project is concerned with the Bush—and to a lesser degree—
Kerry campaign strategies, ethnographic interviews, conducted within a particular 
context and environment, were critical. I incorporated interviews20 ith campaign 
operatives, pastors, activists and party insiders. My interviews with Leah Daughtry, 
                                                
19 Sheri Parks, “Brother Bill,” Baltimore City Paper, January 17, 2001. 




former Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chief of Staff and former Secretary 
of Labor and Democratic political veteran Alexis M. Herman, provided rich 
information about the history of the Party’s African American outreach to churches 
and its current challenges.21 I interviewed the former in her office at the DNC and 
was struck by her candor as we sat just steps away from Chairman Howard Dean’s 
office.22 The latter, whose political involvement has been in a mostly advisory 
capacity since she left the Department of Labor in 2001, provided her first-hand 
knowledge of African American church outreach in presidential campaigns dating 
back to Jimmy Carter’s reelection campaign in 1976.23 
                                                
21 Leah Daughtry, Joseph Watkins and Jesse Jackson, Sr. served dual roles during my interviews with 
them. They are all ministers who also happen to have been very active in party and presidential 
politics. 
22 I first met Leah Daughtry when she worked at the Department of Labor and I was the Director of 
African American Outreach at the DNC. I encountered h r again when I worked on the pre-transition 
team for the Kerry campaign. We had interacted in political circles over a six year span by the time of 
our interview but a mutual acquaintance helped us reconnect. I interviewed her in her office in her 
capacity as the Chief of Staff to Chairman Howard Dean at the Democratic National Committee. In 
spite of our presence at the National Headquarters, she was candid and honest and even critical at time 
of the party. You could look out of her office and see people working at rows of desks, but we were 
able to close ourselves off from that bustling environment by closing her door and shutting the shades. 
Daughtry was one of the people I interviewed who wore two professional hats, both of which were 
relevant to the project. As a political operative with experience in several presidential elections she was 
invaluable. However, her position as a Pentecostal preacher was extremely informative because she 
gave an insider’s perspective on the role Pentecostal preachers and churches played during the 2004 
election. Although she mentioned her father, who is also a Pentecostal preacher during the interview, 
and the fact that he remains an anomaly as an activist Pentecostal preacher who is politically engaged, 
after our interview I discovered that he is widely known for his activism, especially in New York City. 
This fact further legitimizes her observations and lso explains the cultural contradictions she 
embodies by being both a Pentecostal preacher and apolitical operative. It also explains her 
willingness to speak critically about “her” church.   
23 I had a preexisting relationship with Alexis Herman that spanned over a decade. I first encountered 
her through an African American leadership organization and would interact with her in multiple 
political environments over the years. I worked with her most directly in her capacity as the co-chair of 
the Kerry transition in 2004. I believe my ability to remain discreet throughout that process engenderd 
a trust that resulted in her comfort during our interview which I conducted in her house. She was 
relaxed because we were in her environment and I worked around her schedule so I could let the 
interview develop into a conversation in some places which led to questions I did not originally intend 
to ask. She chose her words carefully, but that is characteristic of how she usually speaks which is 
probably a function of the various high profile positi ns she has held over the years. However, her 
deliberate speech did not preclude her from making observations about what she viewed as the 




Interviews with two African American pastors supported my central argument 
that Black churches are diverse and their political alignments vary across and within 
denominational lines. For example, an interview with Rev. Bryan Carter, head pastor 
of a megachurch based in Dallas, Texas confirmed my belief that the Bush reelection 
campaign reached out to certain Black churches early in the campaign and stayed in 
touch with them throughout the duration.24 Pastor Carter even appeared at a public 
rally where he, along with other pastors, condemned same-sex marriage. However, in 
2008 Pastor Carter, who is still opposed to same-sex marriage, was supportive of 
Barack Obama, whose campaign reached out to him early as well. My interview with 
Dr. Dennis W. Wiley, co-pastor of a Baptist church in Washington, DC was 
intriguing, because at the time, the church was struggling with internal dissension 
over whether it should conduct union ceremonies for same-sex couples.25 I 
                                                
24 I was introduced to Pastor Carter through a friend. As a result I had direct access to him and did not 
have to go through a series of e-mails or calls with h s staff. I also benefitted from being connected to 
him through our mutual acquaintance—who described m to him as a graduate student—because he 
trusted my integrity and discretion based on the preliminary conversation he had with that 
acquaintance about this project. As a result, I believ  he was less guarded and willing to be more 
candid than he would have been had I been a complete stranger. We spoke over the phone and I 
recorded the call which took place while he was in between meetings on a week day. It is important to 
note that Pastor Carter indicated that I could call him Bryan which felt a little awkward for me.  I was 
aware of his position but had never spoken with him before and thus expected our exchange to be 
much more formal. Interestingly, he did not voluntarily mention the size of his church (which has more 
than 5,000 members) but did offer that his church is rooted in activism with a rich tradition of 
community involvement and social advocacy under its previous pastor, his predecessor who was well 
known in Black church and political leadership circles. Pastor Carter was not hesitant to express his 
views on any of the subjects I broached. 
25 Pastor Dennis W. Wiley is the co-pastor of the Baptist church I attend in Washington, DC. At the 
time of our interview I had been a member of the chur  for two years and he was aware of my 
graduate research but less familiar with my political background. Not long before our interview I 
attended a church meeting where I discovered that many of the members in the congregation were 
upset because Pastor Dennis Wiley and his wife Pastor Christine Wiley had presided over two union 
ceremonies of gay couples. At that meeting church members made several comments about how such 
union ceremonies reflected poorly upon the church (an article had been written in a local paper about 
the Pastors’ progressive position on homosexuality within a Christian context) and were not in keeping 
with the word of God as outlined in the Bible. The fact that some members were leaving the church 
because of this issue was mentioned and many gay members spoke openly about their pain and 
frustration over how it was dividing the church. Consequently, this project was discussed at a time 




interviewed Pastor Wiley, who supported such unions, in his church office and his 
frustration and concern over the tensions brewing in the congregation was palpable. 
For this church and its pastors, the issue of same-sex marriage could not be dismisse 
as irrelevant to the African American experience. Our dialogue greatly impacted my 
analysis of Black churches and how they responded to same-sex marriage as a wedge
issue in the 2004 election. 
The two progressive activists I interviewed provided some of the most 
compelling observations. While Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr., Chairman and CEO of 
Rainbow-PUSH, was unwilling to directly criticize the Kerry Campaign or 
Democratic Party and their roles in the 2004 election, he offered little praise.26 For 
Rev. Jackson, the Bush reelection campaign and Republican Party’s targeting of 
Black churches was insincere and insulting because the Party made no changes to its 
ultra-conservative and exclusionary platform during or after the campaign. Thus, in 
                                                                                                                                          
community. Thus, when I conducted the interview, Pastor Wiley was very honest about his struggle 
with the issue and his disappointment and sadness that it elicited such rancor from some members was 
readily apparent. The interview took place in his pa toral study so we were clearly in his territory 
which I believe made him more comfortable and willing to speak candidly. I believe the fact that I 
spoke during the church meeting and expressed my support of the church’s inclusive doctrine and 
character, which was a reflection of his beliefs, al o made him more willing to be vulnerable about an 
issue he said he was grappling with while trying to reconcile its impact on the church’s survival. 
26 While I have met Rev. Jackson and heard him speak in person, a mutual acquaintance was 
responsible for connecting me to him. He did not remember our political interactions and I chose not to 
remind him, preferring to engage him from what I viewed was the more neutral identity of a graduate 
student.  Rev. Jackson’s travel and speaking schedule is quite hectic so I conducted our interview over 
the phone within the hour before he boarded a plane. Although I was initially concerned about his 
ability to speak freely because he was in a public space, he clearly was not and gave thoughtful 
answers to my questions. Interestingly, he was the only preacher I interviewed who throughout the 
interview expected me to participate in the rhythm, of his comments through call and response. Rev. 
Jackson was also, like Leah Daughtry, someone who wears two hats. He is a minister and accepted as 
such by his peers but is also a national leadership figure and political veteran. His opinion is often 
sought out and his presence can bring a certain weight to both political and religious gathering which s 
why I thought it was important to include his voice and perspectives in this project. His decades of 
experiences in both realms meant he was able to provide a unique historical perspective while 
responding to specific questions. Our limited time did preclude me from asking follow up questions 
but in many cases his answers were so comprehensive that he almost seemed to anticipate the direction 




spite of the criticism heaped upon Kerry for his predictable outreach to African 
Americans, Rev. Jackson cautioned against forgetting the bigger picture: the 
Democratic Party’s support of livable wages, affirmative action, low-income housing 
and affordable health care, which are manifested in its platform. One of Rev. 
Jackson’s most significant contributions to this project was his assertion that 
independent African American political and social justice mobilization will continue 
to be more effective than either party in pushing a progressive agenda to improve the 
lives of Black people in particular and all Americans in general. As I will discuss in 
the fifth chapter, Rev. Jackson, whose publicly expressed views about same-sex 
marriage were somewhat ambiguous in 2004, offered a clearer and more progressive 
position on the issue during the course of our interview. 
I interviewed Dr. Ron Buckmire, an African American gay rights activist 
based in Los Angeles, days before the general election where Proposition 8 would be 
on the ballot across the state of California.27 Buckmire was troubled by the tendency 
of white gay activists to assume everyone in the Black lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and 
transgendered (LGBT) community agreed with their political priorities. His 
                                                
27 I met Dr. Ron Buckmire as an undergraduate at Occidental College in Los Angeles, California where 
he is a professor. We were reconnected through a former administrator and mutual acquaintance who 
knew he was an African American gay rights activist in the Los Angeles area. He was in Washington, 
DC for a conference and allowed me to interview himbefore he returned to Los Angeles. He suggested 
we meet at Dupont Circle and I actually conducted the interview on benches in the park in the middle 
of the circle. Although diverse crowds use that park, I found it significant that we were conducting the 
interview in an area of town that has historically been a social and political gathering place for the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender community and we were talking about his views on same-sex 
marriage in the context of the 2004 election. I thought it was very important to balance my discussion 
of that issue with the voice of an African American gay activist since the majority of the voices I cited 
in the study were those of white gay activists. He was very comfortable discussing both the 2004 
election and the work he was doing around Proposition 8 which would be on the 2008 presidential 
ballot in California. He was most passionate when speaking about the rhetoric and arguments made by 
opponents of same-sex marriage including the notion that homosexuality was infectious and that if full
marriage rights were extended to gay couples it would pen up the flood gates and the gay “lifestyle” 




observations about the need to recognize diversity within the Black LGBT 
community were enlightening, given this project’s assertion that the Black church 
deserves similar recognition. He also admonished white and Black gay activists, but 
particularly white activists who have more grassroots organizational and monetary 
resources, for criticizing Black churches for their conservative views, while failing to 
engage the Black faith community around gay rights issues. Such community 
engagement is the challenging but important work that must be done to educate and 
dispel the myths often perpetuated in opposition campaigns around issues like same-
sex marriage.  
Lastly, my conversations with Tiffany Watkins and Rev. Joseph Watkins, two 
politically active African American Republicans, were critical because they provided 
some partisan balance to my interviews. Tiffany Watkins worked as the Director of 
African American outreach in the Bush administration and played that same role for 
the Bush Reelection campaign in 2004.28 Her recollection of a campaign manager and 
team committed to early, consistent and targeted African American outreach 
confirmed reports of Ken Mehlman’s well-organized campaign apparatus. Ms. 
Watkins also relayed accounts of several campaign events where African Americans 
                                                
28 I was connected to Tiffany by her father, Rev. Joseph Watkins, and did not discover until we began 
to communicate that we went to high school together for a brief time. That connection no doubt opened 
her up to the possibility of participating in an interview. I also believe that my political background 
(which I shared), and the fact that we had held the same position within presidential campaigns, 
created an affinity—despite the fact that we worked on different sides of the aisle—that made her 
comfortable sharing her experiences.  I interviewed h r in her office after hours. This enabled us to 
speak freely with the door open. While she was willing to recall much about her specific role in the 
White House and in the campaign she seemed hesitant to make general observations related to my 
thesis. For example, she was very clear in stating that she was not involved in any direct conversations 
about the use of same-sex marriage as a wedge issue. Yet she was aware of the “coalition” pastors like
Bishop Harry Jackson who the Bush campaign used to activate the faith community around the issue. 
She also shared that while at the White House she did not deal with or organize any faith-based 
initiative conferences. Throughout the interview it as clear that she was proud of her work and the 




were excited to be invited and included. This supports my contention that 
Republicans were building momentum in 2004 which had the potential to make an 
even larger impact in the 2008 election.  
My interview with her father, Rev. Joseph Watkins, who held the same 
position in the White Office of Public Liaison for George H.W. Bush, was interes ing 
because of his current roles as both a Republican political pundit on MSNBC and 
head pastor at an evangelical Lutheran church.29  Rev. Watkins stated clearly that 
there was no overlap between these two roles: he did not wear his pastoral hat on TV 
or wear his political hat in the pulpit. Consequently our discussion, though valuable, 
was very compartmentalized. We talked about his experiences working in the White 
House and as a political pundit in radio and television. His years as both an insider 
and partisan analyst resulted in astute observations about the role “issues of passion” 
often play during presidential campaigns. The religious views he shared as an 
evangelical pastor were consistent with research that informed this project ass rting 
                                                
29 I had never met Rev. Watkins before our interview. As with many of my interviews, I came to 
connect with him through mutual acquaintances. I had seen him in his capacity as a political pundit on 
television but never experienced him in person. I traveled to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to interview 
him and conducted our exchange in his office where  works as a consultant. While I described by 
background in politics, I chose to engage Rev. Watkins primarily from my identity as a graduate 
student, as I had during my interview with Rev. Jackson. This was particularly important because I was
aware of Rev. Watkins’ affiliation with the Republican Party and wanted him to feel comfortable 
expressing his views without thinking they were being received in a partisan context. During our time 
together he kept the door open which was interesting g ven some of the controversial topics we 
discussed. I did not get the sense that he wanted to shield his views from his colleagues or people 
occupying adjacent offices. Perhaps our interview gave him the opportunity to make his positions on 
politics, same-sex marriage and other topics clear to them. Of the people interviewed who wore two 
hats, he was the least willing to connect those rols. He was emphatic that the two were completely 
separate. He also seemed, by stating what he felt the role of the church should be (a spiritual, soul-
saving place of worship only) to make a critical sttement indirectly about “activist churches.” His 
political role and faith roles did not seem to inform each other in his mind. I felt comfortable asking 
questions but also followed his cues and did not con inue to interrogate those possible connections 




that African American evangelical churches are more politically conservative and 
hermeneutically strict.  
 All of these interviews, along with observations made during my time with 
each subject, greatly informed my arguments and provided a human element to each 




Chapter Two: “The Black Church” 
 
Before taking a look at the 2004 presidential campaign environment, it is 
important to dispel the myth of the Black Church as a monolithic entity through a 
discussion of its dialectical tensions, denominations, evangelical trends and 
megachurches. Following this analysis the chapter discusses how since 1964, no 
Democratic presidential candidate has won an election without garnering the vast 
majority of the Black vote in the urban centers of key states including Pennsylvania, 
Ohio and Michigan. It goes on to examine the fact that political candidates have 
traditionally viewed the Black church as the gateway to the Black community in these 
cities with pastors serving as gatekeepers.   In addition to addressing the extent to 
which both parties have previously used outreach to Black churches as an African 
American outreach strategy, this chapter addresses the larger political and cultural 
impact of the Black church. As journalist David Kirkpatrick observed in his New 
York Times article in October of 2004, “Both sides acknowledge that the 
endorsement of African American clergy has a symbolic value among non-Black 




rights movement.”30 This legacy has given the Black Church a certain moral 
authority—which I will also complicate in this chapter—that has contributed both to 
the effectiveness of some churches as powerful mobilizing forces and led to higher 
expectations around issues of sexuality and class which have been woefully unmet in 
many churches. 
 
Chapter Three: The 2004 Bush Re-Election Campaign 
 
Chapter three begins with a discussion of the innovative strategy used by the 
Bush campaign. This is important because their African American outreach and 
outreach to Black Churches was a piece of this larger puzzle. The chapter also cover 
the 2004 campaign environment preceding and following both party conventions as 
well as both campaigns’ African American outreach plans. Questions I attempt to 
answer in this chapter include: What were the domestic policy issues of primary 
concern to Bush and Kerry before and after the national conventions of each party? 
Did the Bush and Kerry campaigns’ African American outreach include specific 
plans to target Black churches? Media analysis and research will help me answer
most of these questions.   
 
Chapter Four: Faith-Based Initiatives  
 
Chapter four addresses faith-based initiatives and George W. Bush’s support 
of them in the 2000 election, their evolution during his first administration, and the 
possible correlation between them and the Bush campaign’s ability to effectively 
reach Black pastors during the 2004 election.  This chapter examines the history of 
                                                





faith-based initiatives, which were one of Bush’s signature campaign domestic policy 
promises during the 2000 election season. According to Amy Black, in Of Little 
Faith: The Politics of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiatives, in 2000, Republican 
leaders thought faith-based initiatives might “allow them to attract a few more highly 
religious African American and Hispanic voters” and help “change the caricatu e of 
their party as one beholden to white evangelical Protestant males, without actually 
offending any members of that group.”31  
Once elected, faith-based initiatives became the top domestic policy priority 
in George W. Bush’s first administration and the chapter will conclude by identifying 
its status by the 2004 election. 
 
Chapter Five: Same-Sex Marriage  
 
Chapter five covers same-sex marriage, which became such a hot-button issue 
by the debates, that both candidates were forced to address it. This chapter discusses 
how each candidate responded. In this chapter I argue that strategically, the issue of 
same-sex marriage became a domestic policy issue that Bush used to distinguish 
himself from his opponent whom he consistently accused of “flip flopping” on issues 
in the last months of the campaign. According to Martin Evans of Newsday.com, 
Kerry underestimated the significance of the issue. “Kerry and the Democrats thought 
they would just sweep same-sex marriage under the table, be opposed to it but not say 
much about it…That left people who were very much against same-sex marriage with 
                                                




the impression that it was not important to him, even though it was very important to 
them.”32  
In addition to discussing the history of the issue as outlined in the studies 
described earlier, the chapter also includes statistics about African Americans and 
their views on same-sex marriage. For example a study by the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life showed that since 2000, Black protestants have become far 
less likely than other Protestant groups to believe that gays should have equal rights. 
My ethnographic interviews with pastors of Black churches are invaluable to 
understanding the cultural context and environment in which these views are fostered.  
The chapter concludes with an analysis of why the issue of same-sex marriage 
became so important within the African American Christian community given the 
other domestic policy issues like healthcare and unemployment that 
disproportionately affect African Americans. The debate over same-sex marriage 
elicited the kind of intense responses that have historically been reserved for civil 
rights issues.  For example, a group of Black ministers in Chicago held a news 
conference applauding Bush’s stance on same-sex marriage and Rev. Gregory C. 
Daniels, the organizer of the event, was actually quoted as saying, “If the K.K.K. 
opposes same-sex marriage, I would ride with them.”33  
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion/Future Implications 
 
                                                
32 Martin C. Evans, “Same-sex marriage Gained Bush Black Votes,” Newsday.com. November 14, 
2004.  
33 Lynette Clemetson, “Both Sides Court Black Churches In The Battle Over Gay Marriage,” New York 





The last chapter briefly revisits and synthesizes the central themes and 
arguments from the previous chapters in order to make some compelling conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the Bush campaign’s targeting of African American pastors 
and churches in the 2004 election. It also discusses what implications their efforts in 
2004 had for both the Republican and Democratic parties and their African American 




No comprehensive study that addresses the Bush re-election campaign and 
Republican party’s targeting of African American churches and pastors exist . 
Consequently, this study breaks new ground by addressing a phenomenon that had 
the potential to shift the African American outreach strategies of both national parties. 
On a broader scale it will complicate conceptualizations of race, religion and politics 
in America, which have often been over simplified by scholars and pundits alike. For 
example, this project, through an analysis of same-sex marriage and its polarizing role 
within the Black church during election 2004, will dispel the notion that all Black 
pastors and churches place civil rights before every other domestic policy issue. 
Interviews with key political operatives, pundits and activists along with several 




This project presented a few challenges. First, although I was certain about my 




outreach strategy to Black churches and pastors, I was concerned that my assertions 
about faith-based initiatives would be much more difficult to document. While there 
was more research and information available about same-sex marriage as  wedge-
issue, I found enough information about faith-based initiative projects and funding to 
piece together a reasonable argument.  
Second, since the bulk of this project was completed before the 2008 
presidential election, I struggled with whether to update each chapter by including 
comparative polling data and post-election analyses or include that information in he 
conclusion. Fearing that the former approach might cloud my central arguments abou  
what took place during the 2004 election and disrupt the flow of the chapters, I 
decided on the latter. The reader should be aware that as of this writing, much of the 
2008 polling data broken down by race, religion and other social categories is still 
being developed.  
While I did not view my personal relationship with the subject matter as a 
challenge, it is important for me to locate myself within the project. I am both a 
scholar and member of two key groups discussed in great detail throughout this 
project. I was raised in Black Baptist churches and currently belong to the Black 
Baptist church led by one of the aforementioned pastors.34 My religious affiliation 
combined with my experiences in partisan presidential politics led me directly to this 
topic.35 Furthermore, my Master’s Thesis research focused on Union Temple Baptist 
                                                
34 I am a member of Covenant Baptist Church located in Southeast Washington, DC where Dr. Dennis 
Wiley and Dr. Christine Wiley serve as co-pastors. 
35 I was active during the 2000 election cycle as a staffer on Vice President Al Gore’s presidential 
campaign and as the Director of African American Outreach for the Democratic National Committee. 
In both capacities I encountered and interacted with three of the people I interviewed for this study, 




Church, another Black Baptist church in Washington, DC with a strong activist 
tradition.36 It was during my research for my Master’s Thesis project that I first used 
my insider/outsider status to observe and analyze a church. In this study I use  my 
insider/outsider status in the Black church tradition and political arena to observe and 
critique Black churches and pastors as well as political campaign environments.  
Both my religious background and political activism informed each other and 
also impacted my choice to focus on strategy, the candidates’ campaign “styles,” and 
Black churches as African American outreach gateways. The intersections of race, 
culture, class and sexual orientation complicated and connected each of these 
elements to each other in the context of the 2004 election.
                                                
36 Tamara M. Wilds, “Rev. Willie F. Wilson and Union Temple Baptist Church: Agents of Change 
‘Saving’ the Ghetto and the Disinherited from the Inside/Out” (master’s thesis, University of 





“There’s always the need to keep prodding the Black church to go to other- 
centeredness rather than self-centeredness. It can slide back into private salvation 
rather than social justice. There’s always that tension between saving souls and 
saving the conditions in which souls operate.”37 
 
Chapter Two: “The Black Church”  
 
“The Black Church” has always been a reflection of its wide-ranging laty and 
is therefore more multifaceted than is often acknowledged. Throughout the 20th and 
21st centuries it has continued to change, grow, evolve, shift and adapt to the socio-
economic and socio-political trends of African Americans as a whole. Although 
Black Americans also belong to other faiths, including Islam and Judaism, the vast 
majority of religious African Americans belong to Christian churches. Over the last 
thirty years it has diversified significantly as evidenced by the prolifeat on of 
megachurches and nondenominational churches. Over the course of those thirty years 
the courting of Black churches has also become a staple of Democratic presidential 
politics and campaigns. Presidential candidates seeking entrée into the Black 
community have viewed the Black church as the most logical institution to engage in 
order to reach the most African Americans.  
In 2004 for the first time since the major party re-alignment of 1964, the 
Republican Party, in conjunction with the Bush reelection campaign, included Black 
Churches in their outreach and targeting. They did this in spite of consistent African 
American alignment with the Democratic Party in past elections becaus they 
recognized the multidimensional nature of the contemporary Black church and as a 
                                                




result identified and targeted a segment they believed would be receptive to their 
message. While Democrats were aware of and had interacted with various Black 
church denominations in past elections, their failure to create and implement an 
innovative strategy to energize Black churches—recognizing the complexities of the 
institution—resulted in a significant stumbling block for their candidate, Senator John 
F. Kerry. Understanding Black churches as dynamic entities will continue to b  
critical for political parties and candidates. They must adjust their strategies and 
outreach to account for the diversity and potential mobilizing power of 21st Century 
Black churches or risk alienating and losing voters to their opposition. The following 
examination of the complexity of the Black church will begin with a history of the 
institution and its various Christian denominations followed by a look at how it has 
become a political force and why it played such a significant role in the 2004 
presidential election.  
One of the central reasons the Black Christian religious community is often 
thought of as a monolithic entity is because it is referred to as ‘the Black Church,’ a 
label which obscures the diverse range of African American Christian faiths.  As a 
result of the Civil Rights and Black consciousness movements of the 1960s, ‘the 
Black Church’ replaced the older term ‘the negro Church’ which was used by an 
older generation of scholars including W. E. B. Du Bois, whose study The Negro 
Church, was the first book length sociological study of any religion written in this 
country.38 During the first half of the 20th Century, the Negro Church proved an 
invaluable anchor for African Americans who developed leadership, public speaking, 
accounting, political and community organizing skills within the walls of its 
                                                




institutions. Negro churches often filled the void created by Jim Crow laws, 
segregation and institutionalized racism by creating colleges, Black-owned insurance 
companies and credit unions that helped buoy the Black middle class while also 
providing much needed aid like food, clothing and temporary housing to the urban 
and rural poor. Today, the term ‘Black church’ typically refers to any Black Christian 
person who is a member of a Black congregation within a Black denomination.  
However, according to Anthony Pinn, author of The African American Religious 
Experience in America, there are more than two million Black Christians in white 
denominations including the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Episcopal and Lutheran 
churches.39 Still, it is estimated that more than 80 percent of all Black Christians are 
in the seven largest historically African American denominations.  
 
Dialectics and Denominations 
 
In their comprehensive study The Black Church and the African American 
Experience, C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya discuss the history of the seven 
denominations in great detail. However, one of the most important things they 
accomplish is identifying a dynamic model for analyzing the Black church that 
honors its complexity and continuing significance within African American life. In 
part they offer this dynamic model as a way to address simplistic analyses of the 
Black church and its relationship with and impact on African Americans. For 
example, Gary Marx is credited with formulating the “opiate theory” about Black 
churches and activism which asserts that religion acts as a form of social control by 
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distracting African Americans from focusing on the reality of their “subordinated 
status” by emphasizing the rewards they would receive in the “hereafter” or heaven.40  
Since he first espoused his theory in Protest and Prejudice in 1967 premiere 
religion scholars including C. Eric Lincoln, Lawrence Mamiya, R. Drew Smith  and 
Fredrick Harris have debated the merits of his central argument that religious 
involvement “acts as an opiate” rather than a catalyst for political and civil rights 
activism. Many of the aforementioned scholars have dedicated significant portions of 
their scholarship to complicating what many argue is a simplistic theory. Fredrick C. 
Harris calls for recognition that Christianity can both “dampen” and “stimulate” 
Black activism while Lincoln and Mamiya’s dialectical theory, discussed below, 
speaks directly to the importance of recognizing that elements of Marx’s opiate 
theory exist within the tensions with which all Black churches struggle.41 
Lincoln and Mamiya sought to paint a more “holistic picture” of the Black 
church through the identification and use of six pairs of dialectic tensions. According 
to Lincoln and Mamiya, “Black Churches are institutions that are involved in a 
constant series of dialectical tensions” to which there is no “ultimate resolution.”42 
While some of the dialectics are more sound than others, they all help illuminate the 
wide spectrum of theology and practice that exists within the Black church. Lincoln 
and Mamiya’s model, along with the recent expansion of that model by contemporary 
Black church scholars, provides a sound theoretical context in which to discuss 
churches in the seven denominations as well as non-denominational evangelical 
Black churches. 
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Lincoln and Mamiya argue that all Black churches are impacted by the 
“dialectic between priestly and prophetic functions.”43  This means pastors and 
ministers constantly struggle with whether they should spend more time attending to 
their specific pastoral duties including providing spiritual guidance to members, 
overseeing the day to day operation of the church and preaching or use their platform 
to speak to the social and political issues affecting the African Americans n general 
and the surrounding community in particular. Lincoln and Mamiya suggest that 
whether they eschew one for the other or attempt to achieve balance, all pastors are 
aware of and affected by the tension.  
The next pair is the dialectic between “other-worldly” versus “this-worldly,” 
which is rooted in how Christians view the world. Other-worldly refers to a focus on 
the afterlife and Heaven so that believers are primarily concerned with living this life 
in preparation for the bounties they will receive in the next. This-worldly refers to a 
connection with the social and political realities of the “here and now.” The other-
worldly aspect down plays or even negates a need to address current day racial and 
economic oppression in deference to what awaits “beyond the pearly gates,” while 
this-worldly locates God’s word and lessons in present day struggles for justice.  
The next dialectic between universalism and particularism addresses the 
tension for pastors between the universalism of the Christian religion, the larger faith 
from which they come and share a bond with others, and explicitly acknowledging 
the very real racism they have experienced within the mainstream church. This 
tension was heightened for many churches following the civil rights movement when 
race became a part of the national and intra-group dialogue. Should pastors for 
                                                




example, regularly address how the Bible was used to justify slavery in their 
preaching and teaching or should they just preach “the word” straight from the Bible. 
Is it possible to do both? Can Black pastors and churches recognize the injustices of 
the past while fellowshipping and building coalitions with white Christians?  
The fourth dialectic is between the communal and the privatistic. Churches 
who attempt to meet the spiritual and societal needs of their members and those in the 
community through programs and outreach efforts fall within the communal aspect. 
More privatistic churches lean more towards attending solely to the spiritual needs of 
their congregation and withdrawing from “the concerns of the larger community.”44 
This dialectic is closely linked to the priestly versus prophetic tension describ d 
above because pastors who lean towards the priestly, would likely lead a more 
privatistic church. Conversely, a prophetic pastor would most likely embrace a 
communal vision and agenda for his or her church. 
According to Lincoln and Mamiya, the next dialectic, unlike the others, trends 
overwhelming to one side. The majority of Black churches, emphasize charismatic 
versus bureaucratic skills and leadership. In spite of the differences between 
denominations, which will be outlined shortly, churches across all of the Black 
denominations place great importance on and operate out of a historical tradition of 
charismatic leadership. Here, Lincoln and Mamiya discuss how this emphasis on 
charisma, rooted in the oral tradition of early African American culture, has not 
waned in the 20th and 21st centuries: 
Rising educational levels and upward mobility among Black people 
have not diminished the appeal of charisma in Black churches. While 
middle class Black churches have been more careful in keeping better 
                                                




records and in adopting more efficient organizational forms, their 
pastors must not only possess the proper educational credentials but 
also a charismatic preaching ability. ..The “organization man and 
woman,” those who embody the bureaucratic style, are seldom found 
among the pastors of the leading Black churches in the United States.45  
 
The lack of focus on bureaucratic forms (which generally characterize the 
mainline white denominations) has been a thorn in the side of Black churches, most 
of whom have not established national headquarters. Future studies of the Black 
church should ascertain the extent to which technological advances have improved 
membership and  financial record keeping.46 
The final dialectic is the tension between resistance and accommodation. The 
authors borrowed the concept for this dialectic from historian Manning Marable, who 
argues they have been the “two decisive political options” for African Americans 
throughout history. These options, which W. E. B. Du Bois referred to as “twoness,” 
have been a cultural narrative for Black people and institutions struggling to be 
accepted as a part of the broader American culture. Of course this desire, iron cally, 
has often required resisting hegemonic and racist forces which refused to allow such 
acceptance and access. Lincoln and Mamiya stress the primacy of resistance by Black 
churches manifested in “self determination” and “self-affirmation” while 
acknowledging the pervasiveness of their accommodation as well.  The Black church
helped facilitate the growth of a Black middle class by serving as a bridge betw en 
slavery and freedom: 
In their accommodative role, Black churches have been one of the 
major cultural brokers of the norms, values and expectations of white 
society. For example, after the Civil War the church was the main 
mediating and socializing vehicle for millions of former slaves, 
                                                





teaching them economic rationality, urging them to get an education, 
helping them to keep their families together and providing the 
leadership for early Black communities.47 
 
The tension of this dialectic became more intense during and after the civil 
rights movement when churches weighed the costs and benefits of defining their role 
in the struggle. Would they bow to pressure from their white Christian brethren to be 
patient or identify with the resistance movement gaining momentum across the 
country? Black liberation emerged as a result of this dialectic during the height of the 
Black consciousness movement. Grounded in the scholarship of theologian James H. 
Cone, Black Liberation Theology called for religious practice informed by the Bible 
as well as social justice and activism.  
For Cone and other Black theologians including Gayraud S. Wilmore and 
Lawrence Mamiya, Black Liberation Theology had three important components. Firs  
was the idea that “the values of religion should be interpreted from people’s own 
experience.”48 In other words, it argued for a redefinition of Black people’s 
relationship to Christianity, a religion that for too long had cast them as outsiders 
through racist biblical interpretations and revisionist history. The material 
manifestation of this redefinition was the display of a Black Jesus in church 
sanctuaries and stained glass depictions. Second, through Liberation Theology they 
advanced the idea that “God’s heart is for all people of creation to know freedom, 
justice and peace.”49 Their hope was that acknowledging these qualities in the Creator 
would necessarily place the Black church at the center of social justice struggles 
rather than on the sidelines, where they believed too many Black churches rested 
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comfortably. Finally, Black Liberation Theology sparked an “internal dilogue” 
which resulted in a critique of Black church hermeneutics and the role the Black 
church should play in empowering Black people to love themselves and contribute to 
the struggle for social and economic equality.50 According to Lincoln and Mamiya, 
this dialogue also helped gain respect and recognition of the intellectual writings of 
Black theologians in academic settings.51 Thus, Black Liberation Theology was the 
embodiment of the resistance versus accommodation dialectic but was also connected 
to the universalism versus particularism and communal versus privatistic dialetic 
tensions, with which many pastors and churches struggled.  
These dialectics provide a crucial prism through which to view the 
denominations and independent churches that make up the Black church. Through 
this prism we can analyze their relationship to politics with a depth that would be 
difficult to reach if we considered Black churches to be stagnant rather than dynamic. 
The authors of Black Church Studies: An Introduction, assert that the term Black 
church as it is commonly used is a “euphemistic generalization for the collective 
identity of African American Christians in both academic and societal contexts.”52  
This generalization, created by scholars for the “sake of simplicity and efficacy” 
lends itself to one dimensional analysis. Consequently, the authors prefer to consider 
the Black church a tradition which allows more space for viewing it less as an 
institution and more as a complex and fluid entity. Presenting a “holistic picture” of a 
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living Black church tradition is imperative to the current study and requires a 
differentiation between its various denominations.  
As has been mentioned, the Black church is comprised of seven major 
denominations. Six of the seven denominations are a part of the Baptist and 
Methodist faiths while the final denomination is part of the Pentecostal movement. 
The inability or unwillingness of pastors to reach enough of what Lincoln and 
Mamiya call the “working poor” and “dependent poor,”  who make up a quarter of 
the Black population, is a reflection of the larger societal class divide growing among 
African Americans.53 Yet there are thousands of African American churches that 
provide services including food and clothing banks, health screenings and shelter to 
those in need. The questions is, are those receiving services, authentically welcomed 
and embraced by the church leadership and congregation? While it has been 
documented that many poor African Americans do not belong to churches, some 
belong to independent Pentecostal “storefront churches.”54 
The National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Incorporated (NBC), founded in 
1886, is the largest of all of the Black denominations and is also considered the 
largest organization of African Americans in existence. 55 The other two conventions, 
the National Black Convention of America (NBCA) and the Progressive National 
Baptist Convention (PNBC) were founded in 1951 and 1961 respectively as a result 
of fractures within the NBC.56 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was at the center of the 
schism that occurred within the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A, Inc. over social 
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change strategies that led to the creation of the PNBC. Although the PNBC remains 
the smallest of the three National Baptist Conventions, it boasts unusually large 
congregations, primarily due to the fact that most of its churches are located in major 
urban rather than rural areas.  
One of the most significant differences between Baptist churches and other 
faiths is found in their leadership structure. For example, Baptist churches do not 
have their pastors selected for them as in many Methodist churches, which Lincoln 
and Mamiya discuss here in detail: 
Great emphasis is placed on being “called” to the ministry, while less 
significance is attached to formal education and training, although this 
varies from one locale to another.  Those ministers who are 
responsible for a local church are called pastors, (that is, all pastors are 
ministers; but not all ministers are pastors). In contrast to other 
denominations, Baptist pastors are not appointed to a church by a 
higher ecclesiastical authority, but are elected by majority vote of the 
local congregation.57  
 
This autonomy and lack of accountability to a denominational hierarchy has 
resulted in many Baptist pastors staying with their churches for years, often until their 
retirement or death. However, it has also enabled them to engage in political and 
community activism without fear of reproach or reprimand from a governing body. 
Yet in the 2004 and 2005 Religion and Society surveys cited by Government 
researcher Eric L. McDaniel, African Methodist Episcopal churches were mo
politically engaged and active than Baptist churches during the 2004 election. 
According to Anthony Pinn, the formation of Methodist versus Baptist 
denominations had a regional component, with the former cementing their presence 
                                                




up North while the latter initially grew in number across the South.58 As Pinn 
discusses, the three Black Methodist bodies have much more in common than what 
separates them, which is primarily their “nature and place of origin as opposed to 
deep doctrinal disagreement.”59 Furthermore, all of them have some level of 
educational requirement for those seeking to become “ministers,” “licensed 
preachers,” and “elders.”  
The first Methodist denomination is the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
Church, which was founded in 1787 by Richard Allen and Absalom Jones. According 
to Lincoln and Mamiya, the AME Church is the largest of the Black Methodist 
communions and has several denominational divisions including the “supreme 
legislative body” which is called the General Conference.60  
The next denomination is the African Methodist Episcopal Zion (AMEZ) 
Church, which was founded in 1820. Organizationally, it is quite similar to the AME 
church with the exception that there is no judicial council or court independent of the 
bishops to which decisions may be appealed.  It is distinguished by consistent 
commitment to social justice and equal treatment of women, as it “was the first 
among all of the Methodist denominations, including the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, to extend the vote and clerical ordination to women.”61  
Unlike the AME and AME Zion churches, which were founded and based in 
Northern states, the Christian Methodist Episcopal (CME) Church, founded in 1870, 
was based in the South. It also has the distinction of having been formed within the 
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white Methodist denomination when its leadership decided to segregate its members 
without losing African Americans to the already formed AME and AME Zion 
churches.62  The CME Church remains the smallest of the three Black Methodist 
denominations.  
The Church of God in Christ (COGIC), was founded in 1907 and was a part of 
the Pentecostal tradition.  It is the second largest of all of the Black Christian bodies 
right behind the NBC. Similar to the Black Methodists, The Church of God In Christ 
has a substantial organizational bureaucracy.  However, COGIC pastors of local
churches, many of which are very family oriented, serve for life. Furthermor , the 
requirements to become an ordained minister are much less stringent as Lincoln and 
Mamiya explain here: 
Candidates must be active in their local church, be tithers and 
complete the course of study approved by their respective 
jurisdictions, usually involving one or two years attendance at one of 
the seventy Bible colleges sponsored by COGIC.63 
 
Of all of the Black denominations, the Church of God in Christ has grown the fastest 
over the last few decades.  It has been characterized by scholars and religious leaders 
alike as generally the most politically conservative of the denominations, due 
primarily to its roots in the Pentecostal tradition which adheres to a “strict 
interpretation of the gospel.”64  The Pentecostal tradition is also associated with 
speaking in tongues, healing through laying on of hands, “prophesy as direct 
communication from God” and spirited services filled with upbeat music, singing and 
dancing. 
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These various denominations are all part of the phenomenon that is the 
collective Black Church and are typically referred to as the main-line denominations.  
Although they differ in many ways, including their organizational bureaucracies and 
requirements for ordaining ministers, these denominations have dominated the 
religious, spiritual, cultural and social lives of African Americans for well over a 
century.  This has been the case since slavery, when Black churches were often the 
only places where Black people—both free and enslaved—could express themselves 
and serve as leaders. As African American communities developed in the Nort and 
South following emancipation, and the majority of Black adults worked as unskilled 
laborers, many of them found solace in the church, where they were respected as 
ministers, trustees, deacons and ushers. However, any contemporary study of Black 
churches must also push beyond these seven denominations to address evangelism, an 
even more dynamic religious phenomenon which threads through them all. 
 
African American Evangelicals & Megachurches 
 
According to polling data and research conducted by the Institute for 
American Evangelicals and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, between 30 to 
35% of Americans are evangelicals. African Americans make up roughly one fifth of 
those estimated 100 million evangelicals.65 The word “evangelical” describes a 
certain brand of Christianity and is not a denomination in and of itself. Evangelicals 
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are often described as Christians who have had a “personal religious conversion, 
believe the Bible is the work of God and believe in spreading their faith.” In other 
words, they are “born-again.” Consequently, the term evangelical crosses 
denominations including some Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists nd 
nondenominational Protestant churches. This explains why in spite of how often they 
are discussed as a homogenous group, evangelicals are extremely difficult to classify. 
If the aforementioned percentage is accurate, it is also illogical to label evangelicals 
as a fringe group or “other” as the mainstream media often does, given the sheer 
numbers they represent within the country’s overall population. In other words as 
Larry Eskridge, associate director of the Institute put it, “If you’re talking about 33 
percent of the population, they’re not this ‘other.’ They’re your next-door 
neighbor.”66  
Much like the Black church is often spoken about in sweeping general terms 
which obscure its complexity, evangelical Christians are often portrayed as uniform 
in attitude and practice. While they are considered “reactionary or fundamentalist” 
according to Paul Nussbaum, writing for the Philadelphia Inquirer, evangelicals “are 
actually an amalgam of unpredictable, sometimes contradictory, strains of 
Christianity”.67 They are often grouped together because they are perceived to be 
different from middle class mainline churches. Essentially they have been 
marginalized as Leah Daughtry, who is also a Pentecostal minister, attested o during 
our interview.  As a perceived cohesive group, evangelicals usually receive attntion 
around controversial issues like same-sex marriage, which catapulted them into the 
                                                





national cultural dialogue during the 2004 election. However, evangelicals are 
concerned with a myriad of other serious issues, which according to Nussbaum’s 
research and the National Association of Evangelical’s (NAE) manifesto, include “aid 
for Africa, fighting poverty, battling the traffic in sex slaves, and supporting efforts to 
reducing global warming”.68  Reflecting the diversity which exists behind the 
evangelical label, their congregations often have different social and political 
priorities along with wide-ranging interpretations of the Bible.  
African American evangelicals are represented within this number and their 
trends further complicate the term.  According to Nussbaum, most African American 
evangelicals are “charismatic” and believe “in the active influence of the Holy Spirit” 
which is often manifested through faith healing and “speaking in tongues.” Here, 
Bishop C. Milton Grannum, who pastors the predominantly African American New 
Covenant Baptist Church in Philadelphia, PA, which has over 3,000 members, speaks 
candidly about African American evangelicals: 
There's a difference in the way we identify politically because there is 
a difference in the way we identify, period. We have had totally 
different experiences. . . . The church reflects the larger community.69  
 
The born-again, evangelical tradition, which crosses denominational lines and is one 
of the traits that many Black churches share, has continued to have a strong influence 
among Black Christians. Historically, the evangelical tradition tends to be highly 
correlated with Pentecostal churches as well as political conservatism. They are also 
hard to quantify because they don’t like being called evangelical which they identify 
with white conservatives. Consequently, they often refer to themselves as “spirit-
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filled” or “true Christians.”70 Even though the majority of Black evangelicals usually 
register as Democrats, according to Lincoln and Mamiya, many of them still advocate 
noninvolvement in politics. Black evangelicals exist in the largest numbers within the 
Pentecostal tradition. This reinforces Marable’s “ambiguity of The Black Church 
toward politics” argument and is also indicative of the growing diversity in 
perspectives among Black churches and their leadership. 
There is often a direct link between evangelical Christians and megachurches, 
which have grown at an accelerated rate over the last twenty years. Megachurches are 
generally defined as churches with more than 2,000 members attending services 
weekly.71 As of 2007 there were more than 1,250 megachurches in existence in the 
United States. Black megachurches are fairly new phenomena that have further 
complicated the already diverse scene of Black churches. They cross denominational 
boundaries and even as their infrastructure may vary they typically share an 
evangelical zeal and spirit.72  
According to Scott Thumma, less than 1% of all U.S. congregations are 
megachurches. However, megachurches have close to 4.5 million attendees every 
Sunday, the same number of those in attendance at the smallest 35% of churches in 
the United States combined.73 In other words, although megachurches represent a 
very small percentage of all Christian churches in the United States, their membership 
dwarfs that of most congregations. The National Congregations Study (NCS) found 
                                                
70 “The Jesus Factor,” Frontline, December 10, 2003.     
71 Scott Thumma and Davis Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We  
Can Learn from America’s Largest Churches (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2007), 3. 
72 Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, “Plenty Good Room: Adaptation in a Changing Black Church,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 558 (July 1998): 101-121. 




that most Protestant and Catholic congregations have a median size of seventy-five 
regularly attending people.74 The large membership numbers and consistent giving 
through tithes by members of megachurches means they bring in significantly more 
money than smaller churches as evidenced by the following statistics:  
The largest 1 percent of U.S. churches contain at least 15 percent of 
the worshippers, finances, and staff in America. Across the whole of 
Protestantism, the largest 20 percent of the churches have around 65 
percent of the resources. Money, resources, and people are 
concentrated in the largest churches.75  
 
In this country such large concentrations of money and members in one institution 
usually translate into economic power and political influence, which explains why 
interest in and criticism of megachurches has increased over the last twenty years. 
California and Texas with 178 and 157 megachurches respectively, have the largest 
numbers of megachurches. They are followed by Florida, Georgia, Illinois,  Ohio, 
Michigan and Tennessee. According to Thumma, the number of churches in the 
Northeast and Mid Central states has grown significantly within the past five years.76  
To support his assertion that megachurches are not a monolithic entity, he 
breaks them down into categories or “distinctive streams.”77 Old line megachurches 
are usually found in the inner city or “first-ring suburbs” and are often the darlings of 
their denominations. African American churches in this category tend to have a 
“distinctive message and ministry of social and economic betterment of the 
community” which is not necessarily shared with predominantly white old line 
churches whose identities are rarely so closely linked through programs and outreach 
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with social betterment.78 In many cases, old line megachurches have grown over a 
much longer period of time than churches in the other “streams.” For example, the 
historic Abyssinian Baptist Church in New York City has always had a large
congregation, but has grown substantially over the last two decades under the 
leadership of its current pastor Dr. Calvin O. Butts, III.79 Supporting Thumma’s 
assertion that these churches are engaged in the community, Abyssinian has an 
HIV/AIDs ministry and encourages civic engagement and economic revitalization 
through the Abyssinian Development Corporation. 
According to Thumma, charismatic and pastor-focused megachurches are 
typically evangelical and steeped in the Pentecostal tradition. These megachurches 
often depend on the pastor’s charismatic personality and exuberant sermons to attract 
new and retain current members. Furthermore, the senior pastor’s vision for the 
church, as opposed to a denominational or trustee board mandate, is the driving force 
behind its mission and ministry. The senior pastor usually enjoys a good amount of 
notoriety outside of the church and maintains it through writing books and doing 
“preaching tours.”80  
Charismatic and pastor-focused congregations rarely have homogenous 
congregations, and are unified solely by their attraction to a dynamic pastorwho has 
what they believe is a transformative vision. While their programs are less ori nted 
towards developing and supporting local communities than old line megachurches, 
they have a myriad of unique ministries for congregants to participate in. They are 
also decidedly less political than the old line churches many of which Ellingson also 
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points out that these churches are more likely than churches in the other categories to 
have successful television ministries like Joel Osteen, pastor of Lakewood Church in 
Houston, Texas whose Sunday morning show attracts millions of viewers. Creflo and 
Tafi Dollar, pastors of World Changers Ministries in College Park, Georgia and T.D. 
Jakes of the Potter’s House of Dallas, Texas are other examples of African American 
ministers who run charismatic and pastor-focused megachurches. In keeping with 
Thumma’s description of charismatic and pastor focused congregations, Potter’s 
House and its ministries are dwarfed by T.D. Jakes and his books, films and 
commentary. Until 2004 Jakes was steadfast in his refusal to identify with a particular 
political party saying, “I've never seen an eagle fly on one wing. I've got to be in the 
middle of the bird.” Jakes is more focused on serving parishioners who have become 
increasingly more sophisticated and remaining relevant and competitive with other 
megachurches by offering conveniences such as computer hook ups in the sanctuary 
and ample parking.81 Yet, as will be discussed in the next chapter, he was among the 
pastors courted by the Bush administration during the President’s first term. 
Seeker churches are the most evangelical in nature of all of the four streams of 
megachurches. According to Thumma and Stephen Ellingson their mission is to reach 
the “unchurched” and they use unconventional methods to non-traditional worship 
styles to accomplish that mission. Most seeker churches, many of which were 
founded during the 1980s and 1990s, are nondescript edifices which look more like 
office parks than they do places of worship.82 That corporate aesthetic continues on 
the inside of seeker churches which are often void of crosses and other traditional 
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religious symbols. Carrying the corporate trend even further, these churches operate 
from a purpose and mission statement and “organize much of their staffing according 
to their functional roles as described in these statements.”83 In an attempt to appeal to 
people who are “indifferent” to or have become disenchanted with organized religion, 
these churches emphasize one’s personal relationship with Jesus and individual 
faith.84 They often describe themselves publicly as non-denominational, even if they 
have denominational ties, to maintain their identity as innovative and autonomous 
entities.  
According to Ellingson, seeker churches make up 30 percent of all 
megachurches while charismatic and pastor focused churches make up 25 percent. 
Both megachurch “streams” have received the most press attention and criticism over 
the last two decades because their pastors have been the most visible, leading “fast-
growth” churches which have been at the cutting edge of the late 20th and early 21st 
century religious experience in the United States.85 Thumma also discusses new wave 
or Re-envisioned churches, which represent the youngest stream. However they are 
not relevant to the current discussion because Black pastors and churches are rarely 
represented in this stream.86 
As more large churches have sprung up across the country, religious and 
cultural scholars have debated whether the trend represented the future for churches 
who wanted to retain their members and remain relevant. Currently, predominantly 
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African American megachurches represent about 12% of all megachurches, a figure 
that mirrors the percentage of African Americans in the United States populati n.87  
Regardless of which stream they are associated with, contemporary Black 
megachurches usually seek to attract a lot of attention and are sometimes met with 
resistance in the communities they inhabit. Prince George’s County, Maryland, the 
most affluent majority Black county in the country provides an excellent example of 
the tension between megachurches and their surrounding communities. 
Megachurches in the county include Reid Temple, AME, Jericho City of Praise 
Baptist Church which boasts “19,000 members and 11 properties covering 73.8 
acres” and Evangel Temple which is housed in an “arena-sized” building. Some 
residents of Prince Georges county are weary of these churches which loom on major 
thoroughfares like large box stores and attract thousands of parishioners every 
Sunday leading to traffic congestion. Lawmakers worry about the revenue the county
loses every time a megachurch, which enjoys tax exempt status, buys acreage that 
could have gone to more lucrative residential and commercial construction. Yet thos  
lawmakers have to be careful because megachurches in the region have become 
significant political forces to be reckoned with.88 Here Rev. Joseph Watkins discusses 
the political power megachurches wield:  
And there are all these independent churches now and they’re not in 
anybody’s hip pocket. And those churches are entrepreneurial, they’re 
not following a script they’re not following somebody’s convention. 
They’re not trying to become president of the national convention at 
some point.89 
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The above summary and analysis of the Black denominations, evangelical and 
megachurch phenomena within the context of their dialectical tensions have clearly 
demonstrated the complexities of the Black church. Because of the dialectical 
tensions they grapple with, Black churches of the same denominations and size might 
have completely different theologies or beliefs about political involvement. As has 
been discussed, megachurches are also more diverse than most assume and should not 
be clumped together without regard to their leadership style and doctrinal differences. 
In light of these variations, the tendency to assign a politically liberal labe to all 
Black churches is deeply flawed. Even worse is the notion that they are allblindly 
loyal to the Democratic Party. The following discussion will locate the Black church 
tradition including evangelicals and megachurches within the recent history of 
presidential politics. Furthermore, it will address the myth that all Black churches are 
ultra-liberal politically, using the 2004 election as evidence to the contrary. 
 
The Black Church and Presidential Politics: A Brief History 
 
The major function of Black churches in electoral and protest politics has been 
to act as mobilizing and communicative networks in local and national settings.  
There are thousands of Black churches and clergy nationwide with millions of 
members. This kind of national institutional network cannot be easily replaced. 
Consequently, no other Black institutions have the mobilizing potential of Black 
churches. The Black church has a history of socio-political action dating back to the 
late 19th Century. However, its contemporary relationship to politics is rooted in the 




NAACP and National Urban League (NUL). Not only were Black clergy involved in 
their founding, but both organizations depended heavily on the leadership and 
membership of Black churches for support.  
Long before local NAACP and NUL offices existed, they often held meetings 
in churches.90  Throughout the early 20th Century, in spite of the deleterious effects of 
the Great Depression on African American communities, some Black churches 
mobilized voters and allowed candidates to speak from their pulpits and make their 
case to the congregation. In addition to the NAACP and NUL the Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, a Black union led by Philip Randolph, used churches as a 
“primary organizational base for recruitment and financial support,” according to 
Lincoln and Mamiya.91  
In spite of the close relationship such organizations, on the front lines of 
socio-political activism for African Americans during the first four decades of the 
20th Century had with Black churches, by the 1950s many Black church leaders 
“courted low visibility.” This supports the argument that churches wrestled with the 
dialectical tension between “survival and liberation.”92 Particularly in the South, 
where racial tensions and oppression was more palpable, Black pastors often 
preferred to quietly communicate and negotiate with local white leaders on behalf of 
their congregants. For them, incremental change seemed more realistic than the more 
aggressive advocacy and activism encouraged by pastors like Dr. King whose 
churches provided “the bodies for demonstrations” and meeting spaces for organizers 
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across the south.93 This explains why the Black church tradition and Black churches 
became so intertwined with the civil rights movement and was manifested in 
everything from music, to speeches and nonviolent protest.  These churches are made 
up of prospective voters, to whom this analysis will now turn. 
The voting habits of African American citizens have been shaped by several 
large historical events. The Civil War freed them and made them Lincoln 
Republicans. The reaction to Reconstruction in the South disenfranchised African 
Americans because in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, most of them lived in the 
rural South well within the reach of Jim Crow laws. The growth of American industry 
brought many African Americans north and this took them away from the most 
severe legal impediments to citizenship, but did not always rescue them from the 
cycle of poverty or exposure to racial discrimination. Their migration to the North 
often disrupted their traditional ways of “belonging” and they regularly sought 
community in churches, social organizations and eventually electoral politics. The 
effects of the Great Depression of 1929 on African American voters in the North 
brought them into the New Deal coalition, and northern African American voters 
have remained supportive of the Democratic Party ever since.94 In the South, 
especially after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted during the presidency of 
Lyndon Johnson, newly enfranchised African Americans also voted Democratic. As 
these voters have observed Democratic politicians espousing a commitment to causes
in which they believe, and have seen the Party platform expand to include their 
interests, they have maintained high levels of support.   
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Today, African Americans are so closely associated with the Democratic 
Party that political candidates, campaigns and many in the media assume that th y 
will vote Democratic based solely on their racial identification. Nelson Polsby, the 
author of Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 
asserts that most people have overlapping characteristics. Thus a single individual can 
be Black, female, Catholic, and a union member all at the same time. By separating 
these “subjective identifications” scholars have shown that belonging to a union 
creates a strong push toward Democratic allegiance.  Being Jewish, being Black, and 
being female propel people toward the Democrats as does being Catholic or working 
class.95 Yet, of those categories, the following discussion of African American voting 
trends will show, being Black is the only one that could stand alone as an identifier of 
political party allegiance, regardless of class: 
African Americans have established themselves as a substantial 
component of the Democratic Coalition: from 5 percent to 7 percent in 
1952-1960 to 12 percent in 1964, and 19 percent in 1968. In 1972 the 
percentage rose again, to 22 percent. In 1976, their contribution fell for 
the first time, reaching 16 percent, largely as a result of the return to 
Democratic voting of many other voters who had defected in 1972. In 
1980 the African American percentage of Democratic voters was again 
at 22 percent, and in 1984 it went up to 25 percent, where it has 
remained with only slight changes since. In 1992 African American 
and other racial minorities supplied a quarter of Bill Clinton’s votes, 
and in 1996 they supplied 22 percent of his votes.96  
 
Likewise, in 2000 minority voters constituted 28 percent of Al Gore’s 
supporters and he received 90% of the Black vote. Yet class played a role in the 2004 
election within the African American electorate. According to Robert C. Smith and 
Richard Seltzer, African American voters earning under $30,000 increased their votes 
                                                





for Bush by a total of 11%.97 Although Polsby discussed the major contributions of 
Black voters to the Democratic Coalition since the middle of the 20th Century, he 
failed to mention the significance of Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaign in 1984, 
which resulted in high African American voter registration, turnout and participation 
and was responsible for solidifying African Americans as a steady “base” of the 
party.  
Jesse Jackson’s 1984 campaign in the presidential primaries provides further 
confirmation of the mobilizing potential of Black churches in the electoral process. In 
seeking the Democratic nomination, Jackson—who was able to stick his foot in a 
door cracked opened by Shirley Chisholm’s historic 1972 candidacy—received more 
than 80 percent of the Black vote in most states and he encouraged the registration of 
more than 1 million Black voters. 98 Throughout the massive mobilization and fund-
raising efforts of his campaign, Jackson’s network of Black ministers and churches 
was significant.  As a Black church insider—he was ordained as a Baptist minister i  
1968—Rev. Jackson used the network to help him do everything from registering 
voters to guaranteeing that his campaign stops and rallies would be heavily attended.  
They helped him generate excitement about his campaign and spread his message to 
their congregations.  Furthermore, many of his local, state and national campaign 
operatives went on to hold important roles in the national Democratic Party structure. 
Just as the civil rights movement and the Black Church had been a training ground for 
him, his campaign became a training ground for talented young Black men and 
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women. Once they became a part of the Democratic Party structure, these young 
operatives advocated for resources to be more strategically directed into the Black 
community during presidential elections. 
Prior to the historic turnout of Black voters for Jesse Jackson, Sr., the 1976 
presidential election of Jimmy Carter was both (up until that time) the larg st Black 
vote in history and “the most decisive and influential exercise of minority political 
power in this century.”99 Voting rights have long held a particular significance to 
African Americans, due to a longer history of disenfranchisement. Much of the 
support he gathered in the Black community can be attributed to the influence and 
ambassadorial role that well known Black preachers played early in his campaign. 
When Carter was running in the presidential primaries, former Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Executive Director and then U.S. Congressman Andrew 
Young and Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr., pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church in 
Atlanta, took Jimmy Carter directly to Black churches and clergy. They started in 
their home state of Georgia, and the impact they made for him there in African 
American communities spread like a wildfire across the country.   
Carter’s campaign followed by Jackson’s solidified and institutionalized a 
practice within the Democratic Party, which was already taking place— lbeit to a 
lesser extent—in previous presidential elections.  Their success ensured that 
candidates, particularly Democratic candidates, would publicly acknowledge the 
critical role African American voters would play in their success at the polls. The best 
place for them to convey that message was in Black churches attended by many Black 
                                                




voters. Here, Alexis Herman, who has been an active participant in eight presidential 
elections, discusses the importance of presidential candidates visiting Black churches: 
In battleground states in the later years, it became important to see the 
candidate worshipping. It used be a debate of whether the candidate 
was going to actually go to a church on Sunday. That’s no longer a 
debate. The only debate now is what type of church. And it used to 
also be that the only church that mattered was a Black church in the 
context of the campaign’s visible structure. So if you’re gonna go to 
church you say okay what Black church are you going to go to? Now 
the issue is, what church are you going to go to? So in many ways the 
Black church created that political foundation.100 
 
 Not only did they participate in public symbolic acts, including attending and 
speaking at Sunday services, but they also depended heavily on the private counsel of 
Black church leaders, many of whom had their fingers on the pulse of the Black 
community. Post Carter and Jackson, it became important for candidates to have 
Black campaign staffers who were familiar with the complexities of the religious 
communities throughout the country and could serve as “ambassadors to the 
ambassadors.” In other words, these staffers were responsible for understanding he 
religious politics of local communities, ensuring that candidates sought the counsel 
and support of the “right” pastors and churches in the “right” order. According to 
Herman, it was imperative that campaign staff carefully navigated the candidate 
around potential local political mine fields. There was a pecking order, an unspoken 
pecking order that had to be followed: 
Often times if you were in the Black Community and there was some 
presence of elected Black leadership there then clearly they would be 
very important and very pivotal. So the candidate would need to say he 
was in Congressman’s so and so’s church. Those elected officials 
would often point you to the “right” church or their church. The 
                                                




converse of that used to be, because we had so few elected officials 
and we had so many Black churches, that you had to make sure you 
were doing a balancing act.101  
 
Current Trends in Black Church Political Activism and Participation  
 
Sean Everton argues that although Conservative Protestant congregations have 
received much attention from scholars and the media during recent presidential 
election cycles, Black Protestant congregations are far more politically a tive and 
engaged. In this excerpt from “Whose Faith-Based Initiative?: A Look at the 2004 
Election,” Everton discusses his research findings which indicated Black churches are 
much more willing to mention the election, political issues and voter registration 
during services:  
They are more likely to tell people at worship about opportunities for 
political activity, to form groups to discuss politics or organize voter 
registration campaigns, to distribute voter guides, or (as we have 
already seen) invite someone running for office as a visiting 
speaker…In 1992, 1996, and 2000, Bill Clinton and Al Gore visited 
and spoke at several Black churches during the closing days of their 
presidential campaigns.102  
 
Studies have indicated that Black churches are also more likely to participate n more 
general political activities. R. Drew Smith and Corwin Smidt in “System Confide ce, 
Congregational Characteristics, and Black Church Civic Engagement,” cite their 
Black Churches and Politics Survey (BCAP) which indicated that 84% of pastors said 
their churches were involved with voter registration initiatives while 64 % said the r 
churches helped transport people to the polls. Less than 40 % of respondents 
indicated that they “passed out campaign materials” or “advocated on behalf of a 
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ballot issue or referendum.”103 Based on these survey results Smith and Smidt 
conclude that overwhelming majority of Black churches are generally active in 
electoral politics and encourage their members to participate in the voting process. 
However, such encouragement does not necessarily result in equal levels of issue 
advocacy or protest politics. According to the BCAP, lower levels of involvement in 
advocacy and protest were not necessarily correlated with church theology as much as 
church size and infrastructure. Here Smith and Smidt explain this phenomenon: 
The larger the size of the congregation and the larger the level of 
church income, the greater the likelihood that the congregation is 
currently involved in the activities of a civic organization or has 
helped in a voter registration drive, advocated on behalf of some ballot 
measure, or participated in protest rallies or marches. Of those pastors 
who serve congregations of less than 100 parishioners, only 33 % 
reported that their congregation is currently involved in the activities 
of some civic or political organization—as compared with 61 percent 
of pastors serving congregations of 500 or more that reported such 
involvement.104  
 
These finding were supported by Fred Harris, who dedicates a significant 
amount of Something Within to Black church involvement. Harris also discussed a 
practice that developed involving Black pastors and candidates as the latter began to 
recognize the powerful influence pastors often had over their congregations and the 
surrounding community. Some Black pastors were known to accept “street money” or 
financial donations to their churches and social programs in exchange for 
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encouraging their congregations to support a particular candidate.105 They might also 
allow these candidates to speak from the pulpit.  
This form of “patronage” went mostly unnoticed throughout much of the 20th 
Century, but some who learned of the practice criticized both parties for participating 
in what they argued was bribery or even “prostitution.”106 Furthermore, this 
“patronage” is not openly discussed, even within political circles, but is important to 
mention in order to provide an honest history of the relationship between the Black 
church and political campaigns. As will be discussed in the fourth chapter, critics of 
Bush’s faith-based initiative who believed it was being used for political purposes, 
argued that Black churches who supported the President were receiving federally 
funded “street money.” Journalist Clarence Page maintains that if they were, at l ast 
they had “more built-in accountability than the old variety” which often resulted in 
pastors pocketing the money for personal use.107 Although the clandestine nature of 
the practice makes it impossible to track, it has historically been associated with 
Democratic candidates. 
What is often obscured in mainstream media discussions about the Black 
church and electoral politics, is how few churches are actually actively engaged in 
political activism. Unfortunately the activism of a small number of churches is often 
erroneously attributed to the “Black Church” as a whole. For example, 
historiographies of the civil rights movement have documented how it actually 
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thrived in spite of many Black churches and pastors who were often the last to sign on 
to such outspoken resistance. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who today is usually 
remembered as a mainstream minister, was considered radical by his cohortin 
general and the National Baptist Convention leadership in particular. His message and 
organizing efforts represented a significant departure from the typical behavior and 
attitudes of Black religious leaders, which explains why he was at the center of the 
rift within the NBC.  
Although the number of activist churches has increased markedly since the 
1960s, Black churches remain some of the most socially conservative institutions in 
the country. This is where the complexities of the church are really illuminated. 
According to Lincoln and Mamiya, across denominations, Black Christians tend to be 
“conservative in their religious views but liberal in their political positions.”108 The 
same Black congregations that may support improving public education, universal 
healthcare and affirmative action might resist doing AIDS outreach—becaus  they 
associate it with homosexual or promiscuous sexual behavior—or prevent women 
from being confirmed as ministers and pastors. Furthermore, many small Black 
churches lean towards the privatistic dialectic and open their doors before Sunday 
service and close them directly afterwards, opening during the week only for Bible 
study or choir practice. Yet most often this social conservatism remains in house, out 
of view of the larger American society. In the 2004 election the conservatism of ome 
Black churches was exposed through the debate over same-sex marriage. In 2004 the 
Kerry campaign underestimated the extent to which the same-sex marriage debat
would resonate with Black voters in general and Black Christian voters in particular.  
                                                




It is evident that failure to acknowledge the complexities and socioeconomic 
and political diversity that exists within the Black church can result in a 
miscalculation of the voting trends of their membership in any given presidential 
election. The Republican Party and Bush campaign gambled on the divisive potential 
of same-sex marriage as a wedge issue and won to the extent that it drew attention 
away from the bread and butter domestic concerns that have historically resulted in a 
bloc alignment with the Democratic party and its platform. Black clergy spoke both 
publicly and directly to their congregations about their disapproval of “gay-marriage” 
and the sinful gay lifestyle its support in states like Massachusetts legitimized.   
Some pastors expressed their outrage in the media about gay rights activists 
linking their activism around the issue to the Civil Rights Struggle of the 1960s.  
However my research illuminated trends that suggest that certain kinds of Black 
clergy and congregations were predisposed to such disdain and were purposefully 
targeted by the Republican party and Bush campaign because of that predisposition. 
In other words, they stayed away from churches and pastors who had historically 
been aligned with the Democratic party and went after more churches which were 
new to political involvement or generally remained neutral during presidential 
elections.  Based on these findings it appears that in 2004 the Republican Party was 
more attuned to the diversity of the Black church than the Democratic Party. To that 
end, the Bush re-election campaign targeted evangelical Christians, and in many 
instances to reach the largest amount of those potential voters, looked to 




In 2004, Ted Haggard was the newly elected president of the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) which claimed 30 million registered members. 
Haggard argued that NAE’s members would vote for Bush because Bush was “Born 
Again and Bible-carrying” and because “we need good, God-fearing people in 
government.” He went on to say that he would discourage people from supporting 
John Kerry because he didn’t “even pretend to be an Evangelical…and mixes up 
verse numbers when he quotes the scriptures.” His was not a partisan preference but a 
born-again preference for elected officials and Presidents, including Bill Clinton who 
gave NAE “everything we asked for.”109  
Bishop Harry R. Jackson, an African American pastor of Hope Christian 
Church, a suburban megachurch expressed views similar to Haggard’s in an article 
published in the Washington Times expressing his support for Bush and describing 
what he believed would be an “October surprise.” His comments reflect one of a 
myriad of perspectives that existed within the Black church during the 2004 election: 
 
Courageous Black voters will attempt to act as the conscience of the 
party that currently seems, to many, so insensitive to the plight of the 
poor and needy. They will vote for President Bush and hope for major 
policy adjustments in these vital areas: protection of biblical marriage; 
wealth creation opportunities for minorities; educational reform, which 
emphasizes urban change as a priority; prison reform that rehabilitates 
inmates with spiritual solutions; and health care for the poor. These 
sophisticated churches need governmental assistance from both a 
policy and fiscal level. I predict thousands of members of these 
churches, which represent the best of American Christianity, will only 
give the Republicans four more years to prove themselves. I believe 
that a delicate balance must be struck between righteousness and 
justice. For the reasons outlined above, this election I will be voting to 
re-elect George W. Bush.110  
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One can assume that these churches Bishop Jackson claimed represented the 
“best of American Christianity” were like his evangelical megachurc in College 
Park, Maryland. Where did that leave pastors of mainline Baptist, Methodist 
churches, COGIC churches or even other megachurches who chose not to encourage 
their congregations to “hope” for “major policy adjustments?” According to Jackson, 
these other pastors, who overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, mistakenly 
give social justice issues primacy over issues of “personal morality.” Pastors who are 
“free thinking” should align themselves with the Republican Party because of the 
latter and serve as its “conscience.” 
Bishop Jackson worked diligently on behalf of President Bush in 2004 to 
organize pastors of other megachurches, including Pastor Bryan Carter, across the 
country around a “values agenda.” Pastor Carter recalled that Bishop Jackson “wa  
one of the key persons that reached out to me and tried to get us engaged in terms of 
this moral agenda for America.”111 The Bush campaign and White House reached out 
to Bishop Jackson and like-minded evangelical pastors of other megachurches 
because they knew President Bush could benefit from the influence the pastors had 
over their congregations and supporters without having to address the concerns or 
questions of denominational bodies, since most Charismatic megachurches are 
autonomous. 
The evangelical connection between Bush and Black Christians is key because 
it is with that community that his faith and in general and born-again testimony in 
particular, resonated.  Therefore party and campaign strategists knew that same-sex 
                                                




marriage would upset these particular Christians vehemently enough to distract them 
from other issues, including the War in Iraq and domestic issues, regardless of their 
race. However, it was their race that made their outcry so important because their 
disapproval might result in defection from the Democratic Party or even better, vot s 
for George W. Bush in November.  The numbers suggest that this actually occurred, 
albeit minimally. For statistics that had steadily increased for the last 15-20 years in 
favor of Democrats, even a 2% regression for the Democratic candidate and 2% 
increase for the Republican candidate was significant. The Kerry campaign’s f ilure 
to pay attention to the complexity of the Black church and craft an innovative Black 
outreach strategy left them unprepared to address the friction the issue of same-sex 
marriage was causing in congregations across the country. 
Throughout the 2004 presidential election many scholars, political pundits and 
print journalists often characterized Black pastors and churches as blindly loyal or 
went to the opposite extreme and portrayed them as moral standard bearers. 
Examining the Black church as a tradition within the context of Lincoln and 
Mamiya’s seven dialectics helped illuminate these key stereotypes of Black pastors 
and churches which were commonplace during and after the election. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in later chapters on faith-based initiatives and same-sex 
marriage, those stereotypes emerged repeatedly in reporting and coverage of Black 
churches during the 2004 campaign.  
The media’s lack of knowledge about the complexity of the Black church 
contributed to the stereotypes which were damaging. In the future, scholars and 




various denominations in articles and polls. This will go a long way towards 
preventing the kind of simplistic scapegoating of the Black church that took place in 
both 2004 and 2008. In 2004 Black churches and pastors were placed at the center of 
the controversy over same-sex marriage and its impact on the 2004 election. In post 
election coverage they were blamed, because some pastors publicly opposed same-




“If you drive a Volvo and you do yoga, you’re pretty much a Democrat and if you 
drive a Lincoln or a BMW and you own a gun, you’re voting for George W. Bush.”112  
 
“In 2004 the Democrats took for granted and used a broad brush to deal with Black 
churches. They didn’t take into account the tremendous diversity of belief systems 
among Black churches and Black ministers and invest time trying to make the case 
for why voters ought to be more loyal to their party, then to their belief system.”113 
 
Chapter Three: The 2004 Bush Re-Election Campaign 
 
Against significant odds, including a controversial war and a distressed 
economy, the Bush 2004 re-election campaign was successful. Although President 
Bush was re-elected by a small margin, he received more votes than he did in 2000 
and helped usher in a Republican majority in the House and Senate. Many political 
scientists and pundits argue that his victory was due in great measure to the strategy 
outlined by Bush's Senior Advisor Karl Rove and executed by Bush Re-Election 
campaign manager Ken Mehlman. These men bucked twelve years of presidential 
campaign conventional wisdom and made targeting swing voters secondary to going 
after inactive but conservative thinking and leaning voters. Could such a strategy 
work against the campaign of a long-serving and well respected Senator who also 
happened to be a Vietnam veteran?  
With new information being released almost every week about the faulty 
intelligence the Bush Administration used to justify starting the war in Iraq and the 
mounting costs of that war, many thought the election was John Kerry’s to lose. 
When he did lose, ranking high among the reasons given for his defeat was his 
campaign’s inability to effectively respond to Republican attacks and tactics. While 
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portraying Kerry as an untrustworthy waffler was a key aspect of the Bush 
campaign’s strategy, their narrowly focused plan to ignite “dormant” Republicans by 
presenting the President as someone who shared their values was central to his 
victory. For Rove and Mehlman, conservative African American Christians were not 
only a logical component of their plan to amass enough votes to win both the popular 
vote and Electoral College in 2004, they were necessary. They knew they were 
starting at ground zero so they started building  a strong African American  outreach 
apparatus immediately which would bear fruit four years later. Although it did not 
result in a huge increase overall, in certain states the increase was substantial. The 
larger story is how the Republicans, by focusing on a small group early and often, 
took the Democrats by surprise and gave them something they had not had in over 
forty years regarding African American outreach: competition. 
 
President George W. Bush 
 
The son of the 41st President of the United States, George H.W. Bush, George 
W. Bush grew up in a political family. After losing a Congressional race in 1978, an 
older and wiser Bush returned to politics in 1994. He ran against incumbent Texas 
Governor Ann Richards and won. Throughout his terms (he was re-elected in 1998) 
as governor, Bush developed a reputation for being rigid on issues such as the death 
penalty (which was administered more in Texas during his tenure than in any other 
state) and gun control. His relationship with African Americans in Texas was 
lukewarm at best. Vice President Al Gore and his campaign exploited this and used 




as governor, opposed hate crime legislation. Add to this the fact that Bush was not 
committed to addressing the social ills, including child poverty, that were so 
important to the African American community and the result was a candidate with a 
very weak reputation with Black voters. Accounts of Black voter suppression and 
disenfranchisement in Florida, the state governed by his brother Jeb Bush, who was 
governor at the time, only intensified the damage that had already been done. 
Consequently, Bush entered the White House in 2001 in an unfortunate position with 
African Americans most of whom, polls showed, did not trust him or support his 
presidency. 
Bush had made some friends in the African American community with his 
commitment to federal support for churches making a difference in the community in 
the form of faith-based initiatives. This was his signature domestic policy when he 
entered the White House in 2001. As will be discussed in the next chapter in more 
detail, Bush committed the White House and several Agencies to create offices within 
their walls that would make funding accessible to churches. Because many Black 
churches across the country have programs that support their surrounding 
communities, it was assumed that they could benefit greatly from such funding. It 
was hoped by the White House that support for faith-based Initiatives from African 
Americans might smooth over some of the damage done following the 2000 election 
which disenfranchised thousands of African Americans in the state of Florida. Former 
White House Director of African American outreach, Tiffany Watkins confirmed this 
effort was a priority: 
I think after 2000 one of the main goals of the administration was let’s 




what to talk about. So the primary goal was to build a grassroots 
network. And to build it as broad and as big as possible and so my goal 
was to think of different ways to do that and they let us implement our 
different ways.114 
 
In his first term President Bush matched President Bill Clinton’s record on 
Executive Branch diversity by appointing several women and people of color to 
cabinet positions including Colin Powell as Secretary of State, Elaine Chao as 
Secretary of Labor and Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor. Although he 
made these historic appointments, he received little praise or attention for his effort . 
Some attributed this to his hostile relationship with national African American leaders 
and civil rights organizations including the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Such 
organizations, which praised President Clinton for his diverse cabinet, were too 
preoccupied with Bush’s refusal to give them access to the White House (he did not 
meet with either organization during his first term) and what they viewed as counter-
productive domestic policies to applaud his diverse cabinet. Furthermore, his 
appointments below cabinet level were far less diverse than President Clinton’s, 
which led some to question the depth of Bush’s commitment to diversity.115 
By the end of his first year, he had gained a little momentum with some 
African Americans through domestic policies, which included faith-based initiat ves 
and No Child Left Behind (as well as a lot of criticism). The latter was the Bush 
administration’s attempt to improve performance in the country’s public schools by 
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establishing national teacher accountability and student achievement standards. 
Whatever momentum he gained was stopped in its tracks when two planes hit the 
World Trade Center, one plane hit the Pentagon and another slammed into a field in 
Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. The administration’s response to what was 
quickly determined to be a terrorist attack were the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
As has since been documented, the newly minted “War on Terror” took attention and 
resources away from all of the President’s other priorities, but particularly his 
domestic priorities. He would spend the majority of the next three years leading up to 
the 2004 election focusing on, explaining and defending his administration’s choice 
to invade and occupy a country that was alleged by 2003 (and later confirmed) to 
have no weapons of mass destruction or viable connection to the Al Qaeda terrorists 
responsible for the September 11th attacks.  
Consequently, President Bush entered the 2004 campaign season with little 
support in the African American community. His polling numbers remained around 
20% among African Americans throughout his first term.116 Yet, as has already been 
mentioned, the Bush reelection campaign activated a rather aggressive African 
American outreach effort. That effort, which targeted a specific segment of the
African American community, was a significant piece of an innovative campaign 
strategy to garner support from groups Bush and the Republican Party failed to 
energize in 2000. Evangelicals, both white and Black, were at the top of the list. 
While this study is greatly concerned with the Bush campaign’s outreach to 
evangelicals, it is important to place it within the context of their overall plan to win 
the election. Following an examination of that plan, I will return to a discussion of the 
                                                




campaign’s evangelical outreach and explain how the social differences between 
Black and white evangelicals necessitated different strategies. 
 
The Bush Re-election Master Plan 
 
General strategies emerged for the Bush campaign in early 2004 which they 
would stick to through Election Day. One important and successful strategy the Bush 
campaign employed was to paint John Kerry as incapable of handling the office of 
President by labeling him a flip-flopper and generally weak on national security. This 
was a battle they waged openly in the media in contrast to what critics characterized 
as the covert way they targeted conservative voters across the country. In the spring 
of 2004, soon after Kerry clinched the nomination, the Bush campaign was already on 
the attack and was relentless for the next eight months. Essentially, they go  off to an 
early start (as incumbents historically have had the ability to do) and forced Kerry 
into a defensive stance before he could begin crafting a consistent message about the 
President. 
Under the leadership of Ken Mehlman, the campaign bucked trends of the last 
three presidential cycles and focused more on Republicans first and so called “swing 
voters” second. Swing voters are voters who are in the middle of the two party poles. 
They are usually not registered independents, who research has shown are often 
partisans that like the label and the idea of not being placed in a party “box.” Only 




most claim not to know where they “fit in” politically.117 With such big issues as the 
war and economy on the table, the Bush camp felt it would be too risky to devote as 
many resources and attention to swing voters as had been done in the past. They 
would focus their energies right of center and work their way towards the middle.  
So they focused on registered Republicans who had not been active, as well as 
those who the campaign believed would vote Republican if they registered. Rove 
called them “suspected Republicans” and believed they were more capable than 
swing voters of “tipping the balance in a narrowly divided race.”118 These “suspected 
Republicans” just needed to be energized and “touched” by campaign workers and 
volunteers who could share Bush’s message and vision with them. This group, 
according to Rove, Mehlman and chief campaign strategist Matthew Dowd, was 
much more dependable because they fit the profile of Republican voters and were 
already leaning towards supporting the President. Furthermore, if the campaign could 
reach them, they would be more likely to vote Republican in future elections. This 
strategy would only work if the election was close. Rove banked on the advantages of 
incumbency during a time of war (even if that war was becoming increasingly 
controversial by the day) and the benefit of having no Republican challengers. He 
also instituted a plan to make sure that it stayed close by conveying a consistent 
message and labeling Bush’s opponent as inconsistent.  
These elements combined to set the stage for a close enough election that the 
Bush camp could actually implement the Micro Targeting strategy they depen d on 
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so heavily. That targeting was the brainchild of Matthew Dowd, who pitched the idea 
to Rove of using demographic files and consumer data to locate, register and inundate 
conservative leaning voters with messaging geared towards their beliefs, concerns, 
consumer habits and values.119 Here Mehlman discusses the campaign’s innovative 
voter identification plan, which helped them determine which people would be 
inclined to support and hopefully vote for Bush during the election: 
We did what Visa did. We acquired a lot of consumer data. What 
magazine do you subscribe to? Do you own a gun? How often do the 
folks go to church? Where do you send your kids to school? Are you 
married? Based on that, we were able to develop an exact kind of 
consumer model that corporate America does every day to predict how 
people vote -- not based on where they live but how they live. That 
was critically important to our success.120  
According to Ed Gillespie, RNC Chair during the 2004 campaign, the party 
registered 3.4 million new voters who had been identified in mid 2003 by Rove as a 
top priority if Republicans were going to be able to compete with Democrats.121 The 
Bush camp found these new registrants who a campaign official described as “a 
homogenous group” of people who were often tucked in outer suburbs of “fast-
growing counties” and bombarded them with messaging and attention. They received 
direct mail, personal phone calls and “front-porch visits” from campaign staff and 
volunteers all designed to get them to the polls for Bush in November.122 Here, 
Tiffany Watkins, who transitioned from the White House to the Bush reelection 
campaign describes some of outreach efforts she coordinated: 
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My goal was of course to get as many votes as I could. Knowing that 
African Americans vote 90% Democratic, what could I do to break 
into that. And the church was one way, you know the values piece was 
one way. But I really felt that the message was showing the diversity 
of the party and what kind of people he had put in place to say look, 
this President is not as bad as you guys think. Look at the breadth and 
the diversity within the African American community of supporters 
that he has. So whether it was a small business person, an engineer or a 
pastor, there’s something that is linking all three of them to support 
President Bush.123 
 
According to a Washington Post article written by Dan Balz outlining the 
campaign’s strategy a few weeks after the election, Republicans wanted to “eliminate 
the Democrats' traditional registration advantage.” They were successful in their 
efforts and “for the first time, the percentage of Republicans equaled the percentage 
of Democrats on Election Day, each accounting for 37 percent of the electorate.”124  
Equally as impressive as the number of new registrants was the number of 
volunteers the Bush campaign had built up by election day. An estimated 1.4 million 
volunteers were actively involved in the targeting and subsequent get-out-the-vote 
apparatus for the Bush re-election campaign. The candidate played his role in this 
intense targeting production by making several trips to counties in battle ground states 
including Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania, which he had won in 2000. These counties 
were decidedly Republican and were places where his team identified Republican 
leaning voters he could reach and fold into his base. This is not to suggest that he 
avoided highly contested areas or “hostile territory” all together, because he did spend 
time in those places as well. But predominantly Republican areas were his first 
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priority as opposed to his second or third as had been the trend on both sides of the 
aisle in recent elections. 
The Bush campaign continued their targeting of Republicans with an 
advertising strategy that was also aimed at Christians in general and conservative 
Christians of color in particular. Based on their data collection the Bush campaign 
was also able to “spend smart.” They concluded that Democrats not only watch more 
regular television but also watch more local and national news. Consequently, they 
bought more airtime on cable TV and radio than in past years. In fact, 25% of their 
advertising dollars, which amounted to 20 million dollars on cable and 12 million 
dollars on the radio went to mediums other than “spot” TV. In keeping with their 
overall strategy, they decided to reach their base of Republican leaning voters where 
they would reach them best and in the largest concentration rather than spreading 
money to advertise at a time and in between shows that fewer Republicans 
watched.125 They placed many of the ads between rush hour traffic news reports 
which families listened to on their way home. Their general advertising strategy nd 
budget included buying time on Christian, Spanish-language and African American 
radio. Here, Leah recalls how effectively the Bush campaign used Black pastors s 
ambassadors for Bush on Christian radio:  
They were very smart about Christian radio. In a way, they didn’t have 
to have Bush. If you had TD Jakes, who had talked to Bush, that was 
good enough. And then the myth, the legend takes over. And you’ re 
dealing with these megachurch people. So all of the years of them just 
calling and checking in, pays off for you.126 
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What was left unsaid by Rove, Mehlman and Dowd in mid-November as they 
proudly described how they won the election, was how much values had to have 
played a role in their MicroTargeting strategy and advertising. What they did not say, 
other political operatives including Scott Reed, Bob Dole’s campaign manager i  
1996, discussed openly: 
The evangelical vote was where he really ran up the numbers. This 
was part of their national strategy to play to the base, and that's what 
they did to close. They stuck with it. They didn't waver when there 
was a push from some in the party to move to the middle, and it paid 
off in spades.127  
All of the references to the “base” necessarily referred to “suspected Republicans” 
and evangelical Christians. 
 
Black Evangelical Outreach  
 
The Bush team was also unwilling to discuss African Americans in their post 
election commentary, giving no indication of how significant, early and consiste t 
their outreach to certain segments of the African American community had been. 
Even if the Bush campaign’s African American targeting was done quietly, the 
Party’s attempts to be more inclusive were apparent during the Republican Natio al 
Convention where there were a “record number of minority delegates” and the crowd 
on the convention floor was noticeably more diverse.128 During the week of the 
convention even ultra conservative former House Speaker Newt Gingrich was “on 
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message” stating, “If we don't attract more minorities who share our values, we'll 
eventually be a minority party," in speeches to two separate groups.129  
Yet Bush campaign operatives did not openly admit that they were targeting 
African Americans. In fact, after the election they conceded defeat in the press, 
although they were essentially conceding African Americans who clearly identified as 
Democrats. They also made no mention of evangelical churches or ministers who 
were supporting them or working on their behalf across the country. During the 
campaign, Kwesi Mfume, President of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) at the time, called the campaign to task for targeting h  
characterized as insulting: 
We're not fools. If you're going to court us, court us in the daytime, but 
not like we're a prostitute where you run around at night or behind 
closed doors and want to deal with us, but not want to deal with us in 
the light of day.130  
Mfume was referring to outreach to churches and other segments of the African 
American community which the Bush campaign did without a lot of fanfare. The 
Bush campaign responded by claiming they did not change their messaging 
depending on their audience but instead talked “about the same important issues to all 
groups.”131 This reinforces the argument that they had a singular focus for the people 
they targeted. They knew that focus would be considered divisive because it was not 
based on big picture domestic or foreign policy, but on values. Yet the Bush 
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campaign knew they would have to use a different formula with Black evangelicals 
who were by no means identical to white evangelicals. 
While African American and white evangelicals share a belief in the Bibl, 
conversion and moral issues including abortion and same-sex marriage they have, 
according to historian Mark Noll, “socialized into very different political 
behavior.”132 Consequently, white evangelicals vote “overwhelmingly” for the 
Republican Party such that “Black churchgoers and white churchgoers who would 
share a common set of evangelical beliefs almost predictably are going to come down 
on different sides of the modern political debate.”133 In a PBS survey conducted in the 
spring of 2004, 84% of Black evangelicals identified as Democrats or “leaned 
Democratic.” As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the Bush reelection 
campaign hoped the President’s opposition to same-sex marriage would encourage 
them to “lean” towards the Republican Party. 
In a 2005 Chicago Sun-Times article about evangelicals, Rev. James Meeks, 
pastor of Black Baptist church in Chicago, said one of the reasons for the differences 
in party affiliation between Black and white evangelical churches is that the latter are 
much more individualistic and opposed to many of the social programs that Black 
evangelicals value. In the same article, Sociologist Michael Emerson said hi  research 
supported Rev. Meeks’ claims and argued that many white evangelicals had a history 
of opposing racial progress for African Americans.134 Here Rev. Meeks outlines 
specific differences in their social and political priorities: 
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It seems as if the flaw in the white evangelical church is that it will 
fight tooth and nail to protect an unborn child in the womb, but won't 
lift a finger to assist a child once it's been born. Where is the [white] 
evangelical church on issues outside of abortion and outside of 
homosexuality?"135  
 
Rev. Meeks went on to say he believed that most white evangelicals think Black 
poverty is self-imposed and therefore social programs would just be “an enabling 
crutch.” However, the Bush Administration and Bush reelection campaign were well 
aware of the importance of social programs to mainline protestant and evangelical 
Black churches and presented their support of faith-based initiatives as evidenc  that 
they valued their contributions to the community. 
According to political science scholar Ronald Walters, the Bush campaign and 
RNC started their campaign-specific targeting of Black evangelical churches as early 
as February of 2004. RNC Chair Ed Gillespie promoted Bush’s commitment to faith-
based initiatives and the millions of dollars he promised to Black churches through 
them. For example, Gillespie told pastors and their wives, who were gathered in DC 
for a meeting, that Bush “sought many ways to tap the moral leaders in America’s 
communities.”136 Here Rev. Joseph Watkins discusses why he believes some Black 
pastors were “in play” for the Republicans in 2004: 
There are people who are strict constructionists of the Bible and there 
are some people who do not strictly construct the Bible and everything 
in between. So really, a lot was just based on how pastors reacted to 
the issues that were on the table in the 2004 election and their 
understanding of scripture and the degree to which they felt that one 
ought to vote in concert with one’s beliefs.137 
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By October, it appeared that some in the press finally made the connection, 
including David Kirkpatrick a white journalist who wrote several articles about 
religion for The New York Times over the course of the election. In an October 15th 
article, Kirkpatrick used unambiguous language when discussing Bush’s targeting of 
Black churches saying “In a departure from typical Republican presidential 
campaigns, the Bush campaign is making a serious push for the allegiance of African-
American clergy, while the Democrats are fighting back to motivate them to get heir 
parishioners to the polls.”138 Kirkpatrick was one of the few in the media to mention 
both the size and denomination of the churches the campaign targeted and Bush 
visited:  
Mr. Bush has appeared several times over the last few years in large 
predominantly Black churches from Philadelphia to Dallas. Timothy 
Goeglein, the White House liaison to conservatives and Christians, 
meets frequently with predominantly Black congregations and 
religious groups, including the annual meeting of about 25,000 
members of the Church of God in Christ, one of the largest and most 
theologically conservative Black denominations, to the Brooklyn 
Tabernacle in New York.139  
 
Kirkpatrick went on to discuss several pastors, who though he made clear were 
“anomalies,” were among a cohort of pastors. Pastors like William Turner of 
Pasadena, California who said he thought the President was an “honest man,” and 
prioritized Bush’s personal character and beliefs over the economy or the war. Leah 
Daughtry believed this cohort was largely Pentecostal: 
Where the Bush people targeted in the African American clerk 
community were primarily Pentecostal ministers. I’m Pentecostal, so I 
know who was getting the phone calls and what people were hearing. 
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We tend to be more conservative than the others. We also have a much 




According to Walters, African Americans did not support the war, thought it 
was senseless and believed a disproportionate number of their young men and women 
were dying on its front lines.141 He cited data from pollster Cornell Belcher indicating 
that 77% of African Americans agreed in some measure that President Bush 
“intentionally misled the country as to America’s entry into war.” Walters also 
asserted that they were frustrated by the diverting of resources away from domestic 
problems to funding the war.142 Similarly, a Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies poll found that there was a 20% gap between African Americans and whites 
regarding the direction of the country with 74% of the former versus 54% of the latter 
believing that “America was on the wrong track.”143  
Kirkpatrick went on to explain that many of these pastors including Bishop 
Ernest Morris, were greatly impacted by the President’s faith and his opposition to 
same-sex marriage which “made their decision about the election a closer call.”144 A 
combination of Bush’s values and the fact that he was on a first name basis with 
pastors including Bishop Morris, went a long way with African American pastors of 
similar churches and inevitably spilled over into their congregations. In short, the fact 
that Bush was an evangelical Christian was not enough to sway African American 
evangelical pastors. While that was a good start, it also took four years of cultivating 
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relationships with Black pastors through faith-based initiative outreach and usi g his 
opposition to same-sex marriage to energize them enough to gain their support. 
 Their efforts were well organized and based on a strategy that deputized 
openly supportive pastors to use their influence externally and internally. According 
to Kirkpatrick, the campaign was using “coalition coordinators” in churches to 
identify other conservative churches that would be potential support bases as well. 
This was supported by researchers Russell Muirhead, Nancy L. Rosenblum, Daniel 
Schlozman and Francis X. Shen in “Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election,” a 
chapter in Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 
Presidential Election. In the article, four government scholars describe these efforts 
which included the explicit directions the Bush campaign gave to churches. They 
were instructed to send important membership information including lists of Bush’s 
supporters and conservative members who were not registered to vote directly to the 
Bush headquarters.145 Kirkpatrick also reported that they were given deadlines to 
accomplish these and other assignments that were meant to sway members not just to 
vote but to vote for Bush. Although their directives included churches hosting 
registration events, most of the activities the pastors were asked to facilitate were 
explicitly intended to garner support for the Bush re-election campaign. Coalition 
coordinators were even asked to host “parties for the President” and recruit volunteers 
within the congregation.  
The campaign combined legal and acceptable non-partisan voter registration 
and education activities with clearly partisan activities and both the IRS and 
Democrats took notice. The latter called their church outreach, “an exploitation of 
                                                




religious faith for political gain and a potential violation of privacy.”146 As a result of 
such public outcry, the Bush campaign, according to the Harvard scholars, stopped 
the practice. The criticism was valid given the clear violations of tax exempt status 
the Bush campaign was encouraging by asking churches to use their resources to 
share information and plan events of a partisan nature. However, it also seemed 
hypocritical, given the long-standing interactions between Democratic presidential 
candidates and campaigns and Black churches that was outlined in the previous 
chapter. Yet it is important to note that these directives were not the only questionable 
tactics the Republicans used during the election. As will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, the White House hosted several faith-based initiative funding 
workshops in key states in 2004. According to former Special Assistant to President 
Bush, David Kuo, they were not organized by the campaign but sanctioned by the 
same person calling the political shots for the White House, campaign and RNC: Karl 
Rove. The fact that people who were invited to the workshops were being misled 
about the amount of funding that was actually available, makes them even more 
problematic. 
Even with all of these efforts, it is important to remember that the Bush 
campaign’s targeting of Black evangelical churches was just one piece of a larger 
strategy to reach conservative evangelical Christians across the country whom they 
hoped would identify with Bush’s stance on abortion and same-sex marriage. 
According to Rove, it was really important for the Republican party to compete 
successfully with historically strong Democratic voter mobilization and turn out 
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efforts. Rove said they were able to get their “efforts up to parity” by mobilizing 
evangelical Christians and other conservatives who shared the president’s values.147  
Senator John F. Kerry 
 
Kerry emerged from the pack of Democratic candidates by Super Tuesday in 
March when his primary victories were substantial enough to eliminate his most 
formidable challenger, former Senator John Edwards. He was a decorated Vietnam 
veteran, who returned from the war and was among a small number of young soldiers 
over the course of the conflict to speak out against it. He came into public service in 
1982 when he was elected Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts on the ticket with 
Michael Dukakis. Prior to entering the 2004 presidential race he had served  in the 
U.S. Senate since 1985. Based on his success during the Democratic primaries (he 
won both the Iowa Caucuses and the New Hampshire primary with 38% of the vote, 
won the February 2nd primaries and swept Super Tuesday), it was clear Democratic 
voters believed Kerry would be the candidate most capable of defeating Bush in 2004 
because of his military service, voting record and the respect he enjoyed on both sides 
of the aisle as a practical politician with an informed command of the issues. But by
the time he entered the race as the presumptive nominee, he was already at a 
disadvantage because the Bush campaign was able to craft a strategy and messge, 
half of which was designed to invalidate any of Kerry’s strengths as a candidate. It 
did not help matters that the Kerry campaign focused more on fundraising in the 
spring than it did getting him out into the states to touch “real people.” According to 
Chuck Todd, former Hotline Editor-in-Chief and current MSNBC Political Director, 
                                                





Kerry wasted too much time that could have been used to establish his readiness to 
take over the White House during wartime: 
For a challenger, Kerry had an unprecedented amount of time as the 
unofficial nominee and looking back, it was not memorable time well 
spent. There were no trips to Iraq, no unique 50-state campaign swings 
and no presidential administration creating. It’s this final point that we 
believe future nominees running in a wartime atmosphere ought to 
consider. With the country at war, there was a sector of the electorate 
who despite their misgivings for the incumbent, was reticent at 
changing horses in midstream. What if Kerry had used each week of, 
say, a six-to-eight week span in the late spring and early summer to 
name a major cabinet member? Kerry would have had more control of 
each news cycle and likely forced the Bush campaign to be more 
reactive instead of always proactive.148  
 
John F. Kerry the candidate, much like Vice President Al Gore, the 
Democratic nominee in 2000, did not engender a lot of excitement. His campaign did 
little to counteract his reserved and aloof image which, in spite of his clear stance on 
issues, plagued him throughout the campaign. But this was not all their fault. Kerry 
was an intellectual who did not like typical campaign one-liners which he called 
“slogany.”149 He was prone to speaking too long and didn’t like to repeat himself too 
much in speeches, an important message branding tactic that his opponent had 
mastered. His concerned family and friends, including Senator Ted Kennedy, tri  to 
get him to work on his delivery and loosen up, but to no avail. The long-winded 
speeches filled with what Senator Kennedy called “too much senatese” stuck. 
This unfortunate image also created the perception that he was too theoretical 
on domestic and foreign policy as Walters suggested in the Philadelphia Inquirer 
when he said, “There is a persistent sense among activists that Kerry is not pasi nate 
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enough on the Iraq war, poverty and social justice.”150 This was the case in spite of 
his voting record as a U.S. Senator on these very issues, which were considered to be 
quite progressive. This perception had not changed three months later and was echoed 
by “regular” African Americans like Michael Johnson, interviewed in a Washington 
Post article in October of 2004, who expressed his disdain for Bush but ambivalence 
about Kerry. Johnson said he might just pass over the presidential section of the ballot 
because Bush “is the most inept president I've ever seen in my lifetime” but Kerry 
“does not have the charisma, and his platform does not excite me.”151 Confirming that 
the Bush campaign strategy to paint Kerry into a corner was working, Johnson went 
on to explain that he felt Kerry spent too much time sparring with Bush over Iraq and 
too little time addressing “the economic and domestic issues” that were more relevant 
to his community in his hometown of Normandy, Missouri. The article warned that if 
the “festering dissatisfaction” with Kerry articulated by Johnson and many other like 
him was not addressed, it could lead to a decrease in African American voter turnout. 
Some African Americans may have been able to sense what Leah Daughtry describe  
as Kerry’s obligatory attitude towards Black outreach which was a stark contrast 
compared to his predecessors: 
For Clinton it was more of a here’s who I am, I want you to know me, 
I want you to see me, I want  you to understand that I understand you. 
For Gore it was, okay I know I need to do this. And we share values 
and we share issues. And I kind of get it, I’m just not warm and fuzzy 
like Clinton but I kind of get it. For Kerry it was, they put me on the 
phone and told me I have to do this. And part of me doing this is the 
Republicans are beating us up on the values issues with this set of 
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people. And so if we’ve got any hope of holding them, I’ve gotta show 
them I don’t have two heads.152 
 
The Kerry Campaign: Missteps and Lost Opportunities  
 
Kerry’s struggles to solidify the support of African Americans, a very 
important component of his base throughout the campaign, by articulating a message 
that was relevant to them, might have been the result of his campaign’s lack of 
diversity early on. In Freedom, Walters argued that the Kerry campaign made a 
woefully slow transition from what he described as “the kind of campaign structure 
with which he had won the nomination to a structure that was capable of mobilizing 
the large national constituencies that were the base vote of the Democratic pa ty.”153 
As a result his campaign was broadsided by critics who expected him to hit the 
ground running with an experienced and diverse team capable of mobilizing the 
various constituencies within the Party’s big tent.  
African American political veterans including Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr. and 
former Gore 2000 presidential campaign manager Donna Brazile, were not shy about 
expressing their frustration with an obvious lack of African American senior staff in 
Kerry’s camp.154 Brazile and Jackson would eventually quiet their complaints when, 
by late summer, Kerry hired political heavy hitters like former Secretary of Labor 
Alexis Herman, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice 
and labor veteran Bill Lynch. But Jackson was still complaining to the press about 
what he argued was a backwards political strategy in the fall. Very much aware of 
                                                
152 Leah Daughtry, interview by author, Washington, DC, March 29, 2006. 
153 Walters, Freedom, 164. 
154 Rev. Jackson avoided answering my questions about the shortcomings of the Kerry campaign and 




Rove’s master plan to start with the Republican core and fan out, Jackson called 
Kerry to the carpet for “distancing himself from his base.”155  
The next month, Jackson was brought on as a senior advisor, but the 
campaign’s base strategy, much like the campaign’s broader strategy, was reactive, 
limited and stale compared to the Bush campaign.156 Kerry’s outreach continued to 
follow the same rubric as past Democratic presidential campaigns where African 
Americans received the most attention in the fall Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) portion of 
the election cycle. As Alexis Herman pointed out, there was no “ongoing outreach 
infrastructure in the party that was comparable to what was going on on the other 
side.”157 The Kerry campaign took this 20th Century approach in a 21st Century 
campaign, waiting until late in the year to specifically target African American voters. 
Just as the Kerry campaign proved to be defensive on larger issues, it continued its 
reactionary stance with African Americans only diversifying its staff or intensifying 
its outreach when criticized for its subpar outreach to a key component of the base.  
The Democratic Party, under the leadership of Terry McAuliffe, was 
competitive with the Republican Party in terms of fundraising during the 2004 
election. The party was free to play “bad-cop” and bombarded Democratic voters and 
potential voters with messaging attacking Bush’s record and the ongoing scandal  
associated with the Iraq war. In addition to raising unprecedented amounts of money 
for the party, McAuliffe was responsible for creating a database of over 1.5 million 
Democrats which he used to get the message out through daily e-mail blasts that kept 
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Bush’s failures front and center while highlighting Kerry’s profile as a pragmatic and 
well respected politician. Consequently, the DNC feverishly raised money and 
distributed it across the country to state offices in order to hold on to existing, and 
pick up new Congressional seats.  
Simultaneously, emboldened by four years of cutbacks to social programs and 
a war that was continuously draining federal dollars from the programs that were still 
left, non-profit, non-partisan organizations like the National Coalition for Black Civic
Participation (NCBCP) partnered with other organizations including the NAACP. The 
large scale African American targeted voter registration and mobilization campaigns 
of 2000 expanded in 2004 to include their coordinated efforts to forge a substantial 
grass roots push to educate and energize young and minority voters. Independent 
advocacy groups called 527s played a significant role in the 2004 election. Big donors 
whose contributions were limited by the 2002 McCain-Feingold Act, could give large 
sums to 527s which were behind many of the ad campaigns for both candidates. 
Along with the aforementioned grass roots coalition, America Votes, Media Fund, 
Americans Coming Together and MoveOn.org were four 527s that spent a total of 60 
million dollars in their attempts to help elect John Kerry.  
Their efforts, though significant, were no match for the combined forces of the 
RNC, Bush Campaign, Republican bankrolled 527 organizations and the White 
House. On the Democratic side of the campaign, the most important leg of the stool, 
the candidate and his campaign, did not do their part successfully or consistently 
enough to create the united front necessary to compete with the Bush team. The 




themselves because Democratic and swing voters did not connect with the candidate. 
They energized young people, shone a light on the important issues and the 
president’s failures but could not sell a candidate who struggled to sell himself.  
In Applebee’s America the authors, Douglas Sosnik, a former Clinton adviser, 
Matthew Dowd, the chief strategist for the Bush campaign and Ron Fournier, a 
political writer, argue that “Great connectors” like Bill Clinton and Georg  Bush were 
able to connect with people and win unlikely elections and re-elections because they 
conveyed a strong sense of assuredness and authenticity. They contend that it is much 
more important for voters to feel that a candidate is relatable and shares their “gut 
values” than for them to agree with the candidates on their political stances:158  
Voters don’t pick presidents based on their positions on a laundry list 
of policies. If they did, President Bush wouldn’t have stood a chance 
against Al Gore in 2000 or John Kerry in 2004. Rather, policies and 
issues are mere prisms through which voters take the true measure of a 
candidate: Does he share my values?”159 
 
While Bush and his campaign were able to convey this sense of commonality 
with conservative voters, Kerry struggled to connect with important segments of his 
party’s base, especially African Americans. Although the aforementioned Democratic 
coalitions articulated exactly what was at stake for African Americans, Kerry the 
candidate was never able to energize them by tapping into their “gut values.” 
Admittedly, those values were as diverse as the Black population itself, but there 
were enough issues which cut across socio-economic lines that he could have used to 
authentically express his commitment to fighting on their behalf.  
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His struggle to connect effectively with African Americans was due in part to 
his campaign’s weak outreach to Black churches. While Black churches did not 
become an outreach priority until the fall for Democrats, according to Tiffany 
Watkins the Bush campaign and Republican Party activated a national network of 
pastors who served as ambassadors to the Black community for Bush:  
It was new in the fact that, they used real people who were actually 
recognized in their community as ambassadors. So people were like, 
oh so and so’s talking about President Bush? So you’d hear your local 
community leader on the radio talking about the President and that 
made a pretty powerful statement.160   
 
This cannot be blamed on his senior African American staff, many of whom were 
hired in the second half of 2004, but reflected the Kerry campaign’s overall sense of 
entitlement regarding African American support. Why create a plan to energize and 
activate pastors of churches who had supported Democratic candidates in the past? As 
was outlined in the previous chapter, the answer to that question lies in the constant 
growth and evolution of the Black church, along with their mounting frustration at 
being taken for granted. Democratic candidates and the Democratic Party paid little 
attention to this evolution over the last two elections. Walters also placed equal blame 
on the Kerry campaign and Democratic Party for their failure to capitalize on the 
“mobilizing power of the Black church.”161  
While Walters blamed their ineffectiveness on “weak political resources of 
policy, money and mobilization,” their lack of an organized Black Church outreach 
effort showed that they simply did not deem it worthy of necessary energy and 
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resources.162 This sentiment lies at the core of the frustration expressed by some 
African Americans inside and outside of the party who have complained for decades 
that it takes their support and votes for granted. Consequently, this lack of a 
coordinated outreach to Black churches, which Walters described as a “serious flaw,” 
rendered the Kerry campaign incapable of addressing the issue of same-sex arriage 
when Black pastors who opposed it began using it as a reason to support George 
Bush.  
The Kerry campaign could not present a unified coalition of Black pastors to 
respond because they had not taken the time to reach out to African Americans in 
general and pastors in particular, with the same energy they used to court “soccer 
moms” and other swing voters. Here Walters astutely describes how that choice, 
along with a strategic abandonment of the South, resulted in unnecessary losses for 
Kerry on election day: 
The battleground strategy devalues Black voting power by ignoring 
the South, except for the state of Florida. And although…George Bush 
won all of the Southern states, the margin in several of those states was 
not out of Kerry’s reach. With Kerry losing several Southern states by 
numbers in the mid-40 percent range, that addition of an achievable 
number of voters could have resulted in Democratic victories. It shows 
that the difference between the candidates in the 2004 presidential 
contest in the South was not so insurmountable but that with some 
effort additional voters could have been added to the Black voter base 
to make the Democrats competitive.163  
 
How Bush Won: The Four Year Campaign 
 
Bush won 50.7% of the vote and Kerry won 48.3%. The election came down 
to Ohio where Bush beat Kerry by two percentage points. Echoes of the 2000 general 
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election lingered in reports of voter disenfranchisement across the state on election 
day. The difference was this time, Bush actually won the popular vote. The 
mainstream media declared that Bush’s victory could be attributed to the political 
prowess of Karl Rove and the strategic genius of Ken Mehlman who openly 
discussed their methodical targeting plan in the weeks and months following the 
election. Although he was criticized for it throughout the campaign, Rove’s risky 
strategy of focusing resources and attention on a smaller pool of potential voters 
worked. While his critics were right that the results of his strategy would not yield a 
landslide, the contentious political landscape should be considered. First, it would 
have been almost impossible for Bush to achieve a landslide, given the abysmal state 
of the economy and costly (in human lives and U.S. funds) war in Iraq. Second, he 
barely won the 2000 election, so a decisive reelection victory (like the one Clinton 
enjoyed in 1996) would only be possible if he had been able to make it through his 
first term without any major mistakes and controversies. 
Given these factors, Rove, supported by Mehlman and other strategists, 
decided to start campaigning early and focus on voters they could win over by 
marketing Bush’s values and personal strengths. Those who had already made up 
their minds would not respond to this strategy, but those who had not would give the 
President a big enough bump to at least win the popular vote in 2004. Although Rove 
and Mehlman were clear about their narrow targeting, their strategy included swing 
voters. The difference in 2004, was that swing voters were not the top priority—




strategy as the “perfect storm of things” including their focus on Black evangelicals 
“who were newly active and most susceptible to their message.”164 
Ultimately the Bush Re-election team won the election because they 
organized their efforts with great precision and their candidate conveyed a sense of 
confidence and authenticity to “suspected” Republican voters, many of whom were 
evangelical Christians. This successful strategy also included efforts to reach African 
Americans in Black Churches which shared George W. Bush’s views on “moral 
issues” in general and same-sex marriage in particular. Not only did some Black 
pastors speak out in passionate opposition to same-sex marriage, many of them 
claimed the issue would be the reason they voted for Bush in the general election. 
Whether their congregations followed suit is almost impossible to ascertain. What is 
clear, is that Bush received a 2% increase in African American support in 2004. 
When viewed within the context of a weakening economy, war in Iraq and the 
continued devaluation of social programs, that increase is much more significant. 
Here, Leah Daughtry agrees with this assertion and does not hesitate to offer Black 
evangelicals as the explanation for Bush’s substantial increases in Pennsylva ia, Ohio 
and Florida (See Chart): 
The way things were going in this country, there’s no way he should 
have picked up any percentage points in the Black community. None. 
And I would contend, that it’s this church crowd. This particular set of 
folks who were enamored with the whole moral values thing.165 
                                                






The African American Vote for the Republican Presidential Candidate, Selected 
States, 2000 and 2004166 
 
    2000   2004    (R) Gain/Loss 
 
Oklahoma   N/A   28  N/A 
 
Texas    5   17  +12 
 
Pennsylvania*  7   16  +9 
 
Delaware   9   17  +8 
 
South Carolina  7   15  +8 
 
Ohio    9   16  +7 
 
Mississippi   3   10  +7 
 
California   12   18  +6 
 
New Jersey   11   17  +6 
 
Florida   7   13  +6 
 
North Carolina  9   14  +5 
 
Nevada   8   13  +5 
 
Georgia   8   12  +4 
 
Maryland   7   11  +4  
 
*Italics Indicates battleground states. 
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As has been discussed, Black pastors who were loyal to the President acted as 
“coalition coordinators” and appealed to their fellow pastors to support him. Some, 
like Bishop Harry Jackson, played that role very effectively. In other words, the Bush 
reelection campaign inched forward in their attempts to bring African Americans in to 
the Republican fold. Those few inches, when added to the other incremental inches 
gained through the targeting of white evangelicals and right leaning voters, was 
enough to win the election. 
While the Bush reelection team may have won the campaign strategy battle 
with African Americans, they lost the “party-building” war because they wre not 
able to build a sustainable connection with them. The primary reason the connection 
did not last was because while the campaign and RNC’s outreach to African 
Americans was a political and personal—according to his campaign staff and close 
associates—priority for Ken Mehlman, the Party’s platform remained the sam as did 
the re-elected President’s domestic policies. In other words, Mehlman’s commitment 
to a more diverse Party did not take root, because the majority of Republican Party 
operatives, loyalists and supporters did not think it was necessary or important.  
Hurricane Katrina was one of the reasons offered for the Democratic Party’s 
victory when they won the majority in the House in 2006. According to Democratic 
political veterans, doubt over the legitimacy of the war on terror, caused by 
continuous controversy and casualties in Iraq, also became a real liability for the
Republican party heading into the 2006 election. Well before the election, former 




of people were standing with the Republicans because they had one issue that blocked 
out the sun: security, safety, ‘they can protect us better’…but two things blew a hole 
in that: Katrina and Iraq.”167 Perhaps the Bush administration’s failure to respond 
expeditiously to such a catastrophic disaster also explains the Republican Party’s 
inability to continue the momentum they gained from their outreach efforts with 
African Americans in 2004.  In 2006, there was a clear issue which directly involved 
and impacted African Americans that could be used as evidence that the 
administration and by association, the Republican Party, did not value the well-being 
or lives of African Americans. In the shadow of such a recent and grossly 
mismanaged tragedy, it was hard to portray the Republican party as committed to 
expanding its base. This, combined with Mehlman’s departure and the steady decline 
of the economy made it unlikely that the Republican Party would be able to increase 
African American support without doubling the ambitious efforts of 2004. 
Mehlman took over the RNC following the election and seemed determined to 
continue outreach to evangelical Christians and African Americans building on the 
momentum of the campaign and values issues that energized some socially 
conservative African Americans. However, when Mehlman left the RNC any desire 
to broaden the party’s outreach and membership to include African Americans left 
with him. Yet the strategic victory he helped win, showed there was potential in the 
African American community for the Republican Party if it was willing to invest the 
time and resources to cultivate that potential. 
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Now the discussion turns to faith-based initiatives, which many have argued 
were inspired by Rove’s desire to win in 2004 as much as they were a genuine 






“Everybody heard about the money and nobody knew anybody who got any.”168  
 
“Even people who know Mr. Bush are not always sure how much issues are shaped 
by his conscience and how much by the political calculation that this White House 
has refined to high science.”169  
 
Chapter Four: Faith-Based Initiatives  
 
During George W. Bush’s first press conference as President of the United 
States, veteran journalist Helen Thomas, who was so well respected she was called on 
first at White House press conferences for decades, asked, “Mr. President, why do
you refuse to respect the wall between the church and the state?” When the Presid nt 
responded that he “strongly respected” that important separation, Thomas interrupted 
and sharply replied, “You wouldn’t have a religious office in the White House if you 
did…you’re a secular official and not a missionary.”170 Thomas’ tough question 
foreshadowed the challenges the Bush administration would encounter over his faith-
based initiative, which was touted as the President’s signature domestic policy when 
he took office in 2001. The faith in faith-based initiative referred to churches, 
religious organizations and institutions that sponsor programs including food banks, 
prison outreach and troubled teen support groups that are socially beneficial to 
individuals and communities. According to C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya, 
authors of The Black Church in the African American Experience, 71% of Black 
churches of various denominations throughout the country were already running such 
                                                
168 Leah Daughtry, interview by author, Washington, DC, March 29, 2006. 
169 Bill Keller, “God and George W. Bush,” New York Times, May 17, 2003. 





social programs by the end of the 20th Century. Consequently, Black churches had the 
potential to benefit greatly from faith-based initiative funding.  
President Bush’s announcement that he intended to make faith-based 
initiatives a domestic priority sparked a firestorm of both criticism and praise in the 
Black faith community. Prominent Black pastors, including Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr., 
who criticized it, thought it would make churches beholden to the government while 
those who supported it believed it was an important acknowledgement of their work 
in the community. During President George W. Bush’s first term, the relationships 
the White House nurtured with Black pastors through the Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives enabled them to reach out to a particular segment of Black 
churches which they hoped would expand their base of support in the next election. 
The Bush administration used the promise of faith-based initiative funding to seal 
their appeal with conservative Christians and gain the loyalty and support of certain 
Black pastors and churches during the 2004 election. 
 
Faith-Based Initiative Origins 
 
Before making the connection between faith-based initiatives and the 2004 
election, it is important to provide a historical backdrop for the concept. Although 
George W. Bush the candidate began talking about Faith Based Initiatives in 2000, he 
did not invent the model. Faith Based Initiatives are derived from “Charitable 
Choice,” a significant component of the 1996 Welfare Reform law. According to Jo 
Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segars and Paul Weber in Faith-Based Initiatives and the 




legislative provision designed to remove unnecessary barriers to the receipt of certain 
federal funds by faith-based organizations that provide social services” and consists 
of four important principles.171  
The first is the notion that faith-based providers should be allowed to compete 
for funding on equal footing with secular providers regardless of their religious 
affiliation.  This was of particular importance because faith-based organizatio s were 
considered an invaluable component of the safety net proponents of welfare reform 
hoped would catch families coming off the “rolls.”   Next is the provision that seeks 
to protect religious organizations from being pressured to change their “culture and 
symbols” as a condition of receiving contracts and funding. Synagogues, for exampl, 
would not be forced to cover or remove the star of David from rooms where they held 
programs. The third component of Charitable Choice protects program clients and 
participants from discrimination by religious organizations. Furthermore, this 
component mandates that individuals who object to the religious nature of a program 
must be “provided with a secular alternative.”  Separation of church and state is the 
foundation of the final component, which insists that government funds flow directly 
to programs and not to “inherently religious activities” like Bible Study.   
Bob Wineburg, the author of Faith-Based Inefficiency, maintains that the 
seeds were planted for both Charitable Choice and Bush’s faith-based initiative 
during the Reagan administration. He used as evidence the fact that President Reagan 
said in a speech he delivered in the spring of 1982 that “churches and voluntary 
groups should accept more responsibility for the needy rather than leaving it to the 
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bureaucracy.”172 Reagan delivered this speech to a mostly white audience of one 
hundred clergy but less than a month before this event he hosted seventy-five Black 
ministers from across the country. Wineburg argues that these events, combined with 
the 1980s domestic budget cuts “that sent local human service systems into a tizzy” 
were an indication of things to come.173 What began as a few speeches calling for 
more support from local churches would become a part of the growing conservative 
“personal responsibility” mantra used to attack what they claimed was a failing
“welfare” state.174  
While the evidence he presents—a few speeches to Black and white 
ministers—is thin, his discussion of Don Eberly is intriguing. Eberly worked in both 
the Reagan Administration and George W. Bush’s administration. Interestingly, for 
the latter he served as the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives and had this to say in The Soul of Civil Society, which he 
co-authored with Ryan Streeter: 
The drive against the central welfare state in recent years has been 
driven by much more than concern over rising costs. It has been fueled 
by a desire to push back against the bureaucratization of America. The 
encroachment of…‘social service professionals’…suffocates 
citizenship and discourages local nonprofessional caregivers from 
getting involved in healing and renewing the lives of the poor.175  
 
The first part of this excerpt is almost identical to the words President Reagan uttered 
a full twenty years earlier giving some credence to Wineburg’s claim that over the 
course of those years, conservatives have sought to limit federal aid to the poor while 
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decrying the inadequacies of “big government.” The fact that Charitable Choice was 
included in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, which eliminated modern day welfare, 
further supports his notion that Bush’s faith-based initiative was the 21st Century 
manifestation of a late 20th Century conservative concept.  
Thus it was already mandated in Federal law through Charitable Choice, that 
faith-based organizations should not suffer discrimination when they competed for 
contracts to provide social services.176 Bush’s faith-based initiative proposal was 
almost identical to Charitable Choice.  Even before the Charitable Choice provision 
of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act there were faith-based groups receiving support 
from the government for their programs. However, according to Formicola, these 
organizations were incorporated separately from their churches and agreed to “k ep 
separate books, to refrain from evangelizing, and to follow federal nondiscrimination 
standards in hiring.”177 What made George W. Bush’s faith-based initiatives different 
from Charitable Choice and so controversial was that they did not ask religious 
organizations to fulfill those same requirements and conditions in order to receive 
government funding. Consequently, faith-based initiatives took on a life of their own 
in spite of their foundation in Charitable Choice, a concept that was already in play 
and supported on both sides of the aisle. Charitable Choice was one of the most 
popular domestic policy issues during the 2000 presidential campaign and both major 
party candidates supported the concept.  
Bush’s support of the less constrained version of Charitable Choice was a 
reflection of his personal religious beliefs. As a born again evangelical Christian—
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someone who experienced a spiritual rebirth, accepted Jesus Christ his personal Lord 
and savior and was committed to spreading his Gospel—he believed in the power of 
God to change lives and viewed religious organizations as conduits for that change. 
This belief played out during his time as governor of Texas where his support of 
intense faith-based rehabilitation programs foreshadowed his commitment to making 
faith-based initiatives the hallmark of his domestic policy. Under his leadership as 
governor, Texas became one of the first states to partner with religious organizations 
to help them serve the community. He allowed both “religious and non-religious 
groups to apply for social service contracts.”178 His comments in his autobiography 
about a program called “Teen Challenge,” that attempted to address teen drug 
addiction through religious conversion, confirmed he was an early supporter of faith-
based programs. “What caught my attention was how ridiculous it seemed for the 
state drug and alcohol agency to shut down a drug and alcohol program that was 
successfully fighting addiction.”179 Mark Noll, mentioned in the previous chapter, 
suggests that Bush also had an affinity for programs like Teen Challenge because 
they provide the kind of supportive environment that helped him once he “turned 
from alcoholism.”180  
As Governor, Bush also initiated and signed a piece of legislation that 
“required governmental agencies to develop welfare-to-work partnerships with faith-
based groups in a way that respected the unique religious character of those 
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groups.”181 Again, his emphasis was on the very aspect that previous faith-based 
overtly religious programs were required to temper through Charitable Choice. 
Bush’s support for Faith-Based programs when he was governor, combined with his 
desire to connect with the faith community in general and evangelical in particul r, 
made his focus on Faith Based Initiatives during the 2000 general election seem like a 
perfect fit. 
 
Faith-Based Initiatives: An Early Presidential Priority 
 
In keeping with Bob Wineburg’s theory, Bush’s support of faith-based 
initiatives also provided a way for him to indirectly champion shrinking the welfare 
state by “encouraging the private sector to help people help themselves and using 
government as a catalyst for an end rather than an end itself.”182 The campaign 
believed this would appeal both to the conservative base (which included 
evangelicals) and religious Black and Latino voters.183 It became clear, not long after 
the Florida recount, but even before his eventual inauguration, that faith-based 
initiatives would be Bush’s top domestic priority once elected. In addition to seeking 
the counsel of conservative scholars, including Marvin Olasky author of 
Compassionate Conservatism, for which Bush wrote the introduction, about the 
concept, he also started testing the waters with people in the religious community. 
Although his popularity with African Americans was low, this issue served as an 
unofficial olive branch to Black pastors.  It accomplished two things: it was a 
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symbolic gesture, but also served the very specific purpose of introducing an agenda 
to influential pastors who would spread the word that the Bush administration would 
be friendly to Black churches.  
He met with a group of influential Black pastors before he was inaugurated.  It 
was no mistake that these pastors were the leaders of Pentecostal churches and 
megachurches with huge congregations, many of which were much less aligned with 
the traditional Black political agenda. Bishop Charles Blake, the pastor of one ofLos
Angeles’ largest churches and one of the most important leadership figures in the 
Church of God in Christ, was in attendance along with Pastor Tony Evans who had a 
significant Christian radio following.184 Bush’s critics claimed it was a way for him to 
reach out to the Black community, which was still reeling from the Florida recount 
and the knowledge that African Americans in the state had been disenfranchised. 
On January 29, 2001, nine days after the inauguration, Bush officially made 
faith-based initiatives his signature domestic policy. Few outside of the preexisting 
faith-based programs were aware of Charitable Choice, so it appeared that this was a 
brand new concept. He accomplished this through two executive orders. In the first he 
created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and 
appointed University of Pennsylvania Political Science Professor John Dilulio to head 
it. He used the second executive order to establish faith-based centers in five cabinet
agencies: Justice, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Education and Health and 
Human Services. Here is an excerpt from the speech he gave to announce these bold 
measures:  
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Government has important responsibilities for public health or public 
order and civil rights. And government will never be replaced by 
charities and community groups. Yet when we see social needs in 
America, my administration will look first to faith-based programs and 
community groups, which have proven their power to save and change 
lives. We will not fund the religious activities of any group, but when 
people of faith provide social services, we will not discriminate against 
them. There are still deep needs and real suffering in the shadow of 
America's affluence, problems like addiction and abandonment and 
gang violence, domestic violence, mental illness and homelessness. 
We are called by conscience to respond.185   
 
Much of this statement was an almost word for word description of the 
components of Charitable Choice which held that “faith-based providers are eligible 
to compete for funds on the same basis as any other providers, neither excluded nor 
included because they are religious.”186  However, since most Americans knew 
nothing about Charitable Choice, this concept seemed innovative even as it made 
many people uneasy. In the past, the faith community was treated like other 
constituents, usually handled by the White House office of Public Liaison. This new 
creation was quite a departure from that standard because unlike Public Liaison, the 
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives office was actually housed in the 
White House not the Old Executive Office Building next door. Because of its 
immediate creation, announcement and proximity to the oval office, it appeared that it 
was literally and figuratively, the President’s personal project that would take priority 
over other traditionally influential constituencies including White Ethnic, Hispanic, 
Asian-Pacific and African American outreach. The fact that Bush only met with he 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) twice during his first term in office and skipped 
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the national NAACP Convention during the campaign, reinforced this notion with 
those in the African American community. 
 Almost simultaneous with his launch of the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiative, Bush started his “minority outreach agenda” which
included a summit for 400 urban ministers. The gathering of hundreds of lay people, 
several of them evangelical churches, was important enough to the administration and 
Republican Party that the Republican leadership was well represented at the event. 
Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi, the majority leader; Speaker J. Dennis Hastert of 
Illinois; and Representative Tom DeLay of Texas, the majority whip, all attended and 
gave speeches. One could argue that this summit was unrelated to the Faith Based 
Initiative office and simply one component of minority outreach efforts, but that 
argument seems naïve, given the natural link between faith-based initiatives nd 
Black churches, many of whom provide invaluable services to their communities. 
Doubts about whether the Bush White House truly wanted to foster an authentic 
relationship with the Black church would surface throughout the 2004 election as well 
as during early debates over Bush’s efforts to institutionalize faith-based initiatives. 
  
Critics and Supporters 
 
When Bush used an Executive Order to create the White House Office of 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and establish faith-based offices in the five 
agencies, which could not be reversed, his decision was met with both support and 
criticism. The stakes of the discussion were raised once Bush and his administratio  




The fundamental issue of separation of church and state was at the core of the debate 
over faith-based initiative legislation. Those who supported his agenda believed  strict 
adherence to the separation of church and state limited the productivity and good 
works of religious groups across the nation.  The critics were the loudest. 
Conservative evangelicals feared Bush’s program would lead to the regulation of 
faith-based groups, muffling their spiritual message and altering their “religious 
character.” They wanted to protect the autonomy of religious institutions.  They
feared religious affiliated programs that accepted federal monies would be at risk for 
too much government intervention, which might adversely affect their message and 
mission. Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr. articulated it best at the National Baptist Convention 
of America when he said, "Once he puts his federal grant in your church, he comes 
back three months later . . looking for your books. Behind federal money comes 
federal monitoring," he argued at the meeting in Fort Worth, Texas, adding, "The 
church must not trade its independence for a donation."187 Pastor Dennis Wiley 
echoed Jackson’s sentiment when asked about his views on faith-based initiatives: 
I’ve always held the government at arm’s length because I think that I 
see a very important part of my role as a pastor to be prophetic. I’ve 
noticed that they’re too many ministers who have too cozy of a 
relationship with the government or certain political figures. I think it 
takes away the edge from our being able to speak truth to power, being 
able to really address and challenge the government in terms of doing 
what it needs to do and challenging those in political office as well.188  
 
Other progressive critics, like Washington, DC based Housing 
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activist Jim Dickerson, harshly criticized what to them looked like a thinly veied 
political move to get more votes. Dickerson was among the group of pastors invited 
to the White House early on to discuss faith-based initiatives with Oklahoma 
Congressman J.C. Watts, the only Black Republican in the House of Representatives, 
and House Majority Leader Dick Armey. He had this to say about the meeting: 
I listened, but it was quickly obvious this was just a smokescreen to 
recruit Blacks and minorities into the Republican party by bribing 
them with money and access to power -- even while covering up cuts 
in vital social programs and giving big tax cuts to the wealthy.189  
 
A long-time community-housing activist, Dickerson was quite familiar with pre-
existing faith-based programs. He was perplexed by the notion that faith-based 
programs were being discriminated against, since he had always seen what he
believed was a balanced relationship between such programs and the Federal 
government. Many of these programs had their roots, not in “compassionate 
conservatism,” but in the civil rights movement.190 
Many critics feared a different kind of autonomy of groups that would receive 
funding.  Some religious leaders expressed concern that the government could 
conceivably be funding the “discriminatory theory and practices of certain religions.”  
These religions could for example, refuse to hire people to run their programs who 
are from a different religious background. Richard Foltin, Legislative Dircto  and 
Counsel for the American Jewish Committee expressed this concern at a meeting at 
the Jewish Council for Public Affairs attended by John DiIulio in February of 2001. 
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He lamented that the government could end up awarding grants to organizations that 
discriminate in hiring practices. By restricting jobs to the faith of the providing group, 
these religious groups would be "putting up a sign, 'No Jew Need Apply' or 'No 
Catholic Need Apply.'”191 This concern was further complicated by Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, an exemption that allows religious institutions to 
discriminate, based on religious faith, in their hiring practices. At the samemeeting in 
February of 2001, leaders of Jewish organizations also expressed concern about the 
Nation of Islam receiving government funds because they “voiced anti-Semitic 
views.”192 
Religious leaders further right of center spoke out against government funding 
extremist religious groups, which could compromise the nation’s security.  For 
example, Rev. Jerry Fallwell argued that government funds should not go to Muslim 
faith-based ministries because “the Muslim faith preaches hate.”193 Regardless of 
their concerns over other faiths, conservatives were very interested in evangelism. In 
fact, evangelism was the line of demarcation between liberals and conservatives. The 
former believed it would amount to “mandatory conversion.”  
Even Protestant Christians doubted other faiths would be able to escape 
discrimination if they applied for funding from a conservative administration, which 
they assumed, would leave much of the implementation to state and local officials. In 
other words, there was concern about the potential for rampant lack of oversight, 
which could result in federal funding solely for Christian-based rather than the 
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broader scope of Faith-based programs. As Rev. J. Richard Short, pastor of Covenant 
Presbyterian church in Portsmouth, Virginia asked, “Who is going to sit at the table 
and decide which applications get funded?”194  
 
Programmatic Evangelism and Evaluation  
 
The administration and Office of Faith-Based and Community affairs was 
caught in a precarious position. If they said evangelism was allowed, they would win 
big with conservatives but risk their wrath if they didn’t. Obviously, the converse wa 
true for liberals. Furthermore, evangelism was not merely a philosophical issue.
Because there were people, including George W. Bush and Marvin Olasky, who 
believed programs that made a “personal transformation” and relationship wit Jesus 
Christ the focal point of client rehabilitation, evangelism was in play as a legitimate 
concern for both sides. For example, opponents of programmatic evangelism feared it 
would be too difficult to protect the “religious liberty” of clients if there was such an 
absolute belief in the efficacy of conversion.195  
Those who were wary of faith-based initiatives because they believed it 
eroded the foundation of the separation of church and state, were troubled by an 
apparent contradiction in the Bush administration’s support of them. On one hand, the 
Bush administration argued that evangelical faith-based programs were more 
effective than secular programs because they were life transforming. Typicall , 
religious worship, preaching and proselytizing were at the core of this transformation, 
which was both internal (spiritual) and external (behavioral). In fact, for evang licals, 
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proselytizing or spreading the “good news” gospel of Jesus Christ is their mandate. 
On the other hand, Charitable Choice and the launch document for the Office of Faith 
Based and Community Initiatives, clearly stated that proselytizing would be 
prohibited. The existence of religious organizations with successful separate 
programs complicated the debate. 
A real concern with Bush’s belief in the transformative power of such 
programs was the difficulty with which their success could really be measured. A 
prison program called Inner Change based in Texas was an example of one of these 
programs. Inmates and guards shared in a series of interviews that they observed a 
decided difference in the behavior of those who participated in the program which 
teaches that a better future is dependent on a Christian conversion, and those who did 
not. The former were said to be “calmer, happier and more hopeful about their future” 
but still had the same amount of discipline problems as others.196 For the Bush 
campaign, the inmate’s improved attitudes were examples of how faith-based 
programs can change lives and do so more effectively than secular programs, which 
are missing the religious component. Logically it follows then that for Bush, the 
overtly religious components of such programs, including preaching, proselytizing 
and worship led to the inner transformation, which is crucial to a successful program. 
Yet federal funding of such overt religious worship is explicitly prohibited in the 
1996 Charitable Choice provision and Bush’s faith-based initiative. This 
contradiction, between the President’s belief in and past support of overtly religious 
programs, and the Office of Faith-Based and Community initiatives promise to 
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prevent the funding of such programs, was yet another reason for the controversy 
surrounding potential legislation.197  
As was mentioned earlier, Catholic Charities is an example of a faith-based 
“large service-providing non-profit” that had been receiving government funding for 
years. For critics of the initiative whose concerns were less political and more 
pragmatic, such well-established programs would clearly have an advantage when 
applying for faith-based funds. Programs like Catholic Charities had developed 
“standards of professional competency,” had no faith requirement and employed 
licensed and trained professionals to work with clients. According to Formicola, 
people who were familiar with these larger programs were concerned about how 
smaller programs and churches without the same level of infrastructure and that relied 
heavily on volunteers, would be able to meet fund management and staffing 
responsibilities. Also, the Bush administration focused a great deal on “performance-
oriented” programs, which meant the programs necessarily had to have the capacity 
to evaluate and report their success or failure.  
Ironically, small financially challenged churches that needed the most 
assistance would be the least able to afford outside program evaluation and would 
therefore be ineligible for funding.198 This was underscored by a survey of 750 Black 
churches published by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies to 
ascertain how they viewed faith based initiatives. The survey, which was conducted 
between 2005 and 2006, found that non-denominational churches with 1,701 or more 
members were more likely to be aware of faith-based initiative funding restrictions 
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and requirements and were also more likely to submit applications. As discussed in 
the chapter on the Black church, most megachurches have adopted a corporate culture 
as a way to help them meet the needs of their large congregations and handle their 
financial and business affairs efficiently. Consequently, most megachurches already 
have the substantial infrastructures necessary to navigate funding requirements and 
avoid legal pitfalls, supporting the Joint Center’s findings.  
However, the vast majority of Black churches in the Baptist, Methodist and 
Protestant congregations have smaller congregations with less than 125 members.199 
Furthermore, many of these smaller churches have minimal staff and part-time 
pastors making it nearly impossible for them to take the necessary steps to research 
and apply for grants. According to Lawrence Mamiya’s 2006 “Pulpit & Pew: 
Research on Pastoral Leadership” report, 43% of all Black clergy are bivocational 
and the vast majority of them serve in small churches with less than one hundred 
members.200  In other words, applying for grants is expensive and if smaller churches 
have to choose between paying staff and bills or retaining an outside consultant, they 
will most likely choose the former. 
The White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives attempted 
to address this concern with the Compassion Capital Fund from which money would 
be used to train individuals how to gain access to social service dollars.201 To ensure 
that smaller or first time applicants would not be left out, the OFBCI decided to fund 
“intermediary” institutions which would distribute grants to smaller or inexperienced 
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churches and organizations. A perfect example of this concept was the Foundation for 
Community Empowerment in Dallas, Texas. As one of these intermediaries that 
received Compassion Capital Fund money, it awarded Pastor Bryan Carter’s church a 
$10,000 capacity building grant. According to Pastor Carter, he had to attend at least
six-three hour training sessions where he learned about different aspects of capacity 
building including information on strategic planning, fundraising and general tips for 
running a successful non-profit. After completing the training, his church applied for 
the funding, and was awarded the grant. 
Several Black pastors who publically supported faith-based initiatives were 
less concerned about the details and more interested in the assistance. Some African 
American clergy including then President of the Interdenominational Theologica  
Center in Atlanta, Dr. Robert Franklin, an umbrella group for six major African-
American seminaries, were focused on the “immediate good to be achieved” by faith-
based initiatives and were not as concerned about government meddling.202 Based on 
his data, Republican pollster Frank Lutz agreed with this notion that many Black 
churches were more grateful for the help than they were suspicious of its 
ramifications. When interviewed by the Atlanta Journal and Constitution Lutz 
claimed that Black churches “are the most faith-based segment of the population there 
is and they not only appreciate what Bush is doing but they support it."203 
He did not, however, mention whether his data factored in religious 
denominations within the Black church. One could argue that Black churches of all 
denominations were natural targets for the Bush administration because of their
                                                





proclivity towards social outreach. Seventy-one percent of Black churches acros  the 
nation are involved in the kind of social outreach that would benefit from faith-based 
initiative funding. Many of them are on the front lines in the nation’s urban centers 
and rural areas. Lutz believed that Bush’s efforts to help Black churches through 
faith-based initiatives were not politically driven.  But he was nevertheless confident 
that the President would reap the political benefits that would likely come from the 
programmatic assistance.  
 
Faith-Based Initiative Policy versus Faith-Based Politics 
 
Just as there was external tension, there was also internal tension within the 
White House between White House OFBCI Director John DiIulio and the political 
team receiving pressure from conservative supporters of Bush who wanted 
evangelism to be allowed in faith-based initiative programs. DiIulio made it cl ar 
from the beginning of his time at the White House that he did not support programs 
with an evangelical component. This issue was brought up during a meeting where 
DiIulio answered questions about faith-based initiatives. At the meeting, Lynn Lyss 
of the National Council of Jewish Women, questioned DiIulio about a Texas church-
run anti-drug program that specifically attempted to convert clients to believe in Jesus 
to cure their addictions. According to Lyss, this program received money from Texas 
after then Governor George W. Bush lifted restrictions governing state grants to local 




programs through faith-based initiatives DiIulio said, "the answer to your question is 
a strong no."204  
Another source of conflict between DiIulio and the Bush White House was his 
belief that government had a duty to carry the majority of the weight of social 
programs. He made his stance clear in a speech he gave before the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in Dallas in March of 2001. According to DiIulio, 
the nation’s churches had neither the infrastructure nor resources to cover the cost of 
the country’s essential social programs and to burden them would “abdicate the 
legitimate responsibility of government.”205 Here, in an excerpt from his speech he 
argues, in a remarkable departure from the small government theory supported by the 
Bush White House and conservative movement, that faith-based initiatives cannot be 
viewed as a replacement for government support: 
Even if all 353,000 religious congregations in America doubled their 
annual budgets and devoted them entirely to the cause of social 
services, and even if the cost of government social welfare programs 
was magically cut by one-fifth, the congregations would barely cover a 
year’s worth of Washington’s spending on [social] programs and never 
even come close to covering the program costs.206  
 
These were remarks given by a man who was a policy intellectual. DiIulio’s acuity 
and command of domestic policy issues was one of the core reasons Bush brought 
him to the White House. However, his intellectual and policy prowess were also 
responsible for forming an almost immediate tension between himself and the more 
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politically focused staff of the White House. An anonymous source commenting 
about the tensions within the White House between DiIulio and staffers talked about 
how differently they viewed the role of the government. “The view of many people 
[in the White House] is that the best government can do is simply do no harm, that it 
never is an agent for positive change. If that's your position, why bother to understa 
what programs actually do?"207 
Many outside of the White House and academic circles did not know that 
John DiIulio brought a particular interest towards Black churches and their programs 
with him to the White House office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.  In the 
spring of 2001, those outside of the White House would find out that there were 
certain Black ministers, academics and urban social workers who had a strong 
connection to DiIulio, when they voiced their support for him at a press conference 
that preceded a meeting with President Bush. The ministers read from a group-
authored letter that included this strong statement: 
We respectfully challenge and dissent from the sectarian and  
 divisive rancor that has come from some public figures  
 among religious conservatives. These individuals seek to  
 deny faith-based groups in the Black community the  
opportunity to enter into constructive, non-sectarian  
alliances with public institutions, in order to serve more  
effectively those in greatest need.208  
 
As much as this letter made it clear to the rest of the country that these pastors 
supported faith-based initiatives, it also sent a signal to the White House that they 
respected John DiIulio. DiIulio was able to take advantage of Karl Rove’s desire to 
broaden Republican support by acknowledging and inviting Black ministers into the 
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fold. Aware of the President’s damaged image because of the 2000 election 
Republicans welcomed opportunities to find allies outside traditional African 
American leadership circles. Civil Rights veteran Walter Fauntroy’s pointed 
accusation of exclusivity supports this assertion. An initial supporter of faith-b sed 
initiatives Fauntroy was widely criticized for standing next to the President as he 
signed the Executive Order to create the Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives. By Bush’s second terms Fauntroy was speaking freely about his 
“disillusionment” with the initiative which occurred when it became clear to him t at 
“the people who were let in were selective and were evangelical.”209  
Consequently the Bush administration went after Black evangelicals who 
were led by a previously untapped group of pastors. Megachurches were a fairly new 
phenomenon in the 1990s during the Clinton administration. By 2001 charismatic 
megachurch pastors including T.D. Jakes had reached significant prominence but had 
not been courted by the White House.  
While Rove’s motives were political, for DiIulio, the inclusion of urban Black 
ministers was a logical component of his mission to promote “ideas and policies to 
partner government with faith-based institutions.”210 The Bush administration 
replicated some of the Clinton administration religious outreach programs in order to 
connect with a new set of Black churches and ministers. Former Bush campaign and 
White House staffer Tiffany Watkins recalls helping to organize a Black pastors 
roundtable which was part of a larger effort to “reach out to everybody early.”211 
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John DiIulio was particularly keyed into the connection between Black 
churches and social outreach because of his academic research on the inner city ad 
working relationship with Rev. Eugene Rivers who ran the faith-based Ten Point 
Coalition in Boston, Massachusetts.  Rivers supported faith-based initiatives and was 
not shy about sharing his assertion that Black churches and their pastors should 
benefit from federal funding. He was also keenly aware of the potential political 
ramifications of Bush’s support of faith-based initiatives. There was the possibility 
that his support would result in a competition between the two parties for the support 
of Black churches and their congregations.  Seeming pleased about the attention 
Black churches were receiving from the Bush administration and hopeful that it might 
generate some two-party competition, Rev. Eugene Rivers offered this observation. 
“Democrats always thought they had a proprietary right to Black churches. This will 
highlight some fissures that exist on the liberal-left side.”212  
In the summer of 2001, in what many deemed a setback for the new Bush 
White House, John DiIulio resigned as the Director of the Office of Faith-Based nd 
Community Initiatives. While DiIulio attributed his decision to leave to a desire to 
spend more time with his family, White House insiders and close associates said he 
was frustrated by how little true support and commitment he received as he attempted 
to put meat on the faith-based program bones. By the time of his departure, DiIulio
was already unpopular with many conservative Christian groups because he was 
steadfast in his warning that social service programs that were evangelic l in nature 
would not be eligible for government grants. Thus he met with opposition from 
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people who had been supportive initially but turned against the proposed legislation. 
People including Marvin Olasky, a well-respected Christian conservative, went public 
with their displeasure and DiIulio was somewhat shocked by how “contentious” 
things became.213  
 
Faith-Based Initiative Funding Controversies 
 
Leading up to the 2002 mid-term elections, James Towey, John DiIulio’s 
successor in the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives was criticized by 
Barry W. Lynn, Executive Director of Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, for appearing with Republican congressional candidates in six states 
including Arkansas, Illinois and Florida. While his purpose for traveling to those 
states was to discuss publicly funded grants to religious groups, he also made 
contributions to faith-based programs in some of those districts. Lynn offered a biting 
criticism of Towey’s travels saying, “’The faith-based office is conducting seminars 
in congressional districts that just happen to have very close races coming up.”214 And 
referring to the Compassion Capital Fund said, “They’ve created a kind of faith-based 
slush fund and they’re dangling it around the country.”215 An article in the Boston 
Globe put it even more plainly:  
The White House, fearful that African-American voters will cost 
Republicans control of Congress in 2002, is executing a carefully 
choreographed plan that uses the new Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives to engage Black clergy and build support for 
the party in their congregations and neighborhoods.216 
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These observations foreshadowed a similar strategy that many believe the Bush 
administration executed with the same political motivation two years later during the 
2004 Presidential election. 
As faith-based efforts during President Bush’s first term became  
increasingly associated with partisan Republican efforts and events, it became more 
difficult to argue that it was not politically driven. It is not unusual for such mixing of 
political activity and non-partisan efforts to occur during an election year. But for 
such cross over to occur involving faith-based initiatives, an already controversial 
issue, sent an interesting message: that faith-based funding could in fact be used as 
incentive for political support.  While the Bush administration capitalized political y 
on the connections they made through faith-based initiative workshops and funding, it 
became increasingly clear that supportive Black pastors and churches received less 
than they were promised they would. 
For example, during the 2000 Presidential campaign, Bush promised that in 
his first year in office he would provide $1.7 billion for groups that cared for the poor, 
$6.3 billion worth of tax cuts to encourage “giving” and $200 million for a 
Compassion Capital Fund to assist local faith-based organizations through five 
agencies. In all he promised to spend $8 billion dollars a year to support faith-based 
programs.  David Kuo, a former White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiative staffer who worked under DiIulio and Towey, claims a very small 
percentage of that funding actually found its way to faith-based programs. For 
example, the $200 million Bush promised would go to the Compassion Capital Fund, 
                                                                                                                                          




was reduced to $100 million and finally to $30 million. According to Kuo, that last 
amount was the sum total of all the money that was actually available for distribut on 
to churches by 2004.217 Furthermore, in June of 2001, close to the start of his first 
term, the tax incentives Bush promised were omitted from the $1.6 trillion tax cut 
legislation.218 However, when the White House released figures about their funding 
output to programs, the report painted a very different picture.   
In spite of Towey’s insistence that his office was committed to “maximum 
transparency” in their reporting, several scholars highlighted gaps in the numbers and 
called for more accurate and complete data.219 For example, the White House 
reported that five agencies gave a total of over one billion dollars to faith-based 
groups in 2003 but did not indicate how that figure compared to grants distributed in 
2003. Lisa Montiel, a researcher at the Roundtable on Religion and Social Policy 
thought it was important to know whether funding had increased or decreased since 
the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives opened in 2001. Similarly, 
Carol De Vita of the Urban Institute wanted to know “whether the portion of federal 
funds received by religious groups” was rising or declining. Again, the White House 
offered percentages for 2003 (various agencies awarded from 2 percent (Labor) to 24 
percent (HUD) of all their grants to faith-based groups in fiscal 2003) but did not 
provide information for previous fiscal years.220 In the following excerpt from 
Tempting Faith, Kuo disputes Towey’s 2003 figures and points to another empty 
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billion dollar funding promise President Bush made during his 2003 State of the 
Union address: 
 It was exciting…Unfortunately, the excitement was  
tempered by two realities. First there wasn’t really any money 
available. The Iraq War was eating up countless billions, and the 
president’s tax cut, combined with a less than booming economy, 
meant that government revenues were through the floor. That is why 
two of the items—the million mentors for disadvantaged kids in 
middle schools and the mentors for all 1.5 million kids with a mother 
or father in prison—were combined into one program. Second, the 
numbers weren’t what they seemed…When the President announced 
our $400 million dollar program for mentoring, it was actually a four-
year program: $50 million in each of the first and second years, $100 
million in the third and $200 million in the fourth. Even if the program 
is included in the president’s budget it won’t necessarily get funded. It 
is just a proposal.221  
 
Kuo goes on to recall that the White House never signaled they were a budget priority 
or made a commitment to the programs, which “disappeared” within a month. As had 
become a trend in his administration, neither Bush nor the White House of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives was held accountable for these “ghost” programs 
which were over before they began. Since they kept the press at arm’s length, and 
news cycles, which focused on the “big stories” changed so rapidly, no one caught on 
to the series of grand announcements the President made about programs that never 
came to fruition.  
 Through faith-based initiatives the Bush administration promised support to 
thousands of programs in need, mostly to no avail. Faith-based initiatives, had they 
been fully or even half-way funded, could have been transformative for Black 
churches and other religious institutions stretching their resources to meet the n eds 
of people suffering as a result of poverty, joblessness, drug addiction or a lack of 
                                                




quality healthcare. What made the offenses exposed by DiIulio and Kuo particularly 
egregious, were the social programs that were simultaneously being cut. At the same 
time the administration slashed funding for housing and community development 
programs and eliminated literacy and education programs, it was knowingly 
underfunding faith-based initiative programs it claimed should fill in the gap. 
In spite of this criticism, it is true that programs received funding  
as a result of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.  
The administration could and did accurately report that they provided support to faith-
based programs across the nation. Where that support was provided became an issue 
of interest as the 2004 presidential cycle neared.  As critics of faith-based initiatives 
kept a close eye on funding and where it was disseminated, they began to complain 
that program support was politically driven. According to a W shington Post article 
published in June of 2004, even aides to President Bush admitted that support for 
faith-based programs would help his reelection bid and “encourage evangelical 
Christians to mobilize to keep him in office.” They were also clear that such efforts 
“could give the ticket inroads in African American communities.”222  
When it was reported that significant funding went to programs located in 
2004 election battleground states, the connection between electoral politics and faith-
based initiatives was more than plausible. Thomas Edsall reported in a 2006 
Washington Post article that churches in Wisconsin and Florida, received a combined 
total of over three million dollars leading up to the 2004 election. Both men, Bishop 
Sedgwick Daniels and Bishop Harold Calvin Ray, were early supporters of Bush and 
Ray was even a delegate to the 2004 convention. In the same article, Edsall 
                                                




mentioned several conservative organizations that received funding, including The 
Youth Institute for Youth Development which received $7.5 million dollars over 
three years and used the money to award smaller grants to conservative organizations 
and groups. Even as reports like this one called attention to “strategic” programmatic 
funding, other reports surfaced indicating that the White House Office of Faith-B sed 
and Community Initiatives and its agency branches were using “smoke and mirrors” 
to create the illusion of fulfilled promises.  
While some in the media and critics followed faith-based initiative  
funding trails closely during the 2004 election, conferences planned by the White 
House and sponsored by the agencies flew under the radar.   According to Kuo, the 
first White House conference on federal funding was held in Atlanta and was very 
successful. Over 2,500 people attended, at least half of whom were African 
American. Representatives, mostly from smaller religious and social service 
organizations, showed up to learn how to accurately complete funding applications 
and avoid legal difficulty. In spite of presentations Kuo described as “mind-
numbingly boring,” attendees were extremely appreciative of the informati n nd 
hopeful they may be able to fund new or expand existing programs.223  But based 
on the significantly reduced Compassion Capital Fund, Kuo estimated that less than 5 
people out of the 2,500 attendees who applied for grants had a chance of receiving 
them. Nevertheless, the White House sponsored over twelve of these conferences 
between 2003 and 2004, attracting 20,000 people and covering every battleground 
state. A conference was held in Miami, an important city in one of the most critical 
battleground states, ten days before the election. Funded by the agency faith-based 
                                                




initiative offices, they occurred without media coverage or scrutiny. However as a 
former U.S. Labor Department political appointee, Leah Daughtry heard about the 
conferences which she discusses here:  
 
The AMEs and Baptists would call the campaign and say you gotta do 
something because they’re in our community they’re having forums, 
they’ll come in, during election time, September, October go into a 
city and have a grant writing workshop. Now what grants are the 
government giving in October of an election year? None. But you got 
em’ sitting there. And so they get to do their spiel so the WH invites 
them to a grant writing workshop. In September. Now, it’s so obvious 
but, if the Department of Labor sponsors it, who’s gonna say 
anything?224 
 
An important question the authors of Faith Based Initiatives and the Bush 
Administration: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly asked, was whether funding for 
social service programs actually increased to accommodate the anticipated influx of 
applications after the faith-based initiative launch in the various agencies. According 
to the authors, other long-time social service providers that received federal funding 
including Catholic Charities USA were skeptical of the President’s original plan 
because “they saw no appreciable increase in funding and thought faith-based 
organizations were being invited to compete for a static amount of federal 
funding.”225 For people like Jim Dickerson, who were familiar with the government’s 
pre-existing relationship with such organizations, Bush’s passionate commitment to 
make funding accessible to faith-based groups seemed misleading: 
  Every social program I've been part of these past 40 years  
  had been explicitly 'faith-based' in one form or another and  
  used government money. We've never been discriminated  
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  against because of our faith.226 
 
When Kuo released Tempting Faith in 2006 it was initially criticized by the 
White House as salacious but turned out to be accurate in its central assertion that he 
administration had simply not lived up to its faith-based initiatives funding promises. 
Most of the so-called “new” programs Bush had touted over the years were being 
funded through existing budgets. For example, in 2005, Bush mentioned a $150 
million gang prevention program in his State of the Union Address. According to 
Kuo, funding for the three-year program was actually being taken from the already 
dwindling $100 million Compassion Capital Fund request.227 Even before Kuo 
exposed the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives’ shortcomings in hi  
memoir, there was public outcry from some Black pastors in the faith community 
against Bush’s failure to deliver on his promises. In 2003, more than thirty religious 
leaders who initially supported his faith-based initiative sent a damning letter to he 
President voicing their frustration over the administration’s betrayal of their trust:  
Mr. President, 'the good people' who provide such services  
are feeling overwhelmed by increasing need and diminished  
resources. And many are feeling betrayed. The lack of  
consistent, coherent and integrated domestic policy that  
benefits low-income people makes our continued support for  
your faith-based initiative increasingly untenable. Mr.  
President, the poor are suffering, and without serious  
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The Unfortunate Legacy of Faith-Based Initiatives 
 
This criticism was a clear indication that some in the faith community were 
aware of how programs were receiving much less than what was promised.  However, 
those promises were made before the September 11th attacks. Kuo acknowledged that 
the focus shifted to the war but was also quick to point out that the administration’s 
commitment to Faith-based programs and funding was expressed to the nation with 
an urgency that was not supported by action and significant new appropriations even 
before September 11th.   
Although President Bush was fulfilling at least a portion of his campaign 
promises through the agencies he designated to disseminate faith-based funding, he 
attempted to take his signature domestic policy priority to the next level by 
institutionalizing it through legislation. However, both David Kuo and John DiIulio 
confirmed after their departures that the Bush White House had neither the policy 
expertise nor the desire to commit to the political machinations necessary to gner
widespread bipartisan support for a bill. According to DiIulio, the Bush White House 
never really transitioned out of campaign mode. In that environment, particularly as it 
related to domestic affairs, “political calculation” trumped policy. In other words, 
ideas and rhetoric about faith-based initiatives were offered to the public through 
carefully crafted speeches and press conferences but those ideas were not supported 





DiIulio places Karl Rove at the center of this environment in which “on-the-
fly policy-making by speechmaking” flourished.229 In his unprecedented role as 
senior advisor to the President, Rove demonstrated that he clearly had a working 
knowledge of a plethora of policy concerns. However, here DiIulio criticizes both 
Rove and those working with and for him in the Bush administration for confusing 
that knowledge for “genuine expertise:” 
Karl Rove and his people, who consistently talked and acted as if the 
height of political sophistication consisted in reducing every issue to 
its simplest Black-and-white terms for public consumption, then 
steering legislative initiatives or policy proposals as far right as 
possible. These folks have their predecessors in previous 
administrations but in the Bush administration, they were particularly 
unfettered… When policy analysis is just backfill to support a political 
maneuver, you'll get a lot of oops.230  
 
DiIulio went on to describe how the Bush White House supported legislation they 
knew would not make it out of the House in order to appease their base: 
The White House winked at the most far-right House Republicans, 
who, in turn, drafted a so-called faith bill that (or so they thought) 
satisfied certain fundamentalist leaders and Beltway libertarians but 
bore few marks of compassionate conservatism and was an absolute 
political nonstarter. It could pass the House only on a virtual party-line 
vote, and it could never pass the Senate. Not only that, but it reflected 
neither the president's own previous rhetoric on the idea nor any of the 
actual empirical evidence....I said so, wrote memos, and so on....As 
one senior staff member chided me at a meeting at which many junior 
staff were present and all ears, 'John, get a faith bill, any faith bill.'231 
 
The apparent lack of desire to craft a bill that would pass the House and Senate 
suggests that the administration cared more about the appearance of making the 
attempt. Since funding of programs was not dependent on the bill, its failure did not 
                                                






significantly impact the various offices of community and faith-based initiatives 
housed in the agencies. 
President Bush and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives were met with much resistance throughout their attempts to in titutionalize 
faith-based initiatives. Yet the White House Office of Faith Based and Community 
Initiatives survived all eight years of the Bush administration and was responsible for 
the creation of nine additional Offices of Faith Based and Community Initiatives in 
federal agencies for a total of thirteen. Unfortunately, as has been discussed, it never 
lived up to its promise. The dubious legacy of the White Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives also indicated the degree to which Bush’s personal beliefs and 
values were trumped by politics and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to 
Kuo, President Bush was not fully aware of just how underfunded his faith-based 
initiatives were.232 Could he then be justly accused of failing to back up his faith with 
“works”? As will be discussed in the next chapter, he clearly benefited politically 
from those promises and therefore more churches and pastors should have benefitted 
from their fulfillment. 
Historically, second presidential terms—which do not operate under the 
weight of re-election pressures—provide a significant opportunity for presidents and 
their administrations to dedicate more energy and resources towards issues of 
particular interest to them. Much of what can now be considered successful about 
Bush’s faith-based agenda developed and thrived during his second term. Program 
evaluation, accountability and execution all improved and flourished between 2005 
                                                




and 2008. However, figures documenting new funding allocated specifically for faith-
based programs remained ambiguous.  
According to a 2006 survey done by the White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives, fifty percent of Black churches bring in under $250,000 
annually. Only a little over one tenth of all Black churches reported an annual 
revenue of more than one million dollars. These figures illustrate the fact that a small 
minority of Black churches actually had the existing capacity and infrastructure to 
handle large grants. It also explains why African American church partici tion in 
faith-based initiatives was actually low, even as Jay Hein, the Director of he White 
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in 2006, claimed “interest” 
was high.233 The results of this survey support the argument that the promise of 
funding to Black churches was much more significant than the actual dissemination 
of grants. Certain Black churches, discussed earlier, benefited from faith-based 
initiative funding. Unfortunately, many of the Black churches that were “interes d” 
in the federal assistance President George W. Bush claimed was their right to eceive, 
saw a small fraction of the $8 billion he promised to allocate per year. Most of them 
received nothing. Interestingly, the two domestic issues that were “top priorities” 
during Bush’s first term, faith-based initiatives and the constitutional amend nt 
banning same-sex marriage were never institutionalized in the form of legislation.234  
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“If the KKK was opposing same-sex marriage, Reverend Daniels would ride with 
them.”235 
 
“Who said you can vote on the rights of other people? When has that been okay? 
That has to be questioned.”236 
 
“But God’s plan it seems to me has been more for us to be coequal and to share the 
resources that God has blessed us to have on this earth and to be able to live to our 
full god given potential.”237 
Chapter Five: Same-Sex Marriage 
 
Same-sex marriage was one of the most provocative issues debated and 
discussed during the 2004 election. While same-sex marriage was mentioned during 
the primaries it garnered the most attention during the general election when both 
Democratic Presidential candidate John F. Kerry and President George W. Bush were 
forced to state their positions on the issue in front of the millions of Americans 
watching the debates on television.238 Although the issue of same-sex marriage had 
much of its own momentum around the country because of state based activism the 
Bush reelection campaign capitalized on that momentum and used it to appeal to 
certain Black churches and pastors who often hold more conservative views about 
homosexuality. Using networks established throughout Bush’s first term, the 
campaign specifically targeted evangelical churches and megachurches wit  a values 
message that diverted attention away from traditional “kitchen table” domestic issues. 
As a result, same-sex marriage became the issue many of these churches and their 
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members used to determine who they would support in the 2004 election. While 
polling indicates the majority of Black churches and their members did not flock to 
the Republican Party en masse because of this strategy, it is clear that some in the 
Black faith community publicly aligned themselves with Bush because of his anti-
same-sex marriage stance. This support can be linked to his significant increase in 
African American votes in key states. This chapter will focus on the Bush campaign’s 
successful use of same-sex marriage as a wedge issue as well as the cultural and 
historical context in which the controversy unfolded. 
Their success can be attributed to three phenomena. First, President Bush 
came out in support of a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage making his position on the issue clear at the beginning of the election year. 
Second, for the first time in decades, the RNC did not concede all support of African 
Americans to the Democratic Party. Instead they went after what they viewed as the 
most logical target: socially conservative African American evangelical Christians. 
They targeted their message to evangelicals and megachurches, knowing they would 
be more likely to connect with Bush around the issue. Finally, as the campaign 
progressed and ministers continued to voice their opposition publicly, the media and 
Democratic activists began to question whether they represented a significant 
segment of the Black church community. In 2004, ministers spoke out publicly 
against same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, Texas, Ohio and California. The 
intensity with which they voiced their opinions on the subject contributed to increased 




The lack of a coordinated response from Black ministers aligned with the Kerry 
campaign and DNC contributed to the public perception—and in some cases reality—
that the same-sex marriage issue was driving African Americans to support President 
Bush.    
This chapter’s focus on the relationship between same-sex marriage and Black 
protestant Christians who opposed it in the 2004 election also provides another 
opportunity to complicate simplistic conceptions of the Black church. Black pastors 
held rallies and press conferences in cities across the country including Boston and 
Dallas, in the candidates’ home states, condemning same-sex marriage as immoral. 
While the diversity of denominations and churches within the Black church makes it 
difficult to know how representative these pastors were of African American 
protestant Christians as a whole, historical and cultural trends regarding the treatment 
of homosexuality within the church provide some clues. I will pause here to discuss 
these trends before turning to a brief history of the same-sex marriage issue after 
which I will examine how the aforementioned phenomena contributed to the Bush 
campaign’s successful use of the controversy as a wedge issue. 
 
Homosexuality, Homophobia and the Black Church 
 
According to several quantitative and qualitative studies conducted  
over the past twenty years, the majority of African Americans oppose 
homosexuality.239 In “Whosoever Will”: Black Theology, homosexuality, and the 
Black political church,” Todd C. Shaw and Eric L. McDaniel, argue that general 
                                                




opposition to homosexuality within the African American community is connected to 
concerns about its impact on Black heterosexual marriage, the Black family, and 
raising children as well as its potential damage to already compromised i ages of 
Black masculinity, sexuality and gender roles.240 They cite studies that have identified 
a strong correlation between church attendance and African American intolera ce of 
homosexuality.  Historically, religion has often guided African American perceptions 
about homosexuality and been used to explain why it is wrong, obscuring many of the 
above visceral fears and concerns it evokes.  
Shaw and McDaniel maintain that the three mainline Black Protestant 
denominations espouse interpretations of the Bible that view “homosexuality” as a sin 
and likely an “abomination.”241 Here Pastor Dennis Wiley confirms the prevalence of 
these interpretations: 
And then there’s a kind of biblical literalism or fundamentalism that is 
prevalent in many of our churches so that the Bible has become such 
an essential reference in our churches and in our communities, that 
people don’t approach it from a historical critical perspective.242 
 
Using biblical “evidence” including Leviticus 20:13 and Romans 1:26-27, these 
churches teach that homosexuality is unnatural and goes against God’s purpose in 
creating man and woman.243 Consequently, homosexuality is often viewed as an 
illness or disease that can be “cured,” or a choice that can be corrected rather th n a 
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biological phenomenon that cannot. This issue arose during the campaign season 
when Black pastors speaking out against same-sex marriage balked at comparisons 
being made by same-sex marriage proponents between the gay rights and civil rights 
movements. A common retort Black pastors who strongly opposed same-sex 
marriage gave to such comparisons, was that gay people had a choice to be gay but 
Black people could not select their skin color. African American gay rights activist 
Ron Buckmire says that “the infectious model of homosexuality” is also prevalent in 
the Black community.244 In this model adults express their fear that if children are 
exposed to gays and lesbians they will somehow become homosexual. According to 
Buckmire, opponents of same-sex marriage exploited this fear and used images of 
children in their ads during the Proposition 8 campaign in California. 
However, Black protestant Christians do not have a monopoly on these views 
about homosexuality. They are consistent with the larger Protestant community. 
According to a 2003 Pew Research center study, over 50% of both Black and White 
protestants believed that “homosexuality was a lifestyle choice as opposed to a matter 
of biology.”245 Shaw and McDaniel include other reports from the Joint Center and 
the Policy Institute for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. However, based on 
the inconsistency in the data, the authors refer to research done by Schulte and Battle 
which concludes that “American religious orthodoxy” is a much larger determinant of 
homophobia than race, especially since there is rarely more than a ten point difference 
in percentages between them. Nevertheless, the significant role of the Black chur h in 
shaping African American attitudes about homosexuality cannot be denied. This 
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hard-line opposition to homosexuality in most Black churches has subsisted while 
African American gay, lesbian, bi-sexual and transgendered men and women have 
been a part of their congregations. They have not only filled the pews on Sunday but 
often been active in various ministries. Consequently, Black gay men and women 
have been and continue to be a part of the Black church tradition, but often as a 
silenced group within a broader church community that does not approve of a 
significant part of their identity.  
As Shaw and McDaniel explain, Black gays and lesbians who belong to these 
churches “risk enduring homophobic sermons or alienation if their homosexuality is 
ever openly disclosed.”246 Meanwhile, heterosexual members and leaders of the 
church who are often aware that there are gay and lesbian members in the 
congregation, accept their presence and embrace them as fellow Christians as long s 
they remain silent about their sexual orientation. This “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
phenomenon has been well documented and is often discussed outside of the church 
in academic and informal environments. Here Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr. confirmed the 
prevalence of this unfortunate dynamic when recalling a disturbing but typical 
experience he had at a Black church where he was a guest in the pulpit: 
I was with a pastor of a church one Sunday and he knew several 
members of his church and choir, musical staff were gay and we all 
rejoiced in the singing and in their talent. Then at some point he left 
his central message and started preaching about homosexuality…We 
accept the service of people who are gay, the talents of people who are 
gay, the tithes of people who are gay and then attack them as a 
testimony of our religiosity. And that is hypocritical.247 
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It has been documented that homophobia in the Black church marginalizes 
Black gays and lesbians and reinforces a dangerous intolerance for heterosexual 
members, which can lead to everything from broken families to hate speech and 
crimes. However, both inclusive mainline Black churches and Black “gay-led” 
congregations exist as well. The former are typically what Shaw and McDaniel refer 
to as “Black Political Churches” which “see a political identity as one of their many 
salient identities—spiritual salvation being foremost.”248 These churches are led by 
ministers like Rev. Dennis Wiley, who along with his wife, Co-pastor Christine 
Wiley, espouses a theology that is inclusive of people of all socio-economic 
backgrounds, races, gender and sexual orientations. Here Pastor Wiley shares his 
progressive views about same-sex marriage:  
My philosophy on gay marriage is that I am fully supportive of it. I 
don’t see how you can genuinely say that you’re inclusive that you’re 
really welcoming and affirming human beings into your fellowship if 
you allow them to be included up till a point. And then when it comes 
to perhaps the most important decision that a human being can make in 
terms of who he or she will spend the rest of his or her life with in a 
committed monogamous, loving relationship, then the church says 
no.249 
 
Gay-led Black churches, many of which were founded in the late seventies 
and early eighties, focus on the Bible’s message of love and acceptance and eschew 
narrow interpretations of a text that has been used throughout history as a tool of 
subjugation and division. Gay-led churches that focus on an “ethic of love” include 
Unity Fellowship Church, which has 15 congregations across the nation and 
Metropolitan Community Churches which has congregations in over 40 states. 
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Yet within the Black church tradition, these inclusive and gay-led Black 
congregations, though growing in number, are anomalies. Figures from the Black 
Pride Survey discussed in the Shaw and McDaniel article support this assertion. In the 
survey, 43% of all respondents said they had negative experiences within Black 
churches, 31% indicated both negative and positive experiences and 26% claimed 
they had positive experiences.250 Clearly, the vast majority of Black Baptist, 
Methodist, Pentecostal and nondenominational churches do not condone 
homosexuality. Based on data regarding levels of religiosity within the Black church 
it is feasible to assume that more evangelical churches within these denominations 
would fall closer to the “homosexuality as a curable disease or addiction” end of the 
spectrum while many mainline churches would exist just to the left at the “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” point on the continuum.  
It could be argued that same-sex marriage, an issue about same-sex couples 
being able to marry each other and receive the same rights as heterosexual couples is 
at the opposite end. According to this hypothetical spectrum, with the exception of 
the aforementioned anomalies, both mainline and evangelical churches would oppose 
same-sex marriage. In other words, it is quite plausible that in 2004, the issue of 
same-sex marriage struck a chord with conservative evangelical Black Pastors as well 
as mainline and non-denominational pastors who felt morally bound to oppose it. 
However, as will be discussed later in the chapter, pastors of mainline churches who 
may have been opposed to same-sex marriage, did not come out against the issue. 
 
                                                




Same-Sex Marriage: A Brief History 
 
As has already been mentioned, the tensions which grew within the Black 
church community over the issue in 2004, were a reflection of the controversy 
brewing in the larger Christian community and on the national stage. The debate over 
“same-sex marriage” did not arise spontaneously during the 2004 presidential 
election. Therefore, just as it was important to begin the chapter with a discussion of 
homosexuality and the Black church, it is important to provide a historical context for 
the issue that garnered so much attention that year.  
Like most issues of national significance, the struggle for full marriage rights 
for same-sex couples is one component of a larger movement. The current same sex 
marriage issue stems from the more “conservative” branch of the original organized 
gay rights movement, which was born in the early 1980s and focused primarily on 
achieving progress through established political channels. Its leaders, including San 
Francisco City Councilman Harvey Milk believed that equality and equal rights 
would be achieved most effectively from “within.” Taking cues from the Civil Rights 
and Women’s movements, gay rights activists lobbied politicians, sought public 
office themselves and used the judicial system when necessary to further their cause.  
Although less visible and overtly pernicious than violent hate crimes against 
gay men and women, a historically egregious form of discrimination gay couples 
experienced occurred when their partners became ill or died and they had no legal 
rights to make decisions or claim property. Furthermore, they could not claim each 
other on health insurance policies or file taxes jointly or enjoy any conveniences that 




a push for same-sex marriage rights in the courts created an arena in which many of
the gay community’s equal rights grievances could be articulated and hopefully 
addressed by the government. 
Over the last thirty years, gay rights court cases have run the gamut fro  
litigation focused on sodomy laws to suits brought by couples who directly 
challenged states that did not allow them to apply for marriage licenses. Within the 
last decade, among some of the most famous cases were Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health (2003) and Lewis v. Harris (2006).251 In Goodridge, a lesbian couple 
applied to the Massachusetts Department of Health for a marriage license and was 
denied because the state did not recognize same-sex marriage. Julie and Hillary 
Goodridge sued the department arguing that the denial “violated their right to 
individual liberty and legal equality as guaranteed by the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”252 The basis for the state’s opposition to same-sex marriage was 
anchored in its belief that same-sex marriage would not promote procreation or 
ensure a good child-rearing environment and would negatively impact state financial 
resources. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided 4-3 in favor of the 
couple stating that the state’s constitution “requires the government to offer the 
protections, benefits and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of 
the same sex who wish to marry.”253 Chief Justice Margaret Marshall explained in the 
majority opinion that the only basis for the state’s exclusion of same-sex couples 
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from the institution of marriage was a disapproval of their lifestyle which the court 
held was not a “constitutionally adequate reason” for denying marriage benefits.   
The plaintiffs in Lewis, inspired by Goodridge, filed suit in New Jersey, where 
the state Supreme Court found that the state’s constitutional guarantee of “legal 
equality” required the legislature to grant the same rights and benefits to same-sex 
couples as were enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. However, unlike in Goodridge, the 
court left it to the legislature to decide whether those rights should be extended 
through civil unions, or same-sex marriage. The New Jersey state legislature would 
go on to pass a measure allowing gay couples to enter into civil unions not same-sex 
marriage. On the state level, other gay couples seeking equal rights found some 
solace in civil unions and domestic partner designations.  
As of January of 2009, New Jersey, Vermont and New Hampshire allow civil 
unions and California has domestic partnerships. Although they are often assumed to 
be almost identical to marriage, there is a significant difference between Civil Unions 
and Same-sex marriage. Benefits granted through Civil Unions, like shared health 
insurance and the right to visit a partner’s hospital room, do not offer the same 
amount of state-wide benefits that same-sex marriage does. This explains why Civil 
Unions are often thought to be a poor alternative to same-sex marriage, which offers 
all of the transferable rights and benefits that married heterosexual couples are 
guaranteed by the state. The domestic partner designation raises similar concerns.  
Yet even in the two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, where same-sex 
marriage is currently legal, gay couples do not have access to the federal benefits 




signed by President Clinton, which stated that “The Federal Government may not 
treat same-sex relationships as marriages for any purpose, even if concluded or 
recognized by one of the states.”254 Consequently, couples married in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and California, cannot take advantage of the more than 1,000 federal 
benefits of marriage including family leave and immigration rights for spu es. 
Significantly, the two things that all three of the designations share, are the fac  that 
none of them are transferrable to other states and none of them enable access to 
federal benefits. In other words, if a gay couple marries in Massachusetts or another 
couple has a domestic partnership in Vermont, neither couple can file joint federal 
taxes and if either couple moves to Georgia, their rights will not move with them.  
So even as states legally acknowledge and allow same-sex marriage and 
domestic partnerships and civil unions are celebrated, the state-to-state limitations 
and federal exclusions are crippling to many gay couples. However, for several states 
where there is strong state-wide opposition to same-sex marriage, the federal
exclusions guaranteed through DOMA do not go far enough. These states have 
responded by changing their constitutions to ensure a singular interpretation of 
marriage. Currently, 30 states have constitutional amendments using language that 
restricts marriage to one man and one woman. A majority of the 30 states with 
constitutional amendments also include language that has the potential to adversely 
impact other legal same-sex relationships including civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.  
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Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election 
 
Passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996 is a clear indication 
that same-sex marriage was a controversial issue before the 2004 Presidential 
election. In fact, it was a large enough part of the political and public discourse that in 
the 2000 presidential election, both Vice President Al Gore and George W. Bush 
stated their positions on the issue. Gore made it clear during the 2000 campaign that 
he was in support of civil unions but against same-sex marriage. In that election, 
Bush’s position on Same-sex marriage was that it was an issue that should be left to 
the states to decide. Yet, nothing compares to the attention the issue received in the 
2004 election when it seemed to take on a life of its own. Questions from the 
moderator Gwen Ifil in one of the presidential debates and the vice presidential 
debate, resulted in tense moments between the candidates.   
Same-sex marriage was also another area where Senator Kerry was accused of 
“flip-flopping” because while he and his running mate Senator Edwards clearly stated 
that they believed marriage was between a man and a woman they were both in favor 
of “partnership benefits” as he explained during the debate: 
We both believe that -- and this goes onto the end of what I just talked 
about -- we both believe that marriage is between a man and a woman. 
But we also believe that gay and lesbians and gay and lesbian couples, 
those who have been in long-term relationships, deserve to be treated 
respectfully, they deserve to have benefits.255  
     
According to Sean Cahill in The Future of Gay Rights in America, the views 
expressed during this debate about same-sex marriage were representative of both the 
Republican and Democratic views on the issue as far back as four election cycles. 
                                                




Here Cahill describes how Republican activists and candidates have openly 
denounced same-sex marriage and gay rights since the 1990s: 
Pat Buchanan denounced same-sex marriage and legal protections for 
gay people at the 1992 Republican convention; six other speakers also 
denounced gay people and/or legal protections for gay people. In 1996, 
Republican candidates criticized efforts by same-sex couples to gain 
access to the institution of civil marriage, and Congress debated and 
passed the anti-gay Defense of Marriage Act. In 1999 and 2000, 
Republican candidates denounced the Vermont high court ruling in 
support of equal benefits of gay couples, and then Governor George 
W. Bush announced his opposition to sexual orientation 
nondiscrimination laws, which he portrayed as “special protections.256  
 
The issue received such remarkable attention and coverage in 2004 because 
the Bush reelection campaign under the direction of Karl Rove, was purposefully 
positing it as a clear difference between the two candidates. To underscore that 
difference, President Bush came out in support of a constitutional amendment in early
2004. Although it appeared that Bush confidently backed the amendment, at the time, 
officials close to the White House claimed his advisors carefully weighed the decision 
and delayed the announcement. He talked about the issue for six months in private 
before officially throwing his weight behind it. During a primary debate back in 2000, 
Bush, when asked about his position on same-sex marriage, was quoted as saying, 
“Don’t try to trap me in this states’ issue like you’re trying to get me into.”257 But the 
day after announcing the start of his general election campaign in 2004 he used his 
proclamation of support for the amendment to accuse Senator John Kerry of waffling 
on the issue of same-sex marriage.  
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In 1996 Senator Kerry was one of 14 senators who voted against the Defense 
of Marriage Act which President Clinton signed. Since the act denied federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages which was consistent with Kerry’s 2004 stance 
that a federal amendment was unnecessary but slightly inconsistent with his statement 
that, “I believe, as a matter of belief, that marriage is between a man and a woman” 
the Bush reelection campaign said he was flip-flopping.258 In retrospect Bush’s 
labeling of Kerry as a waffler on this issue was a stretch, particularly because it 
appears that Kerry’s personal belief did not translate into a desire to deny gay couples 
certain rights through supporting either DOMA or a constitutional amendment.  
Ironically, Bush’s accusation of Kerry may have effectively diverted attention 
away from the shift in his own position on the issue.  Apparently, the benefit of Bush 
potentially appealing to evangelical Christians outweighed the cost of entering the 
discussion about what he had previously argued was an issue for states to decide.  
Representative Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO) introduced a version called the Federal 
Marriage Amendment which White House Press Secretary, Scott McClellan said was 
in line with the President’s “principles.”259 Musgrave’s amendment was also heavily 
supported by conservative evangelical groups including the Alliance for Marriage, a 
non-profit organization that promotes marriage and reforms “designed to strengthen 
the institution of marriage”. The Alliance for Marriage had been lobbying for an 
amendment since 2001 and found a willing sponsor in Representative Musgrave.260  
In spite of his prior position on same-sex marriage, on February 24, 2004 
President Bush announced his support for a constitutional amendment that would 
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clearly define marriage as the union of a man and a woman. In his speech, Bush 
argued that same-sex marriage would weaken society: 
The union of a man and woman is the most enduring  
human institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures  
and by every religious faith. Ages of experience have taught humanity 
that the commitment of a husband and wife to love and to serve one 
another promotes the welfare of children and the stability of society. 
Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious and natural 
roots without weakening the good influence of society. Government, 
by recognizing and protecting marriage, serves the interests of all.261  
 
Same-Sex Marriage: A Wedge Issue  
 
 While Bush placed the symbolic power of the White House behind the 
amendment banning same-sex marriage, he said state legislatures should determine 
what kind of rights and benefits gay couples are entitled to. He stopped short of 
condoning civil unions and domestic partnerships but the amendment would enable 
states to support and allow such arrangements. Often overlooked in the hoopla 
surrounding Bush’s support of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage is the protracted process it involves. Such amendments require two-thirds 
vote in either chamber of Congress in addition to ratification in 38 states, which is 
extremely difficult to accomplish. But by coming out in support of the constitutional 
amendment, even if it had little chance of happening, Bush appealed to his base and 
kept the issue in the national spotlight.  His support of the amendment sent a message 
that he was opposed to same-sex marriage. The Bush campaign used this clear stan  
to energize evangelicals, who they knew would get behind the issue. 
                                                




According to a USA Today article published on September 27, 2004, Karl 
Rove desperately wanted to motivate the “4 million Christian conservatives who had 
failed to vote, despite GOP expectations, in the 2000 election.”262 As Bush’s top 
political strategist, Rove clearly thought Same-sex marriage would energize some of 
those “missing voters” from the 2000 election. According to Pastor Bryan Carter, 
Rove and the Bush campaign tapped into an issue that many Black Christians were 
passionate about: 
I think that some parties, I think the conservative party knows our 
value system and I believe that there’s certain hot buttons in our 
culture that historically attract churches and I feel like those may have 
been utilized to influence us or to attract us to certain agendas.263 
 
They also believed the Bush campaign was using same-sex marriage as a 
wedge issue to divide potential Kerry supporters within the Black community and to 
shore up support of Bush’s evangelical supporters. However, Deal Hudson, former 
publisher of the Catholic magazine Crisis and Catholic outreach advisor to the Bush 
reelection campaign writes in Onward Christian Soldiers: The Growing Political 
Power of Catholics and Evangelicals in the United States that this accusation was 
misplaced. According to Hudson, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in 
Goodridge to allow same-sex marriage in November of 2003 is what injected the 
issue into the 2004 campaign.264 White House staffer Ralph Reed confirmed this 
stating, “The gay marriage issue was not on anybody’s radar screen until eight 
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members of the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided to redefine marriage.”265 
However, the fact that the issue was not originally a part of the campaign strategy did 
not preclude the Bush Reelection team from incorporating it into their outreach, 
especially after Bush signed on to the idea of the federal amendment. 
As the campaign season heated up and Black pastors opposing same-sex 
marriage received more attention, it became clear that this issue was striking a chord 
with Black evangelical Christians. The Bush campaign had used their outreach staff 
over the course of the campaign—the four years of Bush’s first term—to make 
ministers feel like they were part of a community. They had essentially sored the 
political capital they accumulated over four years and were able to cash in during the 
campaign as conservative and evangelical Black pastors came out against same- ex 
marriage and simultaneously aligned themselves with President Bush. These 
conservative pastors who were actively involved in the Bush reelection campaign, 
including Bishop Harry Jackson, pastor of Hope Christian Church in College Park, 
MD, were speaking out against it publicly, while simultaneously using same-sex 
marriage as a way to bring other pastors into the Republican fold. The image of a 
group of Black ministers crowded around a microphone speaking out not in favor of 
rights for a marginalized group, but against them, was perplexing to many progressive 
Americans.266 How could Black preachers who, because of the central role Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. played in the civil rights movement, had become a symbol for 
the struggle for racial equality, be so vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage?  
                                                
265 Hudson, 89. 





Inherent in the question is the notion that these pastors believed same-sex 
marriage was a civil rights issue: they didn’t. Furthermore, shock and confusi  at 
their outspoken opposition to same-sex marriage, further supported the argument 
expressed in previous chapters that Black churches and pastors are often stereotyped 
as monolithic rather than complex entities. Here, Rev. Leah Daughtry discusse the 
fundamentalist theology of Pentecostal churches, many of which lean towards 
Lincoln and Mamiya’s “otherworldly” and “privatistic” dialectics which devalue a 
connection to the social concerns: 
It makes absolutely no sense that the people who are in the worst 
economic shape would vote against what seems to be in their personal 
interest. George Bush is not in control of their finances and neither 
was Bill Clinton as far as they’re concerned. God blesses you with 
what he wants you to have. That’s the theology. If you get that, then 
you understand why they can’t vote against their economic interests. 
Because actually they think they’re voting in favor of their economic 
interests by voting for the person whose moral authority lines up with 
theirs.267  
 
Same-Sex Marriage and Black Evangelical Churches 
 
While it may not have been a top issue for most voters, the issue of same-sex 
marriage certainly seemed to be generating a lot of attention in the African American 
church. Black pastors held press conferences in Massachusetts, Illinois and California 
expressing their outrage over same-sex marriage and comparisons between the gay 
rights movement and civil rights movement.268 Later in the campaign season, as Rev. 
Jackson, Sr. toured Black churches across the country expressing his support for John 
Kerry, he remembers encountering pastors who voiced their concerns about same-sex 
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marriage in the pulpit. When it was his turn to speak Rev. Jackson would attempt to 
place the issue alongside other issue he felt were of greater significance to their 
everyday lives: 
  In 2004 I would go to certain churches in Ohio and other  
states on Sunday morning sometimes with 2,000 people. I’d hear the 
reverend say some strong thing about how he was against same sex 
marriage. So I would ask the church members how many of you in 
here today support Medicare? All the hands went up. Support livable 
wages? All the hands went up. Support affirmative action? All the 
hands went up. Are against the war in Iraq? All the hands went up. 
How many of you have ever been invited to a same sex marriage? No 
hands went up. How does an issue that is not on your agenda become 
the basis for your vote? No one’s ever asked you to perform one or to 
attend one. So why would you take a moral abstraction over Medicare, 
jobs, wages, education and affirmative action? Everybody just kind of 
laughed because you realized it was a straw man issue.269 
 
Democratic activists became increasingly concerned about the amount of attention the 
issue was receiving in churches like these and feared that it could hurt their 
candidates in battleground states. Their fear was that the cultural issue of same-sex 
marriage would eclipse economic and social justice issues.  
In what, according to polls, was shaping up to be a close contest, both parties 
and campaigns had to proceed with caution, even as they tried to stay true to their 
core base constituents.  As early as March of 2004, John Ritter of USA Today 
observed that “Republicans don’t want to appear intolerant...Democrats want to avoid 
a ‘gay party’ label.”270 In the same article, Matt Foreman, former Executive Director 
of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force along with other gay rights groups 
expressed concern about conservative’s use of same-sex marriage as a divisive 
strategy. Here, Rev. Daughtry, who was working with the Kerry team in 2004, 
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describes how the campaign and Democratic Party were not equipped to deal with the
damage the issue was doing to their outreach efforts until it was too late:  
In many ways we were blindsided. We didn’t understand how big a 
wedge this was. We think we can explain away everything 
intellectually. That’s our party, we’re gonna talk it to death. So if you 
can just make people understand then it will all be fine. No this is 
hitting an emotional chord with folks and they weren’t targeting 
everybody. This is a very precise and targeted message for a set of 
people for whom this will resonate. And we had no comeback for 
that.271 
 
The Democrats were simply not prepared to deal with this momentum resulting from 
the Bush campaign and Republican Party’s substantial outreach to Black evangelical 
pastors.  Furthermore they were never able to formulate a unified message of their 
own around the issue of same-sex marriage and left Black pastors who were loyal to
the party with no talking points with which to respond. 
 Would the issue of same-sex marriage drive a wedge between some African
American voters and the Democratic party? The general consensus appeared to be 
that the issue certainly had the potential to do just that. There were certain Black 
churches and Black pastors who latched on to the issue rather than more traditional 
liberal issues including poverty, joblessness and inequities in the criminal justice 
system. In some churches same-sex marriage took the focus off of domestic issues 
that disproportionately affect African Americans and removed the sense of urgency 
that was present in the 2000 election. Pastor Carter, who leads an historically active 
and nondenominational megachurch, recalls how pervasive the issue of same-sex 
marriage became for Black pastors like him who opposed it biblically: 
                                                




For many of us in the Black church it became our whole determination 
between who we voted for…was based on who was going to enforce 
the marital issue. I believe you’ve got to look at it holistically and I 
don’t think that happened. What happened was we had rallies in our 
city where this is what we talked about and we stood in our pulpits and 
tried to declare this is the way to go but in turn we just missed out on 
anything else. So we made that the chief issue. Because we’ve got 
people in our church that hold to this values piece you know and so 
they vote based on abortion and they vote based on the marriage issue. 
That’s all they see is the abortion and marriage. They want me to 
always to lean that way but I tell them it’s more to it than just those 
two issues.272 
 
The question is whether their fervor over same-sex marriage actually transla ed in to 
more or less Black votes for Kerry and Bush. Based on the statistics it can be argued
that the small increase in Black votes for Bush was much less significant than the dip 
in votes for Kerry. Even with polling data we cannot be completely sure why Black
voters did not turn out for Kerry to the extent they did for Gore.  
 
Same-Sex Marriage Rights as Civil Rights 
 
In their efforts to gain support for same-sex marriage, proponents drew 
comparisons between their struggle to attain full marriage rights for gay couples and 
the modern civil rights movement when African Americans struggled to attain equal 
rights.  This strategy was not new, as North American movements and such 
movements all over the world have adopted the language and central tenets of the 
movement.  For example, in most recent years conservatives have used civil rights 
catch phrases like “racial justice” and “equal playing field” to win support for 
everything from dissembling affirmative action in higher education to championing 
                                                




the end of public assistance. Just as there was an outcry against what many have 
considered a misuse of “sacred” language by conservative groups since the 1990s, 
several Black pastors expressed outrage at the use of civil rights language and 
imagery by same-sex marriage advocacy groups. According to Ron Buckmire, the 
fact that “when you see an activist in the media espousing the gay rights position it’  
a white person,” made the comparisons even more dubious for many Black pastors.273 
There were two popular arguments offered by those who opposed the 
comparison. The first was that the gay movement was conveniently “appropriating” 
the language and symbolism of the civil rights movement which is particularly 
offensive because same-sex marriage is wrong and a “sin before God.” The second 
was that African Americans who were at the center of the civil rights moveent 
could not change their race while gay people could change their behavior.274 Bishop 
Paul Morton of a New Orleans Baptist church stated it most clearly when, at a 
meeting in Washington, DC organized by the Traditional Values Coalition he said, 
"You insult African-Americans when you say that this is a civil rights issue. I can't 
change the color of my skin, but you can change your lifestyle."275  
To the contrary, those in the gay rights movement who have used the 
comparison as a strategy argue that settling for anything short of achieving full 
marriage rights, and all of the benefits that accompany them, is akin to accepting the 
same kind of rampant inequality that women and Black Americans fought against.276 
Jennifer Mills-Knutsen, an assistant minister at the Old South Church, a Boston 
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church that has been progressive for over three hundred years, offered an interesting 
perspective. She argued that same-sex marriage “is not a religious issue” but a civil 
rights issue that should be addressed by the state. Mills-Knutsen believes that 
marriage rights should be applied equally to gay and “traditional” couples and the 
only role the church should play is deciding whether to perform same-sex 
weddings.277 Here, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr., who as a young man was an active 
participant in the civil rights movement, echoed Mills-Knutsen’s sentiment: 
We live in our faith and under the law and all Americans deserve equal 
protection under the law…access to education, to healthcare to speech 
under the equal protection of the law and ultimately you cannot choose 
another person’s marriage partner under the law. Your faith may not 
agree with that but we don’t live under your faith, we live under the 
law.278 
 
It is quite ironic that some old guard civil rights leaders, including former U.S. 
Congressman Walter Fauntroy, expressed resentment towards same-sex arriage 
proponents for appropriating language from the modern civil rights language while 
the former, in opposing same-sex marriage, appropriated the language of white 
conservatives. This reverse messaging by same-sex marriage opponents was on 
display in May of 2004 in Hillsborough County Florida when Black pastors, there to 
speak out against a small group of gays who were at the courthouse applying for 
marriage licenses, used language like “vocal minorities” to describe gay rights 
activists. Those press conferences and the ensuing media coverage created a buzz 
around the issue and its impact on Black voters well past the election. Was the 
outrage of these Black pastors shared by the majority of African Americans acros  the 
nation or limited to more socially conservative African American Christian? To 
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these ministers, and many others just like them all across the country, gay men and 
women should not be afforded the privilege of comparison to Black civil rights 
activists and leaders who struggled for full rights before them. To them, 
homosexuality is a lifestyle choice, and an abominable choice at that.279  
For other religious leaders who opposed same sex marriage the whole 
controversy was about pushing a broader gay “agenda” which according to Jerry 
Johnston, senior pastor at suburban Kansas City, Kansas First Family Church 
included, “increased political recognition and clout, promotion of homosexual 
lifestyles in the schools and intimidation of the pulpit.”280 Johnston’s suspicions, as 
extreme as they may sound, tapped into what may have been the true foundational 
fear of many Black church leaders: that same-sex marriage was only the tip of the 
iceberg. In other words, the acceptance and legalization of same-sex marriage would 
open up the flood gates for gay people and activists to flaunt and impose their 
“choice” and lifestyle on everyone. If the gay agenda was validated by the sta e and 
Federal government then conversely, their religious teachings and biblical foundation 
would be invalidated. Furthermore, same-sex marriage threatened to shake the 
aforementioned moral high ground many Black pastors have been able to operate 
from as a result of the Black church’s role in the civil rights movement. According to 
Ron Buckmire what often goes unacknowledged by these same people is that in many 
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cases they are holding fast to their “heterosexual privilege” and essentially saying that 
“they want this special word (marriage) reserved just for them.”281 
 
The Morality of Black Churches 
 
Because the activist and progressive history of a few churches and pastors is 
applied to them all, the Black church has developed a certain “moral authority.” A 
good example of the first extreme are the obligatory visits—mentioned in earlier 
chapters—presidential candidates must make to Black churches during campaign 
season.  
While these visits are politically savvy, the image of a candidate pictured in a 
Black church pulpit or shaking hands with a well respected Black pastor is invaluable, 
not just because of its meaning to Black Americans of a certain generation, but to any 
Americans for whom the Black church symbolizes peaceful progress. This plays out 
in cultural, political and intellectual discourse as evidenced by an excerpt from Jo 
Renee Formicola's The Politics of Values: Games Political Strategists Play  where 
she talks about the future of the Black church within the context of recent political 
happenings:  
Even though the Black church may choose to enlarge its moral agenda 
in the future and increasingly consider matters of personal morality, it 
will continue to unify its members politically. Regardless of what its 
detractors may say about how the Black church should proceed within 
the political process, its prophetic history cannot be denied: It has 
always spoken truth to power, and will continue to do so in the 
future.282  
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That “moral agenda” includes opposition to same-sex marriage, which Formicola 
spent much of the chapter discussing. However, in this case she dismisses it as an 
issue of “personal morality” and without differentiating between denominations or 
traditions, asserts that the Black Church’s “prophetic history” lives on. There are 
those who would argue that part of that prophetic history must necessarily include 
“speaking truth to power” on behalf of gays and lesbians as some of the inclusive and 
progressive Black churches do. For Pastor Wiley, that truth includes acknowledging 
that while same-sex marriage is often used as a wedge issue to distract African
American attention away from kitchen table issues, it is a real issue for Black gays 
and lesbians: 
I think that we run the risk sometimes of on the one hand of saying to 
the religious right, which is true, that you all throw this up in our face 
to distract us from some of the other issues that we need to be dealing 
with. But on the other hand there’s the danger that we trivialize this 
issue and minimize its significance and forget that these too are human 
beings who are seeking justice who are seeking a quality of life that is 
meaningful and purposeful and who have the right to exist just like 
everybody else.283 
 
 Just as it was more convenient for Formicola to use the “moral authority” 
characterization than to delve into the complex details of Black church variation, it 
became easier for journalists and pundits to go to the opposite extreme, focusing 
disproportionately on Black churches in their post election coverage where they 
highlighted the impact of same-sex marriage on turnout for Bush.  
 
                                                




Election 2004 Hindsight 
 
Following the election, pundits, party activists and voters were all anxious to 
find an explanation for the close election. What or who was to blame for the second 
presidential election in a row when Democrats found themselves on the losing side of 
a close election that was not decided on election night? Did Kerry fail to gain enough 
votes because of the “Swift Boat” advertisements or because the Republican strategy 
to label him a “flip-flopper” was successful? Was the American public unconvinced 
that Kerry and Edwards could take over the reins in the middle of the war in Iraq and 
safely and successfully chart a course towards peace as well as victory? In the days, 
weeks and months following the election, most of the commentary focused on what 
the Bush campaign did successfully which was not unusual. Political strategists and 
pundits touted the Republican party and Bush campaign for employing innovative 
targeting strategies and tactics. Among those strategies was campaign manager Ken 
Mehlman and Karl Rove’s focus on activating untapped evangelical voters from the 
2000 election. Before polling data could be accurately analyzed and generated, the 
role same-sex marriage played during the campaign was also given significant 
weight.   
 On the state level, several states included initiatives banning the practice on 
the ballot. On election day, eleven states had referendums on their ballots and all of 
them passed with the overwhelming majority passing by more than 65%. Of the 
eighteen so-called “battleground” states in the 2004 presidential election, four of 
them, Arkansas, Michigan, Ohio and Oregon had ballot initiatives banning same-sex 




where Bush won by such a small margin that Senator Kerry did not concede until 
November 3, 2004, the day after the election.  Some argue that these initiatives 
localized the issue and gave local politicos something closer to home to rally voters 
around which they could also connect positively to Bush and negatively to Kerry. 
Cheryl Jacques, president of the Human Rights Campaign at the time, argued 
that the number of states that succeeded in putting state constitutional amendments on 
the ballots were part of a national Republican Party and Bush campaign strategy. 
According to Jacques, the numerous ballot initiatives were “all about the president 
energizing his base and dividing and conquering in this election.”284 Jacques was 
inferring that local Republican party apparatuses took their orders to mobilize voters 
around these ballot initiatives from the national party. While it is hard to say whether 
the Party or Massachusetts case sparked local action, the Republican Party and Bush 
campaign clearly used the momentum generated by the issue to their advantage with 
Black churches and evangelical Christians.  
 Lisa Schiffren, writing for The New York Times in February of 2004, made the 
excellent point that statistically speaking, Americans of “every age group, income 
level and educational background” were overwhelmingly opposed to same-sex 
marriage. At the center of the article was the notion that same-sex marriage could 
hardly be a wedge issue since there was so much consensus about it across racial, 
ethnic and class lines. According to Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 
statistics in the article even among Democrats, 52 percent to 37 percent opposed 
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same-sex marriage.285  Both Schiffren and Ritter argued, based on polling data, that 
six months out from the general election, same-sex marriage was not a top issue for 
most voters. Polls showed the economy was the number one issue for 29% of voters, 
while they indicated same-sex marriage was the number one issue for only 5% of 
voters.286  
 This issue of American popular opinion about same-sex marriage came up in 
an PBS interview African American host Tavis Smiley did with Ed Gilespie, Chair of 
the Republican Party, on February 6, 2004. Gillespie denied that same-sex marriage 
was being used as a wedge issue to gain support from the African American 
community. Instead, after admitting the issue came up when he met with Black 
pastors earlier that day, Gillespie focused his comments on the “unelected activist
judges in the state of Massachusetts (who) say that there should be full marriage 
rights conferred upon gay couples.” He asked whether those judges should have the 
right to “tell the rest of the country what we should do relative to this issue,” referring 
to states that decided to go beyond DOMA and place referendums on the ballot 
defining marriage as between a man and a woman, precluding those states from 
having to recognize same-sex marriages sanctioned in other states. Gillespie also 
referenced an often quoted statistic during the election cycle that 2 out of every 3 
Americans do not believe in same-sex marriage. 
There were several factors which should have complicated the analysis of 
Black churches and the 2004 election. Most significant was the fact that, as has 
already been argued, Black churches are far from politically one dimensional. Many 
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Black churches are made up of Black Christians who are simultaneously socially 
conservative and politically liberal. Same-sex marriage is an issue that illuminates 
both of these characteristics and makes it difficult to statistically pin dow the 
opinions of most Black Christians. For example, Lynette Clemetson pointed out in a 
March 2004 New York Times article the fact that “many Blacks opposed to same-sex 
marriage…support equal benefits for gays as a matter of economic justice.”287  Just as 
such beliefs belie the notion that individual Black Christians thought in lock-step, the 
strategies of Gay rights activists and conservative operatives make cler how wide the 
political spectrum of Black churches actually is.  
Reports and research claiming that the same-sex marriage issue had little or no 
impact on turnout for either candidate did not break down their data by race. For 
example, The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force in their report entitled, “Same-
Sex marriage, Civil Unions and the 2004 Presidential Election” held that “same-sex 
marriage did not cost John Kerry the presidential election…and had little net effect on 
the outcome of the election.”288 Out of fourteen categories the only one that mentions 
race is “White Protestant Conservatives.”289 Polling fell victim to the same problem. 
Most of the newspaper reporting on the issue of same-sex marriage was not broken 
down according to race. For example a Washington Post-ABC News poll released on 
February 25, 2004 found that 46 percent of “respondents” favored an amendment 
banning same-sex marriage and 45 percent opposed it. The article went on to say that 
support for the amendment had risen 8 percentage points from a similar poll taken in 
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the previous month with no mention of racial or religious breakdowns in the poll 
either.290 There is some evidence that Black evangelicals were less opposed to  
same-sex marriage than white evangelicals at one point. A 2003 Pew poll found 83% 
of white evangelicals were opposed to same-sex marriage, followed by 64% of Black 
evangelicals.291  
Republicans were celebrated for what was viewed as a deliberate strategy o 
push for ballot measures across the country which could drive more socially 
conservative voters to the polls where they would identify with Bush’s position on the 
issue and pull the lever for him in the process. Conversely, gay rights activists fought
back claims that their fight to seek full marriage rights and benefits, cost the 
Democratic party the election. Although both arguments were rather simplistic, they 
received quite a bit of attention in the mainstream media. Several mainstream 
newspapers, including the New York Times and Washington Post ran stories the day 
after the election and throughout the month of November. This was exacerbated by 
the fact that same-sex marriage had been labeled a wedge issue in the months leading 
up to the election. Even Kerry went so far as to accuse Bush of using same-sex 
marriage as a wedge issue to motivate his religious right supporters and play on their 
fears.  
Both conservatives and gay rights activists were factions that sought the 
support of the Black church in the 2004 election. However, neither group had 
historically had a successful or significant relationship with them in the past. It 
appears that one group was able to successfully form a broad alliance with many in 
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the Black church while the other remained largely marginalized. Same-sex marriage 
advocates sought the support of more liberal leaning churches while their opponents 
cozied up to more conservative Black churches. Both factions used civil rights as the 
connection, the former affirmatively and the latter negatively. Advocates used civil 
rights language and imagery to appeal to more liberal churches. Conservatives 
suggested that such language and imagery was being misused in support of an issue 
that is unworthy of the comparison. When convenient, both factions suggested that 
their support from either socially liberal or conservative churches was evidence that 
“The Black church” as a whole was behind their efforts.292  Meanwhile, the 
Democratic Party’s message was absent. 
According to Ronald Walters in Freedom is Not Enough t e Bush campaign 
succeeded in penetrating historically Democratic counties in battleground states. Even 
in places like Palm Beach County Florida where he didn’t win, African American 
voters and Democratic Party leaders made note of how the Republican Party and 
Bush campaign were making a concerted effort to reach African Americans. While 
one person who Walters mentions specifically referenced the positive impact faith-
based initiatives had on some African Americans in the community who ended up 
voting for him, he also quoted another South Floridian woman who said she admired 
the President because he was a Christian and “not for gay marriage.”293 According to 
the long time African American Democratic Party activists I interviewed for this 
study, this woman expressed a sentiment they heard in African American 
communities and churches as they traveled across the country making appearances on 
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Kerry’s behalf. In retrospect, Herman and Daughtry believed that the Kerry campaign 
and Democratic Party made a grave mistake by not working with supportive Black 
pastors to craft a unified message they could take back to their membership “because 
they were troubled.”294 
In late June of 2006, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr., Rev. Al Sharpton and Rev. 
Joseph Lowery were the most notable ministers in attendance at the National 
Conference and Revival for Social Justice in the Black Church in Dallas, Texas. At 
the conference, both Sharpton and Jackson spoke out against Christian conservatives 
who focused on moral values issues including abortion and “gay-marriage” to the 
exclusion of “larger moral issues such as the war, voting rights, affirmative ac ion nd 
poverty.”295 In front of a captive audience of hundred of Black pastors, they stressed 
the importance of keeping social issues that were disproportionately affecting the 
African American community at the forefront of their message and efforts, 
particularly in the lead up to the midterm 2006 elections. Similar to the views Jackson 
expressed to the author, Sharpton dismissed same-sex marriage as a non-priority for 
Black churches saying, “There are no gay people coming to our churches asking to 
get married, but there are plenty of people coming with problems voting or their sons 
in jail.”296   
The controversy at Pastor Wiley’s church over union ceremonies discussed 
earlier is just one example that contradicts Jackson and Sharpton’s argument, which 
fails to recognize the existence of African American gay and lesbian couples who 
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desire to join their lives in the same meaningful way that African American 
heterosexual couples do. In the future, African American faith, political and thought 
leaders must find a way to stress the primacy of social justice issues without negating 
the importance of same-sex marriage which Jackson and others have described as an 
issue of “equal protection under the law.”297   
 
                                                





“They didn’t have to win us all, they just had to pull off two or three percent, which is 
what they did. It made a difference.”298  
 
“Some years down the road, who knows how many, twenty-five, fifty or so, we’ll look 
back on this issue of same-sex marriage and I believe that there will be a shift, 
there’ll be a change.”299 
 
“President Barack Obama is now Mr. President not Mr. Brother. We will agree with 
him most of the time but there’ll be times when the prophetic voice must speak truth 
to whoever is in power.”300 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
The Republican Party and Bush campaign’s targeting of Black churches in the 
2004 presidential election presented a conundrum for John Kerry and the Democratic 
Party. They were neither used to nor prepared for Republicans competing for votes 
from a crucial segment of their base on the national level. The Bush Administrat on, 
Republican Party and later Bush reelection campaign, formed a powerful trio that 
established and maintained relationships with certain evangelical Black pastors. 
These pastors became an invaluable resource to the Bush campaign and Republican 
Party who used them to energize other Black evangelical pastors and Christians 
around moral values issues, the most significant of which was same-sex marriage.  In 
keeping with Fredrick C. Harris’ theory that religious institutions often “mobilize 
African Americans into the political process,” the religious values of these pastors 
and their congregants motivated them to support President Bush.301 In this instance 
“the nature and context of political action,” which Harris stressed was key to 
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understanding how religion affects African American political engagement, was 
conservative and grounded in what they believed was their Christian duty to limit 
rather than expand the rights of gay people.302  
At the time Harris’ Something Within was published, megachurches and the 
growth of Pentecostal churches were still considered “emerging trends.”303 Harris 
characterized them both as decidedly less civically active and concerned with issues 
of social justice. This supports Rev. Daughtry’s claim that while Pentecostal and 
megachurches were on the rise during the 1990s, the Clinton administration did not 
court them because of their novelty and political ambiguity. By 2001, both segments 
of the Black church had established a formidable presence in urban and rural African
American communities.  Consequently, widespread recognition of their power and 
influence in these communities coincided with Bush’s first term. Recognizing their 
untapped political potential, the Bush administration used the lure of the White House 
and the promise of faith-based funding to bring them into the Republican fold.    
 
The Expansion of the Black Church Tradition: Black Evangelicals and the 2004 
Election 
 
The 2004 election demonstrated the continued power and relevancy of the 
Black church in American politics. It also illuminated the importance of recognizing 
the diversity and complexity of its various denominations, theologies and practices 
along with the rapid growth of nondenominational megachurches and Pentecostal 
churches. Although the vast majority of African Americans protestant Christians 
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remained loyal to the Democratic Party, the evangelical strain of many Bl ck
churches, especially nondenominational megachurches and Pentecostal churches, 
made a significant impact in 2004. Evangelicals were the common denominator of the 
churches and pastors the Bush administration and campaign targeted during the 
election. They tapped into a segment of the Black church tradition that Democrats 
were aware of but dismissed as unimportant because of their past ambivalence to 
politics.  
Conscious of the growing number and influence of megachurches across the 
country, the Republican Party and Bush campaign built relationships with other 
charismatic pastors who in turn, helped portray the President as someone who shared 
their moral values. For many Black evangelical Christians, it was more important to 
support President Bush because of his values than to vote their “personal economic 
interests.”304 His opposition to same-sex marriage meant he was a “believer” like 
them, and could be trusted to steer the country towards salvation. Evangelical pastors 
reinforced this sentiment in pulpits across the country to the dismay of many mai-
line Black pastors who waited in vain for the Democratic Party and nominee to 
respond. 
For African American evangelicals in 2004, moral values equaled opposition 
to same-sex marriage. The same-sex marriage issue gained traction in these Black 
evangelical churches and charismatic megachurches, which reflected a larger trend of 
social conservatism across Black denominations. Their relative new political activism 
and the primacy of moral values in their doctrine and practices was the perfect 
                                                




convergence of factors for the Bush campaign: They fit the profile of the “suspected” 
Republicans the campaign built their strategy around.  
Historically, this select group of African American pastors and churches 
existed on the fringes of the Black church tradition. Many megachurches were 
criticized for their impersonal edifices and for espousing “prosperity gospel” that 
focused on attainment of individual wealth. According to Leah Daughtry and scholar 
Cheryl Townsend Gilkes, independent Pentecostal churches were ostracized because
of their fundamentalist worship services and theology.305 They were also more likely 
to attract poor members. Both charismatic megachurches and Pentecostal churches 
were younger strains of the Black church tradition and were typically defined by how 
they differed from mainline congregations. For at least some megachurches and 
Pentecostal churches, the Bush administration and campaign embraced them for the 
very reasons they were often criticized.  
Many of the pastors in mainline denominations had developed a level of 
political sophistication through their interaction with local, state and national 
politicians. They understood the spoken and unspoken desires and expectations of 
elected officials who courted their support. In short, they knew their value and had 
become pretty adept at navigating the political terrain. Leah Daughtry and Davi D. 
Daniels, III argue that in contrast, the vast majority of Pentecostal churches and 
pastors lagged far behind and while “Black Baptist and Methodist leaders debated 
political strategies for social change…many Black Holiness and Pentecostal leaders 
                                                




were debating the appropriateness of clergy entering the political aren t all.”306 
Consequently, those who did enter the political terrain during Bush’s first term we 
both unfamiliar with the environment and enraptured by the access they had to the 
president and White House.  
This proved to be a dangerous combination because their political naiveté 
prevented them from demanding a more balanced relationship with the administration 
where there would be some reciprocity. These Pentecostal and megachurch pastors 
did not understand the importance of applying pressure and holding the President and 
his administration accountable for their faith-based promises. Intoxicated by the 
access they gained to the White House, they were too afraid of losing that access to 
realize that they were worth much more to the President than he was to them. Their 
support buoyed his image and lent a great deal of moral authority to his faith-based 
initiative efforts while the access the President gave them—with the exception of a 
few pastors who actually received faith-based initiative funding—amounted to mpty 
bragging rights that they had been to the White House or had met the Commander in 
Chief. This contributed to the perception following the 2004 presidential election that 
many of these Pentecostal and megachurch pastors who had both supported President 
Bush’s faith-based initiatives and spoke out vehemently against same-sex marriage 
during the campaign had been manipulated and had no comprehensive legislation, 
funding or programs to show for it.  
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Meanwhile, mainline pastors who had enjoyed access to the White House during the 
Clinton administration were shut out and becoming increasingly frustrated with John 
Kerry who did not seem to appreciate their political value. 
The Republicans engaged traditionally apolitical Black megachurches and 
independent Pentecostal churches around moral values. Thus, strains of the Black 
church tradition that had previously eschewed politics, found themselves immersed in 
a presidential campaign. Future studies should interrogate the relationship between 
21st Century mega and Pentecostal churches and politics. Consequently, more 
quantitative and qualitative studies of Black megachurches, denominations and 
evangelicals are needed. Future studies should also complicate the term “evangelical” 
and investigate why many Black Christians subscribe to evangelical theology and 
practices but reject the label.  
 
The 2004 Bush Reelection Campaign 
 
Plagued by an increasingly unpopular war and a troubled economy, the Bush 
team ran an intense and focused campaign. The Bush campaign stayed on the 
offensive which kept the Kerry campaign in a defensive stance for most of the general 
election cycle. Under the direction of Karl Rove and Ken Mehlman, the Bush 
campaign stayed focused on their strategy to target right leaning voters and 
“suspected Republicans.” President Bush proved to be a strong candidate who was 
able to convey a consistent message that the American people would be safer with 




issues.307 President Bush was also good on the campaign trail and he thrived in 
informal settings where he connected with voters around “gut values.” He conveyed a 
sense of authenticity and confidence the latter of which was crucial to his efforts to 
convince the American people that he could win the war in Iraq.  
The Republicans did not try gain the support of all African Americans, most 
of whom were loyal to the Democratic Party. They focused their efforts on 
evangelical Black Christians who filled Pentecostal churches and megachurches on 
Sunday mornings and were more neutral politically and socially conservativ . The 
Republicans began implementing their strategy as soon as Bush was elected in 2001. 
Furthermore, the Bush Administration used the charm of the White House and 
promise of faith-based initiatives funding to elicit the support of Black pastors 
throughout Bush’s first term.  
The seductive power of access to the White House cannot be underestimated 
and as the incumbent, Bush was able to capitalize on that power by meeting with 
Black pastors in the White House and inviting them to events. Essentially, the Bush 
administration replicated the Clinton administration’s outreach efforts, except they 
allowed access to a much more select group of evangelical and megachurch pastors 
including T.D. Jakes, Bishop Eddie Long and Rev. Creflo Dollar. That access to the 
President translated into their loyalty and support during the election.  
John Kerry was a weaker campaigner and proved, as Al Gore had four years 
before, that having a stronger command of the issues was not enough to sway voters 
who felt a personal connection with President Bush. As a result, Kerry struggled to 
find his footing with African Americans. Unfortunately, the Kerry campaign’s 
                                                




outreach to African Americans in general and Black churches in particular, did not 
begin until the fall of 2004. Nevertheless, he received 88% of the Black vote. 
Democratic Party veterans including Leah Daughtry and Donna Brazile believed, 
given the economic climate and Iraq war, that the percentage should have been 
higher. Brazile openly criticized the Democratic Party’s African American outreach 
strategy and warned that a failure to overhaul it could be disastrous in future 
elections.  
Future studies and analyses of presidential elections must include more 
detailed information about African Americans in general and African American 
Christians in particular. Such studies, which should address class and educational 
levels, are critical to understanding the evolving role of African Americans in 
presidential politics. 
 
Faith-Based Initiatives: Underfunded Programs and Unfulfilled Potential 
 
Bush broke new ground by creating an Office of Faith Based and Community 
Initiatives and placing it in the White House. He showed his commitment to faith-
based initiatives by creating offices in multiple agencies through executiv  orders. 
The controversy over details of the initiatives including implementation, evangelism 
and funding, plagued the initiative for much of Bush’s first term. However, the 
insularity of the White House, combined with the fact that some churches did receive 
funding through the Compassion Capital fund, kept the initiative from becoming a 




By his second term, information began to surface about two unfortunate 
elements of the initiative. First, the White House was accused of using its Office of 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives for political purposes. Critics cited the 
number of churches that received funding whose pastor’s were public supporters of 
the president.308 The location and timing of faith-based initiative grant workshops 
scheduled in the lead up to the 2002 and 2004 elections were also questioned. Second, 
critics of the initiative, advocacy groups and former staffers including David Kuo, 
accused the administration of misleading the public about the amount of funding that 
was actually available for dissemination to churches applying for grants.  
While some Black churches did receive federal funding through faith-based 
initiatives, the White House was never able to clarify how much of that funding was 
new versus reallocated from existing programs. The Bush administration used the 
promise of faith-based initiative funding to seal their appeal with conservative 
Christians and gain the loyalty and support of Black pastors and churches during the 
2004 election. But President Bush failed to fulfill his promise to help support pastors 
and churches across the country that were providing vital services to their 
communities. Consequently, by the end of his second term, it appeared that the White 
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives would be a dubious rather 
than celebrated part of his presidential legacy. 
 
Same-Sex Marriage: A Moral Values and Civil Rights Issue 
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President Bush announced his support of a constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage at the beginning of 2004, making his position on the issue clear. 
The Bush campaign then used the issue to garner support in the African American 
community. They went after what they viewed as the most logical target: socially 
conservative Black evangelical Christians. As the campaign progressed and ministers 
continued to voice their opposition publicly, the media and Democratic activists 
began to question whether they represented a significant segment of the Black church 
community.  
In 2004, ministers spoke out publicly against same-sex marriage in states 
including Massachusetts, Texas, Ohio and California. The intensity with which they 
voiced their opinions on the subject contributed to increased national visibility around 
the issue. The lack of a coordinated response from Black ministers aligned with the 
Kerry campaign and DNC contributed to the public perception—and in some cases 
reality—that the same-sex marriage issue was motivating African Americans to 
support President Bush. For many Black evangelicals, same-sex marriage eclips d 
other issues which disproportionately impacted their lives including the economy, 
healthcare, public education and the criminal justice system. 
While conservative views about homosexuality cut across denominations, this 
study also discussed inclusive Black churches that welcome gay members along with 
gay-led churches. The existence of these churches, along with the demonstrated 
diversity of Black churches in general, suggest that the pastors who spoke out against 
same-sex marriage were not representative all Black pastors. To that end, future 




that exist within the Black church tradition. To date, most studies have either focused 
on mainline churches or evangelical churches. Because same-sex marriage will likely 
remain a significant political issue in the future, comprehensive studies that collec
data from a large cross section of Black churches are needed.  
 
The Challenge of Political Forecasting  
 
The 2% increase in African American votes Bush received between 2000 and 
2004 was far from insignificant. What seemed like a small percentage belied the 
significant increases in African American votes he received in states including Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Florida where support went from single to double digits.309 
Anecdotal information and interviews with people who were active during the 2004 
campaign also provided insight into what was happening “on the ground” and in 
Black churches across the country. All of the above helped illuminate the fact that the 
Black church neither won the election for Bush nor lost the election for Kerry. What 
emerged as a more important dynamic was how the Bush campaign energized a 
particular segment of the Black church tradition and how their participation made a 
significant impact on both campaigns. It was this disruption of past political trends 
and strategies that made the 2004 election so intriguing. 
It is clear that the Bush team ran a more effective campaign based on a risky 
and innovative strategy. However, the extent to which independent variables 
impacted the outcome of both campaigns, must be considered. For example, had the 
Massachusetts supreme court ruled on same-sex marriage at the beginning of 2005 
                                                




instead of the end of 2003, is it possible that the issue would not have been as salient 
during the election cycle? What if Hurricane Katrina had occurred in 2004 instead of 
2005? Would the administration’s woefully slow response to the disaster have cost 
Bush the election? We will never know the answers to these questions, but posing 
them may help to prevent the tendency to heap absolute praise or blame on campaign 
efforts post election.  
When I began my research for this study, I speculated that the Republican 
Party would build on the momentum they gained with African Americans during the 
2004 election cycle. They had an opportunity during Bush’s second term to set the 
stage for the 2008 election by continuing their outreach to Black evangelicals and 
courting other segments of the African American population that exit polling data 
indicated might be supportive of certain Republican tenets. Once the 2008 election 
cycle officially began in mid 2007, I watched to see how they would activate their 
African American “coalitions.” As the campaign season progressed and the field of 
candidates narrowed on both sides, it became apparent, based on the absence of the 
kind of public discussions about diversifying the party that were occurring in 2004, 
that my initial theory was wrong.  
Perhaps the Republican Party conceded defeat when Hillary Clinton, who had 
substantial support in the African American community and Barack Obama, who had 
a long shot at making history as the first African American Democratic presidential 
nominee, emerged as the front runners. They may have believed the Bush 
administration’s abysmal response to Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath did too much 




commitment to diversify the party, left with him in 2006. As with most institutions, 
when innovative ideas are not institutionalized they exist only as long as the leaders 
who support them are present.  
It took four years for the Bush administration and Republican Party to develop 
and implement a solid—albeit narrow—African American outreach effort. It will 
certainly take the Republican Party much longer to build consensus among its base 
around the importance of committing resources to diversity and making ideological 
room for African Americans. While former Maryland Lieutenant Governor Michael 
Steele’s recent election as the first African American chairman of the Republican 
National Committee is a symbolic step in that direction, the challenging and 
invariably uncomfortable work remains.310  
 
The Impact of Barack Obama’s Candidacy on This Study 
 
The 2008 presidential election shifted the American political landscape. The 
Democratic Party’s nomination of Barack H. Obama coupled with his victory on 
election day changed the course of American politics forever. 
 
Obama’s Faith & Black Church Outreach 
 
                                                
310 “Michael Steele Elected RNC Chairman,” USA Today, January 30, 2009. Within weeks of his 
election Steele, who has been known to make off-the-cuff comments stated that he planned to preserve 
the party’s “conservative principles” but wanted to use them to attract people of color and younger 
voters in urban-suburban hip-hop settings.” His remarks resulted in criticism from Republican activists 





An active member of Chicago’s Trinity Church of Christ, presidential 
candidate Barack Obama spoke openly about his religious awakening, inspired by the 
sermons of his then pastor Jeremiah Wright, in his memoir The Audacity of Hope: 
Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream.311 Unlike his predecessor and 
colleague Senator John Kerry, candidate Obama was both comfortable talking about 
his “faith” and successful in conveying that faith to the public. Similar to 2004, in 
2008 “moderate evangelical” voters were considered reachable by both the 
Democratic and Republican Parties and the Obama campaign went after them 
aggressively.312 John Broder of The New York Times outlined their evangelical 
outreach strategy in July of 2008: 
Between now and November, the Obama forces are planning as many as 
1,000 house parties and dozens of Christian rock concerts, gatherings of 
religious leaders, campus visits and telephone conference calls to bring 
together voters of all ages motivated by their faith to engage in politics. It s 
the most intensive effort yet by a Democratic candidate to reach out to self-
identified evangelical or born-again Christians and to try to pry themaway 
from their historical attachment to the Republican Party.313  
 
As early as July of 2007 a Time magazine poll found voters believed that 
of all the presidential candidates Obama was a “strongly religious person” second 
only to former Governor Mitt Romney.314 The ease with which he discussed his 
faith also appealed to progressive white Christians like Barbara Brandt who voiced 
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excitement over Obama’s candidacy when she said, “It’s time we stand up to the 
conservatives. We’re just as Christian as they are.”315  
The Obama campaign reached out early to Black churches of all 
denominations and sizes under the direction of Joshua DuBois, the director of 
religious affairs and former associate pastor of a Pentecostal church in 
Massachusetts.316 The fact that the campaign had someone with direct ties to the 
Pentecostal church running religious affairs, speaks to how important evangelicals 
were to the Obama campaign’s outreach efforts. This was confirmed by Pastor 
Carter who recalled the Obama campaign reaching out to him in the spring of 
2007, just a few months after he announced he was running for President. As a 
result of his early and consistent outreach, Obama enjoyed widespread support 
from Black churches and pastors across denominations.  
However, there were some Black pastors who expressed frustration over 
what they believed was the unfortunate trend of African Americans supporting 
Obama because of his race rather than his beliefs about abortion and the 
“homosexual agenda.”317 In July of 2008 five pastors of conservative Pentecostal 
churches and megachurches voiced their concerns that Black Christians were “so 
excited to see someone who looks like them even though they are not getting 
someone who believes like them” in the Washington Times. 318 They were quick to 
add that Republican nominee John McCain’s “lack of spiritual input” made it 
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difficult for them to tell their congregants that he was “the right guy.”319 However, 
the Obama team did such a thorough job in both reaching out to pastors early and 
conveying the message that their candidate was a man of faith, that Black pastors
who opposed him did not receive much media attention.  
Over the course of his twenty-one month campaign, Obama proved to be a 
formidable candidate. Validating Sosnik, Dowd and Fournier’s Applebee’s 
America theory that effective candidates convey a sense of authenticity and 
confidence, Obama used his personal history to connect with voters and 
unflappable countenance in debates and town hall meetings to convey a sense of 
steadiness under pressure. Like Bush, he was a “natural campaigner” who 
appeared at ease in rural and urban settings alike. The campaign used the fact that 
he was a husband and father of two young daughters to portray him as a “regular” 
American. Unlike Bush, Obama had a solid command of both foreign and 
domestic party issues which helped compensate for his relative youth and 
inexperience compared to his primary and general election opponents. 
The Obama campaign also succeeded in making current and potential 
supporters feel like they were a part of a community, another element Sosnik, 
Dowd and Fournier argue is crucial to winning campaigns. They did this by using 
the internet and web-based social networking sites like Facebook to organize 
supporters and volunteers around issues and events. The campaign stayed in 
constant contact with anyone who signed up on their website, sending daily 
updates and occasional video messages from candidate. Supporters could log on to 
the campaign website to see pictures and footage of rallies Obama attended which 





made them feel like they were a part of this “movement for change.” Of particul  
significance is how well the Obama campaign used the internet to raise money, 
much of which consisted of contributions under $200.320 The campaign made it a 
point to advertise that fact, ensuring that its “community” of supporters felt like 
they, not big donors, were responsible for Obama’s momentum.321 The Obama 
campaign raised an unprecedented $745 million over the course of the election 
cycle which allowed them to implement a fifty state versus battleground state 
strategy. They spent almost double the amount of money that McCain spent on 
ads.322 Obama’s victory could not be attributed solely to his fundraising strategy or 
outreach strategy. Here, Ira Teinowitz, writing for the Advertising Age following 
the election explained it well: 
The key was not just having the right advertising, correct strategic 
decisions, a precedent-breaking get-out-the-vote effort or an 
amazing ability to raise funds. It was the mastery of coordinating 




Interestingly, during his campaign, candidate Obama pledged to retool 
faith-based initiatives. During his transition, President-elect Obama created an 
advisory committee “involving people with differing perspectives on the most 
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contentious issues” including hiring practices and proselytizing.324 It remains to be 
seen whether a new and improved version of President Bush’s initiative will 
emerge, but  Obama’s pledge to improve rather than eliminate the program has 
already received both praise and criticism. 
 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Same-sex marriage was much less of a factor in the 2008 election. This 
was due primarily to a focus throughout the campaign on soaring unemployment 
rates, an unstable economy and the costly war in Iraq, all of which had worsened 
significantly since 2004. However, throughout the election year, a battle was 
waging in California over the same-sex marriage ballot measure Propositin 8. 
The measure, which was included on the ballot using the language “only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” passed with 
52% voting yes and 48% voting no.325 Gay rights activists and opponents of the 
measure were “crushed” and attempted to make sense of the numbers following 
the election.  
Among the explanations they offered, was the high turnout of African 
Americans who showed up to vote for Barack Obama but simultaneously voted in 
favor of Proposition 8. Exit polls showed that well over 50% of African 
Americans who turned out voted yes. Because they accounted for 10% of all 
voters in California on election day, some same-sex marriage activists argued that 
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overwhelming African American support of the measure tipped the balance. As 
with same-sex marriage in 2004, there was a clear correlation between African-
American support for Proposition 8 and their religious beliefs.  
In their post-election coverage mainstream newspapers including The San 
Francisco Gate and Los Angeles Times focused on multiple African Americans 
like Denise Fernandez who said “I came out because of my religious beliefs…I 
believe a Christian is held accountable, and we have to make a difference.”326 
Therefore, much of the coverage fueled the notion that African Americans were 
responsible for the passage of Proposition 8, in spite of polling data indicating that 
age had an even more significant impact.327  
Although same-sex marriage was not as prominent on the national stage in 
2008 as it was in 2004, Proposition 8 was a clear indication that it will remain a 
controversial and divisive political issue. It could also prove to be a challenge for 
President Obama in the future if Pastor Carter’s sentiments are consistent w th 
other Black pastors who supported him but take issue with his support of gay 
rights: 
I believe God loves everyone, but I still believe that sin is sin, 
regardless of where we are and I think we have to be very careful, I 
think President Obama has to be very careful in how he deals with this. 
A lot of people have said that he may be the greatest advocate for gay, 
lesbian and bisexual issues than anyone else has been. And that may 
be the case, but from a pastoral perspective, I have to continually try to 
hold to my biblical values about that.328  
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Post Election, Post-Racial? 
Obama led a well organized campaign that started early and finished 
strong. On election day, November 4, 2008, he won 365 electoral votes and 53% 
of the popular vote. It was the first time a Democratic presidential candidate had 
won over 51% of the vote since Lyndon Johnson won 61% of the vote in 1964.  
In the lead up to election-day and in post election coverage Obama’s 
candidacy was discussed in the context of what some were calling a “post racial” 
America.329 Journalists and pundits asked if his nomination and subsequent victory 
meant the country had moved past its obsession with race and legacy of racial 
oppression. The debate continued, in spite of the historic speech he gave on race 
during the height of his primary race against Hillary Clinton in which he offered 
that he had “never been so naïve as to believe that we can get beyond our racial 
divisions in a single election cycle.”330  
Future studies of Obama’s campaign must push past the temptation to 
reduce an examination of his candidacy to such a problematic and simplistic 
concept. In the months and years that follow it will be interesting to see how 
President Obama is critiqued and how his presidency is examined by scholars. It 
will also be intriguing to observe whether social justice progressives hold him 
accountable for inaction around issues of importance to them. Rev. Jackson’s 
argument that the “prophetic voice” must “speak truth to whoever is in power,” 
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suggests that Obama will be challenged to uphold the progressive positions he 
espoused during the campaign.331 
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